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Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Arthur F. Stevens, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the business manager of the quarterly, RELIGION IN LIFE, and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, to wit:

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The Need and the Possibility of an Ecumenical Theology

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

OPENING PRAYER

Almighty God, who alone canst order the unruly wills and affections of sinful men, grant unto us, students in the school of Jesus Christ, that we may love the things Thou commandest and desire that which Thou dost promise, that so, among the sundry and manifold changes of the world, our hearts may surely there be fixed where true joys are to be found.

Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

BY the ecumenical movement we mean the movement which tries to bring to expression the unity which is implicit in the different forms of historic Christianity and to furnish them with an organization through which, in spite of their differences, Christians can work and worship together.

There are many different forms of this movement, but the most important are those which deal with the evangelistic work of the Church (as represented by the International Missionary Council), with the social service of the Church (as represented by the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work), and with the faith and order of the Church (as represented by the Continuation Committee of the World Conference on Faith and Order).

Underlying all these different forms of the ecumenical movement there is a basic assumption, namely, that there is a unity among Christians which exists across the outward divisions of ecclesiastical organization, across the intellectual differences of creed, across the emotional differences of different types of religious experience, and that it is the business of Christians to discover and to express this existing unity.

In its present form the ecumenical movement is comparatively recent. Most of its major expressions fall within our own generation. But the movement has historic antecedents that go back very far.¹ Of this longer preparation it is sufficient to say that it has three main forms:

¹ A convenient historical survey of these antecedents may be found in the book, *Christian Unity: Its Principles and Possibilities*, pp. 207-323 (New York, 1921).

(1) the attempt to bring about the reunion of the Eastern and Western Churches; (2) the attempt to bring about the reunion of Roman Catholics and Protestants; (3) the attempt to unite the separated Protestant bodies.

Coming closer to our own time, we find that the movement for Christian unity in the United States has taken two main forms: the movement for federation and that for organic or corporate union. To begin with federation, we have in the local field the formation of federations of churches, and in smaller communities of community churches. Next we see the administrative agencies of the different denominations uniting in organizations like the Home Missions Council, the Foreign Missions Conference, and the International Council for Religious Education. Finally we have the formation of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, which brings together more than twenty of the larger denominations for purposes defined in its charter as follows:

“To express the fellowship and catholic unity of the Christian Church.

“To bring the Christian bodies of America into united service for Christ and the world.

“To encourage devotional fellowship and mutual counsel concerning the spiritual life and religious activities of the churches.

“To secure a larger combined influence for the churches of Christ in all matters affecting the moral and social condition of the people, so as to promote the application of the law of Christ in every relation of human life.

“To assist in the organization of local branches of the Federal Council to promote its aims in their communities.”

Apart from these various forms of federation, there has also been going on in the United States a movement for organic, or, as it is more accurately described, for corporate union—that is to say, the actual reduction of the number of independent and autonomous churches. No less than ten different unions of this kind have taken place in the United States within the last twenty-five years. Together they affect more than eight million Christians.²

Far as we are from our goal, the last quarter of a century has witnessed notable progress. At the beginning of that quarter each denomination or Board—more than this, each local church—did what was right in its own eyes, with little or no sense of responsibility to others. Today we may still be divided, but we are unhappy about our division, and

² An account of these unions is found in the informing book of Dr. H. Paul Douglass, *Church Unity Movements in the United States* (New York, 1934). Cf. also Slosser, Gaius Jackson, *Christian Unity* (New York, 1929).

some significant steps have been taken in the direction of unity. When I became Chairman of the Home Missions Committee of the Presbytery of New York, for example, there were in the city four independent missions to Italians carried on by Presbyterians alone. There is in New York City today a single Church Extension Committee in which are united all the missionary activities of the Presbytery. And similar conditions obtain in other churches. Moreover, the different denominations have united in a City Missions Council, which forms the Comity Committee of the New York Federation of Churches. We may not have done much. At least we are beginning to see clearly what we ought to do.

Parallel to what has been going on in the United States, we note a similar movement on the world stage. This again takes the two forms of a movement for organic union and one for practical co-operation and conference on the basis of our present organizations. Apart from its achievements in particular countries, such as the creation of the United Church of Canada, which brings together in a single church the Congregationalists, the Presbyterians, and the Methodists, the union of the United Free Church and the Established Church of Scotland in the Church of Scotland, the union of the three Methodist bodies of Great Britain in one United Methodist Church, and the various movements for a united church on the foreign field, the movement for unity has found expression in three truly ecumenical organizations which bring together all the larger churches of the world except the Church of Rome. The first is the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, which continues the work of the Stockholm Conference of 1925. The second is the Continuation Committee of Faith and Order, which continues the work of the Lausanne Conference of 1927. The third is the International Missionary Council, which continues the work of the Jerusalem Conference of 1928.

The Stockholm Conference owed its origin to the conditions which the churches faced after the World War. In 1914 a little group of Christians met at Constance, in Germany, and formed the World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches.

Those who were at Constance still tell of the amusement of the German officers who had been detailed to convey them to the frontier when they learned of the purpose for which these well-meaning persons had come. But today there is not so much disposition to laugh at what

happened at Constance. From that modest beginning, under the leadership of that great soul, Archbishop Nathan Söderblom, came the movement which brought together at Stockholm in 1925, at the invitation of the King of Sweden, the World Conference on Life and Work. The thing that interests us most today about those who planned the Stockholm Conference is that they ruled theology out. They assumed that it would be possible for the churches to unite in life and work while they ignored their differences of faith and order. In their plans for the Conference, commissions were appointed to deal with the various topics to be considered—social justice, world peace, education, and the like. But the first subject on the program, "God's Purpose for the World," seemed too full of dynamite for general discussion. So four eminent men, each representing a different branch of the Church, were chosen to tell what they thought was God's purpose for the world. And having given them respectful attention, the Conference passed to other matters.

None the less, the Stockholm Conference was a notable milestone on the road to Christian unity. It brought together for the first time since the war representatives of the Christian churches whose nationals had been fighting on opposite sides. They met as members of the one Church of Christ to take counsel together how they might repair the damage which the war had wrought.

I remember well a conversation I had with one of the most sturdy of the old German irreconcilables. As we were parting he said to me: "Professor Brown, I came to this Conference with a heavy heart. I did not believe that any good could come of it. I could not see how any one could believe the things that many of you Americans believe about my country and at the same time be a Christian. It is as hard for me now to understand this as it was then. Nevertheless, I cannot deny the fact."

Some of our devices for getting together, to be sure, were rather naïve. I recall how we overcame the opposition of one old Lutheran bishop, who was the most convinced opponent of the Social Gospel in the Conference. He did not believe that it was God's will that the kingdom of God should be realized on earth. We said to him: "But, Bishop, do you not agree that it is our duty to work to bring about the kind of social life which God would approve?" "Yes," he said, "but we shall not succeed." So we agreed on the statement that it was the Church's

duty to work for a just social order on earth, the bishop being left free to retain his conviction that it was God's will that we should fail.

When the Conference adjourned it appointed a Continuation Committee, which in 1929 developed into what we now know as the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work. This Council has become in a very real sense a clearing-house for the social service work of the churches on an international scale. Through its office at Geneva it has been the spokesman of the churches in their work for disarmament and world peace; the body through which they carry on their fight against the opium traffic, the white-slave traffic, and similar evils; and the instrument through which they engage in research in the different fields which are of interest to the Church as a whole.

The Conference on Faith and Order owed its origin to the fact that the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, dealing as it did exclusively with foreign missionary interests, did not feel free to consider questions of faith and order. Hence the suggestion, first made by the American Episcopal Church in 1910, that a special Conference be held for this purpose. That Conference met at Lausanne in 1927. The progress in mutual understanding made in the two years which had intervened since Stockholm was notable. At Stockholm we did not feel free to discuss God's purpose for the world. At Lausanne we not only discussed it, but we adopted, by a unanimous vote, a statement drafted by Doctor Deissmann, the eminent German New Testament scholar, on "The Church's Mission to the World." This was a very remarkable document. More than this, it was an historic document, for it formed the basis for the fuller statement adopted by the Conference of Jerusalem in the following year as the common platform of the foreign missionary enterprise. It happened that when the question on the adoption of the statement was put to the vote I was standing by Doctor Zwemer, the veteran missionary to the Moslems. Turning to me with tears in his eyes, he said: "That I should have lived to see the day when Doctor Deissmann and I could agree on a statement like that."

One of the things in which we registered most progress at Lausanne was the fact that in our discussion of such controverted subjects as the nature of the Church, the ministry, and the sacraments, we made no attempt to cover up our differences. We first put on record the things in which we agreed, and then we set side by side with them the things

in which we differed. And we allowed everybody to state their differences in their own words. I had an illuminating experience of the consequences of this method of procedure. On one of the early days of the Conference, at a meeting of the Commission on the nature of the Church, an Anglo-Catholic moved that we insert in our report a sentence that was offensive to the Evangelicals. Protest was immediately made. As Chairman of the Commission, I ruled that any statement that represented sincere convictions on the part of any member of the Conference should be granted place in the report in whatever form the proposer felt most adequate. The Commission sustained me in this ruling. Next morning the Anglo-Catholic who had moved the insertion begged permission to withdraw it. Give a man the right to do a thing and nine times out of ten he will not want to do it.

The Conferences at Stockholm and at Lausanne were followed in 1928 by the Conference at Jerusalem. This adopted the Lausanne statement on God's purpose for His Church as the basis of its own constructive statement, and outlined various plans for further study and service.

The significant thing about that Jerusalem Conference was the contrast between its membership and programs and that of the Edinburgh Conference of 1910. The Edinburgh Conference was a conference of missionary societies, deciding what they would do for the benefit of the people on the foreign field. The Conference of Jerusalem was a Conference of the representatives of native churches *with* missionaries, to decide what they should do *together* to promote the kingdom of God. I think that fact alone speaks more than any words of mine of the distance the unity movement has traveled during the years that have intervened.

During the ten years or more since the Conferences of Stockholm and of Lausanne the Continuation Committees of these bodies have met from year to year, and there has been a steady growth of confidence among their leaders. There have been two developments of significance to which I will refer only in a single word. One is the increasing conviction that these two movements are really parts of a single movement. This has found expression in the creation of what we have come to call the Consultative Committee, an informal committee of perhaps a dozen representative persons belonging to Life and Work, Faith and Order, the World Alliance, the International Missionary Council, and the World

Student Movement. This Consultative Committee, which has since been regularized by the election of official delegates from each of the co-operating bodies, meets once or twice a year to talk over the Christian program as a whole, so that each movement may have the advice of the others and as far as possible dates and programs may be correlated. It is at present, with the aid of a larger and more representative Committee, making a study of the ecumenical movement which it is hoped may result in definite recommendations for the consideration of the coming Conferences.

Back of this lies a second development, which is even more indicative of the essential unity of the two main branches of the ecumenical movement. This is the change of emphasis which is becoming apparent in each. Faith and Order is becoming progressively more interested in the practical application of its work, Life and Work in the theoretical implications of its practice. This is only what we should expect. It is quite obvious that if we are to make progress in our work for the reunion of the Christian Church it is not enough simply to discuss our differences in the abstract. We know pretty well what they are now. We have got to ask ourselves what we are going to do about them. The Christian Church of the future is not going to spring into existence full grown like Athena from the head of Zeus. There will have to be intermediate steps. Some of us were very anxious that these steps should be discussed at the Lausanne Conference. Many of our friends, on the other hand, were fearful of what might happen if we got so close to practice as that. So all we found we could do then was to get them put on the agenda for the next meeting. But they are there today. And they will be the center of discussion at the forthcoming Conference in Edinburgh in August, 1937. We shall ask not only what is the ultimate goal, but what are the intermediate steps; not only what will happen when church unity is finally achieved, but what we ought to do tomorrow.

On the other hand, those who were leaders in the Life and Work movement, after their first experiment in trying to get on without theology, soon discovered that nothing significant could be accomplished in that way. The fundamental differences amongst those who believe in the social gospel are in the last analysis philosophical differences, growing out of different conceptions of God, of His purpose for man, and of the nature and function of the Christian Church. Until we think our way through these, it is hopeless to try to get together on a practical program. So the program for the next Life and Work Conference, which will be held in Oxford in July,

1937, makes ample provision for the discussion of differences of theory. And the program of the Faith and Order movement, which will be held in Edinburgh in August, 1937, is equally generous in its provision for the discussion of practical questions.

Granted, however, that the ecumenical movement needs theology, it is important that we should be clear at the outset just what theology can contribute to such a movement, and what it cannot. Because if we have wrong expectations, we are going to be disappointed.

Two conceptions of the function of theology have divided the Christian Church almost from the beginning. Those who hold the first view believe that it is the function of the theologian to formulate a set of beliefs concerning God and man, sin and salvation, Christ and His Church, and the like, which he can defend as eternally and unchangeably true not only in their general principles but in their details. These beliefs he must champion against all opponents, guarding the purity of the faith from the contamination of heresy in every form. Those who take the other view of theology believe that the theologian will have fulfilled his function if he can discover beneath the differences which separate Christians those basic convictions which make them in fact one. Such a theologian will not expect to secure complete agreement. He will recognize that when Christians unite in the confession of their common faith, individuals and groups among them will understand this faith differently and will draw different conclusions for practice. But this fact will not discourage him, for he will be convinced that the things in which they agree mean more both for God and man than the things in which they differ. This conviction he will feel it is his life mission to share.

It has been one of the remarkable developments of the last generation that this second conception of the function of theology has won so many converts. I remember when I was leaving Lausanne in 1927, Doctor Hall the distinguished Professor of Systematic Theology of the General Theological Seminary in New York, who was also a member, met me in the lobby of the hotel. He, too, like my German friend at Stockholm, had been terribly afraid when he came that something awful was going to happen. He was deaf, poor man, and couldn't hear what was being said. So every time anybody was speaking he had the dreadful thought that some heresy was being uttered and he couldn't hear what it was. But when I met him, his face was wreathed in smiles. "It was a fine Conference," he said.

"Yes," I said, "Doctor, and it had one entirely original feature." "What was that?" he asked. "It was the first ecumenical Council in history which adjourned without writing its list of anathemas." Doctor Hall assented, and to my surprise seemed to regard this as rather a good thing.

That is an extraordinary change, a change that lays upon us who are teachers (and every minister is a teacher) a heavy responsibility. It raises for us all the question: Is the Christian religion simply a matter of personal preference and liking, one among other religions, any one of which may be equally good for the man who likes it? Or have we in our Christian faith a gospel definite enough to be formulated, dynamic enough to be lived, and so adapted to the needs of the human heart as to bring the healing and peace that the world needs? The question, What contribution can theology make to the ecumenical movement? will depend finally upon the answer you and I are able to give to this underlying question.

Nor is this all. Our situation today differs from the situation of even a dozen years ago, not only because of the change which I have just described, namely, the greater open-mindedness and hospitality to new ideas that we find in all the churches, but also because of the growing conviction among many thoughtful people that the easy-going liberalism of this last generation is not enough. The last ten years have witnessed the rise of two new religions: Communism and Pagan Nationalism. These have no room for half-hearted allegiance. You must be for them one hundred per cent, or you are their enemy.

This new challenge brings to us Protestants an issue whose seriousness many of us have not yet begun to appreciate. It is this. Can we, who believe in freedom, and whose fathers for its sake broke with the Church of their day, achieve a set of convictions at once definite enough and dynamic enough to form the basis of a working and a witnessing Church? There are many (and they are not among the least intelligent of our generation) who answer this question in the negative. More and more we see thoughtful people, in our Protestant churches, and outside, turning to Rome for leadership because in a world so chaotic they see no other hope. And the old Mother, who through all the centuries has been waiting, smiles and says: "My child, I always knew you would come. I did not need to argue with you. Your own heart that cries out for authority has been arguing for me. All I have had to do is to be patient. Sooner or later the winds of God will shake the tree of life and the ripe apples will drop into my lap."

The central question which faces us as Protestants today is whether the Roman way out of our difficulty is the only way. Have we who have accepted the principles of the critical theology, we who call ourselves liberals, if I may use that much maligned word, a gospel that can hold us together, a faith that can express itself in common action? That is the one question that will hold the center of the stage in the Conferences which it is proposed to hold at Oxford and at Edinburgh in 1937. We shall not be able to give our final answer then. That will be a task which will engross us for many a month and year to come. But at least we shall look that question in the face. At least we will have made a beginning.

Three things, it seems to me, must enter into the making of a truly ecumenical theology. (1) It must isolate from the vast and confusing mass of questions which compete for our attention today the few central issues on which all turns. (2) It must distinguish, among the many different varieties of Christian thought and experience that history records, the few that have persisted through the centuries. (3) When it has done this, it must discover among these differing answers to these abiding questions the central convictions which, persisting through all changes of thought and experience, can alone unite Christians in a witnessing and working Church.

It is a difficult task, I grant you, but it is by no means a hopeless one. Let us look at its three parts one by one.

And first of the issues on which clear thinking is needed.

There is the question of the nature of religion. Are we to think of religion merely as a subjective experience of man—something that can be adequately accounted for on humanistic principles? Or does religion bring us into touch with objective reality? Is there a real God with whom we have to do?

There is the question of the nature of revelation. Are we shut up for our knowledge of God to such inferences as we may draw from the evidence of His working which we find in nature and in history, as science reports them to us? Or do we find in history outstanding events and personalities which give us light on the nature of God and the meaning of His word which apart from them is not to be found?

There is the question of the meaning of human life. How shall we conceive God's purpose for man—that difficult subject which Stockholm avoided and Lausanne dared to face? Are we to look forward as the writers of the Apocalyptic literature did, and as our modern Communists still do,

to a happy consummation here on earth, when the ideals of the prophets are to be realized at a definite point of time? Or is all life a training school for something better, a school in which to be sure there may be very real progress, in which we must labor and pray and believe that society can be made over into something better, but always with the recognition that the work will not be finished in our time, that the generations that come after us will face the same old problems and must deal with them for themselves, as we must try to do for our generation.

There is the question of the function of institutions in this complex program of education and discipline which we call human life? Are we to think of institutions, with their accompanying codes of law, as a necessary evil? Is all that we can say of the State, as some of our Lutheran friends would have us say, that it is a power that God has given us to hold in restraint the wild, demonic forces of human nature, which without that restraint would destroy us? Or may the State itself become an instrument of God to help us realize the higher life?

What, in particular, is the function of the Church? Is the Church just a company of independent individuals, coming together on some principle of elective affinity, each finally responsible to God for himself alone? Or are we really in our religion, as everywhere else, so members of one another that without membership in the Christian Church we cannot realize to the full our own religious life? Are these symbols through which historic religion speaks to us—the cross, the altar, the Bible—just devices to hold us together and restrain our wandering tendencies? Or are they a language through which in the providence of God things inexpressible are expressed to the heart as well as to the mind of man?

And, finally, what of Jesus Christ? Shall we see in Him just one man among men, our brother, our friend, our fellow-worker. Or is He really, as Christians in every age have believed, the window through which we look up into the face of that unseen but ever-living God, whom having seen incarnate in the man Jesus we dare to think of as loving, forgiving, patient, long-suffering, Christlike? These are the questions that matter in theology, and it is upon the answer that we shall give that our faith in the possibility of an ecumenical theology will depend.

When we put aside the differences of local or individual character that are relatively unimportant, we are confronted by certain dominant and persistent types that have been present as long as history has lasted

and so far as we can see are likely always to remain. For these we must make a place if we are to achieve a truly ecumenical theology.

One of the most distinguished of contemporary German theologians, Professor Paul Tillich, contrasts American Christianity as he has come to see it with European Christianity. "The Christianity of the average American is theocratic rather than sacramental, democratic rather than authoritarian, more inclined to direct action in social matters than to indirect influence, and disposed to speak and think of the churches rather than of the Church."

I am sure Professor Tillich would agree that in order to make his contrast sharp he has brought together under the common head of European Christianity two types that are sufficiently distinct to need separate treatment, namely, the sacramentarian type, which is represented by different forms of Catholicism, and the Lutheran type, which makes witness to truth the central function of the Church. The Catholic, whether Roman, Orthodox, or Anglican, regards the priesthood as a distinct caste, entrusted by God with powers not granted to the layman, and hence makes much of the organized Church. The Lutheran makes personal faith the article of the standing and falling Church, but identifies faith with unswerving fidelity to a doctrinal system once for all revealed. Hence to the Lutheran questions of organization are relatively unimportant.

With each of the two main streams of Continental Christianity, the opportunistic practical type of Christianity which is congenial to the American temperament has something in common. Most American Protestants agree with Christians of the Catholic type as to the importance of organization, though the reason which each gives is different. The Catholic believes in the Church because it is the medium through which sacramental grace is transmitted, the American Protestant because it is the necessary condition of effective service. With the Lutherans, the American Protestant agrees as to the basic importance of personal faith, though he thinks of faith in terms of personal experience rather than of fidelity to a doctrinal creed. It is with these three types, not forgetting the extreme individualism of the Friends and related bodies, that any theology that would be truly ecumenical must have to do.

I shall not be expected within the compass of this article to suggest the main lines of the ecumenical theology of the future. It will be enough to suggest, as a point of departure, one part of the common

heritage of Christians which gives us ground for hope. I refer to the historic figure which is the common possession, and at the same time the common judge, of every branch of the Church. If I am asked what makes a man a Christian, how to distinguish him from anybody else, I do not know any other answer than to say that he is a man who in some true sense makes Jesus Christ normative. One may say: "A Christian is a disciple of Jesus Christ." One may say: "A Christian is one who trusts and follows Jesus Christ." One may say: "A Christian is one who worships Jesus Christ." One may say: "A Christian is one who sees God incarnate in Jesus Christ." To his fellow Christians one or all of these answers may seem inadequate; at least they furnish a point of contact for further thought and exchange of experience. But if one fail to give the central place to this historic figure, it will follow almost inevitably that the divisive influence of the contrasted types of religious faith and experience which we have distinguished will sooner or later make itself felt and we will in the end be obliged to deny the possibility of an ecumenical theology. If, on the other hand, we believe that we have in that dynamic figure, that creative character, something eternally precious and enduring, something therefore in which we may find our bond of union with men in all the churches—Roman, Orthodox, Anglo-Catholic, Liberal, Evangelical; if we find in Christ, as so many have found in every age, something that introduces into our life a distinctive quality and feeling, something that we cannot completely put into words because none of the most precious things can be put completely into words, something for which therefore we need some symbol like the cross, like the altar, like the crucifix, like those great hymns—"Jesus, the very thought of Thee with sweetness fills the breast"—then we may believe in the possibility of an ecumenical theology. Then we may hope that with patience and good will it will be possible by a sympathetic study of the experience of the disciples of Jesus Christ through all the ages to find the things that really do bind us together. And when we have found them we will have the basis for a Church that will outlast the changes of the years and hold its own against every challenging rival.

The Demonic Influence of National Sovereignty

THE RT. HON. THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN, ENGLAND

I

FEW people seem to realize the prodigious effects which national sovereignty has both in producing war and in making impossible fidelity to the moral law or to Christian principles both in international, and in increasing spheres of national life. It is no exaggeration to say that unless it can be overcome, civilization will disappear—as prophesied in Mr. H. G. Wells' book, *The Shape of Things to Come*. It is a commonplace that without "law and order" no organized civilized life for individuals can exist. Man becomes preoccupied with the defence of himself, his family, his home and his food supply. Organized co-operative life is impossible. And the might of the club or the gun overrules justice and makes liberty impossible. It is exactly the same on the larger stage of the world as a whole. Anarchy forces nations to think first and last about themselves, about their own security, exalts might above right, makes chronic war practically inevitable and so destroys the possibility of a civilized and Christian society among men.

There never has been a time when war was not constant on the earth, save when great empires like the Roman or the Chinese or Mogul Empire established law and order over great areas and vast numbers of the human race. But despotic empires of this kind contained within themselves the seed of their own decay, because they atrophied the independence, the initiative and the public spirit of their citizens by substituting blind obedience to authority. But shrinkage in time and space through the discoveries of modern science have made the demonic and destructive power of anarchy infinitely more savage and powerful than ever before, and the urgency of overcoming them correspondingly great.

II

People often accuse nationalism of being the cause of war. That is not the case. Nationalism has been fundamentally a healthy movement.

It has encouraged self-respect, the desire for freedom from external oppression, and has stimulated unity and public spirit as against individual selfishness and parochial narrowness. It is not easy to define the basis of national feeling. It is a compound of race, language, culture, religion and geography. It is a sense of brotherhood and community. It is a recognition of the fact that while civilization is becoming one in the sense that the whole world is adopting the same modes of daily living and is becoming interested in the same things, it is vital that there should be variety and individuality within it. Nationalism only becomes an evil force when it is identified with the sovereign State and therefore, as we shall see, becomes subject to all the baleful pressures to selfishness, arrogance, imperialism, fear, suspicion, hatred and war which anarchy impinges upon it.

III

Others accuse capitalism of being the cause of war. This is not the place to discuss the rival merits of the individualist and the Socialist ideals. One of the main tasks of this century is clearly to discover some working synthesis between the two. But it is profoundly untrue to regard capitalism as a cause of war or Socialism as a remedy for it. Capitalism does not produce war inside the State, nor would it produce war inside a world State. Capitalism, indeed, is an international force. Business men have few racial or national prejudices when it comes to matters of business. Left to itself the capitalist system would rapidly link the whole world in a single economic structure. As in the case of nationalism it is the effect of the anarchy of national sovereignties which causes the trouble. On the one hand it produces economic nationalism, with its constant dislocation of international economic life by tariff, embargoes, quotas, subsidies and prohibitions, and on the other hand it induces business men to try to capitalize patriotism for their own ends and capture or influence the machinery of the sovereign State to secure privileges, concessions or the imperialist control of other countries.

These evils would not disappear, though they would change their form, if all nations were to become Socialist States tomorrow. The anarchy of national sovereignty would still produce its fatal effects. Few of them would be self-supporting. Those that were, would be peaceful, as the countries with the largest territories are peaceful today. But the prosperity, employment and rising standard of the rest would depend upon

their being able to exchange their own surplus products for those of their neighbors.

The task of negotiating agreements between seventy sovereign States so that the imports and exports of each would fit in with the needs of all the rest, especially when one considers that such agreements would necessarily involve changes in occupation and dwelling of millions of families, would be extremely difficult. It might well produce as much, or more, tension and risk of war, than the difficulty of international adjustment of capitalism interfered with by the sovereign State.

The truth is that it is the sovereign State, and neither capitalism nor Communism, which is the principal root of the modern drift toward war, and we are far more likely to arrive at a rational approach to the Socialist-individualist controversy when we realize the prodigious effect upon it of international anarchy.

IV

Yet the State, in itself, is a wholly beneficent, indeed an entirely indispensable, institution. Its primary function is to establish and maintain peace—or as it is sometimes called, law and order. Peace, in the political sense of the word, is a positive thing. It is that organic form of society in which political, economic and social issues are settled by the enactment of law, applied and interpreted by the Courts, and in which resort to violence or war as a means of settling disputes is prohibited and prevented. Peace, in this sense, does not just happen. It is the creation of a specific political institution. That institution is the State. The State is *the* instrument which enables human beings to end war and begin to lead a civilized life. Never from the beginning of recorded history nor on any part of the earth's surface has there been peace except within a State. The State may be a primitive tribal rulership in Africa or a vast system of republics integrated by the Communist party, like Soviet Russia. It may be an advanced democratic republic like the United States, a totalitarian dictatorship, like National Socialist Germany, or a placid constitutional monarchy like Sweden. It may be a brutal tyranny or a benevolent republic. It may be managed in the interest of the ruler, or an aristocratic caste, or the bourgeoisie, or the proletariat, or of all the people voting at parliamentary elections. But in every case peace, and what flows from peace, the possibility of justice, freedom, the increasing welfare of

the people and the opportunity to help other peoples, only appear when the State appears. Until the State appears there is only anarchy and violence and private or public war. And no other institution has ever been devised as a substitute for the State because the coming into being of the State is the ending of private war and violence and the substitution for them of the reign of law.

The essence of the State is not contract, it is dedication. The individual cannot contract out of his duties as a citizen. Wherever he goes he is a citizen or a subject of some State. He is bound to obey the law or he goes to jail. He is bound to pay the prescribed taxes or his money is forcibly taken from him. He is bound to help to support the law, and the policeman. The State, as Hegel said, is, in a measure, the recognition of the fact that we are members one of another, parts of a society, which is not a mere fortuitous aggregation of unrelated atoms, but an organic whole. That is why he regarded it as an almost divine institution, which it is not.

Whether justice, liberty and well-being flow from the State depends upon its form, and upon who controls it. As has already been set forth, there are many forms of State, and the kind of society which will exist and whether it subserves the interests of some or of all the people will depend on whether those who in fact, control its executive, legislative and judicial machinery, be a monarch or an aristocracy, the parties in a democratic state, or the dictatorial parties in a Fascist or a Communist State. But there can be neither justice, nor liberty, nor well-being, as there can be no peace, except through the State.

The State, however, does not eschew violence. On the contrary, it claims that it alone is entitled to use violence. It could not, indeed, exist without the use of violence. It habitually uses violence. Moreover, the violence it uses is irresistible violence. A great number of the laws it enacts and the changes which it brings about are inevitably objected to by individuals or sections of the community. They are often only obeyed by minorities because they know that disobedience involves fines, imprisonment, or death. Yet if the State did not enforce the law, and do so irresistibly, individuals and groups would inevitably begin to use violence or fraud to defend or promote their own rights or interests, and society itself would dissolve in anarchy. In one sense, therefore, the State is violence, but violence only used in accordance with law and, in a demo-

cratic and constitutional State, in the interests of the community as a whole and as a result of a decision by a majority of its citizens.

V

It is because of these tremendous powers, inherent in all States, that the evils of interstate anarchy are so terrible. For in a conflict of States, the whole population of each and all its assets are flung, as a unit, into the struggle. Let us examine first the economic consequences.

The discoveries of natural science and the industrial revolution have placed in the hands of man the possibility of plenty for all. The essence of the process was the division of labor, the specialization of the task of the individual workman and the bringing together into the factory or shop of the special products of the whole earth. The early days of the industrial revolution were marked with terrible hardships for workers driven or drawn from the land and often herded in towns in wretched dwellings and working for excessive hours and in noisome factories. None the less, conditions were gradually improved in most countries by factory acts, social insurance against old age, unemployment and sickness, trades unionism, universal education and so forth, and it is generally agreed that in Western Europe the standard of living of mankind rose no less than four-fold during the nineteenth century.

But if this rise in standards was to continue, freedom for trade, freedom for migration, freedom for the movement of capital, were necessary, as well as a great increase in the regulatory and supervisory activities of government. The organization of economic resources of the world required a prodigious migration of population, the development of raw materials in all parts of the globe, the uninterrupted exchange of food, raw materials and manufactured articles, as well as an increasing social conscience to ensure that the fruits of this enterprise were properly shared and that laws for the protection of labor were passed and enforced.

During a considerable part of the nineteenth century, this free economy existed in greater or less degree. But gradually it has been destroyed through the intervention of the sovereign State. Whether the alleged motive was to protect the standard of living of workers who had machinery at their disposal against the competition of low-paid workers who had little save their hands, and vice versa, or to increase the profits of the employer, or to ensure the nearest approximation to self-sufficiency

in time of war, or to offset the consequences of the one-way traffic necessary to meet extravagant international indebtedness, especially payments for reparation or war debts, it has been the action of the sovereign State which has, in fact, laid in ruins the pre-war economy by means of tariffs, embargoes, quotas, prohibitions, and finally, the destruction of the old international currency based on gold. The sovereign State, thinking of itself, indeed unable by the law of its own self-centered being to think of the world or of humanity as a whole, took action, supposedly in its own interests, which produced the worst depression ever known, enlarged the total number of unemployed to 30,000,000 in 1931, completely dislocated the old world balance between supply and demand, ruined millions of farmers in some parts of the world while ruining countless businesses and throwing out of work millions of workers only too anxious to consume the farmers' products in other parts. Out of the enormous social tensions so set up has sprung every kind of social disorder, and democracy has been replaced by dictatorship in many countries on the ground that nothing but dictatorship was strong enough to keep order or to make the internal changes made necessary by external events.

In these circumstances, the calm and gradual discussion of social reform of the problem of reconciling the Socialist and the individualist ideals has become quite impossible. Nation after nation, after plunging into a struggle between ruthless Fascist and Communist factions, has succumbed to the dictatorship of one or the other, with immense consequences, not only for their domestic life, but also on the international front.

VI

But it is when we turn to consider the consequences of national sovereignty on international political life that we begin to realize the full nature of the evil which is involved.

The causes of war in the modern world are manifold: unjust treaties, out of date treaties, maltreatment of minorities or separation of minorities from the present race, need for markets or raw materials, pressure of population, or inadequate soil, racial, linguistic, cultural or religious differences. But none of these causes of war compare with the consequences of national sovereignty itself. The most obvious effect of hierarchy of national sovereignties, is that every international dispute, whatever its origins, is discussed as a conflict between two or more sovereignties and there is no

authority responsible for considering it or capable of legislating a solution for it, from the standpoint of the well-being of the whole.

But a far more serious consequence of anarchy is that where diplomacy does not produce agreement, there is no remedy but the threat or the use of force—that is war. Minor or “justiciable” matters may be referred to arbitration or an international court. But no court can discharge the functions of a legislature, and matters which, inside a State, could be settled by Parliament or the executive, can only be determined, in international affairs, by negotiation and diplomacy, or, failing voluntary agreement, by war. It is this central fact which produces the inexorable movement toward world war with which history makes us so familiar. Not only are national States inclined to disagree because they look at every problem from their own point of view, but the possibility of their reaching agreement is made far more difficult by the fact that they have to consider the consequences of agreement on their own security in the event of war. The objection to the Anschluss, for instance, was not any desire to prevent Austrian Germans and German Germans uniting, if they wished to, but the fear of its effect on the strategic balance in Central Europe. And one of the principal reasons for colonial expansion was the anxiety lest some other country would gain an advantage in power or strategic position, just as the principal difficulty in the way of colonial rearrangement today, is its strategic consequences.

But the trouble does not end there. Because every serious international question involves the possibility of war, nations, even the most pacific nations, arm themselves, partly to ensure that their rights will be respected, partly to make certain that if war does break out, they will be able to defend themselves. So the competition in armaments sets in, for while no nation State wants to spend more money than is necessary on armaments, it wants to provide for its own security by having just that margin of superiority which will ensure that, in the event of war, it will win and not lose. And if a nation cannot do this by its own strength alone, it will make alliances with others. As this process continues the merits of every international question of importance become overlaid by considerations of strategy and power. Morality is dethroned by prestige and Macht-politik. Secrecy replaces open diplomacy, for, with war in the offing, there are facts and considerations which cannot be disclosed. The *status quo* becomes more and more unalterable, because the organization of se-

curity has come to depend upon it. There may be a few minor adjustments made here and there. In a crisis of power, a particular nation may prefer the humiliation of retreat to the risk of war. But every such retreat makes retreat on the next occasion more and more difficult and stimulates the competition in armaments. And finally, as armaments reach their limits and there are no more alliances to make, the terrible military timetable comes into being. The world, or the major part of it, becomes divided into two great armed camps, each increasingly unable to look at international problems from the standpoint of reason or justice, each armed to the teeth, and with their military preparations so complete that speed in mobilization or in launching an air attack may make the difference between victory and defeat. In such circumstances the decision as to peace and war passes out of the hands of statesmen, for a world war may be precipitated by an accident, a knave or a fool who orders an act which, in some part of the world, starts the vast machinery of mobilization into action. The dangers which existed in 1914 for this reason have been made immeasurably greater by the existence of air power.

The events of the last thirty years illustrate exactly the truth of this diagnosis. While historians will debate to the end of time the distribution of responsibility for the late World War, there can be no doubt that the principal cause was the anarchy of national sovereignties. Europe had had a comparatively quiet century, and for some time was preoccupied with the industrial revolution in a world in which migration and trade were comparatively free, and in its own expansion over Asia and Africa. But gradually national sovereignty began to close the doors of trade, colonial expansion began to be looked at more and more from the standpoint of strategy and power, and crisis approached as the old empires of Turkey and Austria Hungary began to totter to their doom. Amid the growing tension, the race in armaments began, every diplomatic issue began to be a trial of strength, Europe became grouped into two great camps, and after one or two preliminary power crises the assassination of Franz Ferdinand precipitated a mobilization which set in motion a military timetable whose inexorable operation no one would stop.

It is exactly the same story since the war. Appalled by the catastrophe, the nations agreed at Paris to create a League of all Nations which was to prevent war and adjust international disputes by pacific means. Its members undertook to submit all questions to judicial settlement, arbitration

or investigation by the Council or Assembly of the League. They agreed not to resort to war until they had given the pacific machinery of the League a full chance to work and to take sanctions against any power which went to war in disregard of its obligations. They agreed to disarm. Later, under the Kellogg Pact, they renounced altogether the use of war as an instrument of national policy. But national sovereignty has destroyed the League. In the first place, the United States refused to join it because of the onerous obligations in Europe it entailed. National interest prevailed over world organization. In the second place, the League has proved in practice unable to make any substantial revision of the *status quo* created by the Treaty, for the reason that no revision can be made except with the consent of the parties concerned, and these parties think of the issue not only from a self-centered standpoint, but from the point of view of the effect of the proposal on their own security. Until it was too late, the League has been little more than part of the machinery for maintaining against Germany the unilateral discrimination contained in the Treaty of Versailles. In the third place, as has been proved over the Manchurian and the Abyssinian crises, the security offered by the Covenant against aggressors has broken down; because it is now clear that economic sanctions are ineffective unless they are backed by a readiness to go to war, and an overwhelming proponderance in the event of war, and in obligation to go to war individual nations will only undertake if their own national interests are vitally concerned. So, as the exhaustion caused by the war has disappeared, we see, despite the League, a recommencement of the same kind of events as precipitated the last war. The weak have had to yield to the strong. Rearmament has destroyed the hopes of disarmament. Alliances have reappeared, though they are disguised in Covenant terms. Revision of treaties, which might have been easy while the world was exhausted and relatively disarmed, has become increasingly impossible as strategic consideration began to replace morality and justice, Macht-politik began to replace open discussion at Geneva.

VII

Though there are doubtless other and minor causes, is it not perfectly clear that the root evil in the modern world is unlimited national sovereignty? It has created the economic nationalism which has caused so much unemployment through the cessation of international trade, and

the dislocation of the world balance between supply and demand, as to destroy democracy and produce dictatorship in country after country. It has falsified the high hopes of the League of Nations and is compelling the world to come back to competitive armaments and alliances and to the military timetable, made ten times more fatal today by air power. It has dethroned morality and right in favor of force. It is slowly compelling every nation not only to militarize itself in its external relations, but in its internal life also. It is preventing the constitutional solution of the issue between Socialism and individualism by turning it into a world-wide struggle between Fascism and Communism.

It has been estimated by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler that the last war—the war of national sovereignties—cost 30,000,000 lives and in round numbers, \$387,000,000,000. "With that amount," he has said, "we could have built a \$2,600 house with \$965 of furniture and placed it on five acres of land worth \$95 an acre for every family in the United States, Canada, Australia, England, Wales, Ireland, Scotland, France, Belgium, Germany and Russia. There would have been enough left over to give to every city of 20,000 inhabitants and over in all these countries a \$4,833,000 library and a \$9,666,000 university. Out of the balance we could have set aside a sum at 5% interest which would have paid for all time a \$965 yearly salary for 125,000 teachers and 125,000 nurses. After having done all this we could still have bought up all France and Belgium and everything they possessed in 1914, every home, factory, church, railway, and street car." That was the price paid for national sovereignty twenty years ago. What will be the price next time?

VIII

The only ultimate remedy is a federation of nations—the application of the principle of the State to the whole world. No form of League of Nations can end war. The sovereign State will invariably defeat any League based on contract. Law and order, peace, justice, freedom, social progress, derive from the unity and dedication involved in citizenship in a sovereign State. And it is the fact that, in the last resort, the allegiance of the citizen is owed to his own State and not to the League of Nations, which makes the League impotent as against its own members. No system of co-operation can overcome this terrific power. There is no final remedy for the tremendous evils which spring from the fact of national

sovereignty, save the pooling of that sovereignty in supernational matters, in a world federal State, a State which, in its own sphere, will command the allegiance of every individual, be able to legislate for and tax him, and which will represent him while leaving the national State freedom to deal with affairs in the national sphere. When such a body comes into being, then and then only, will war end and the perversions and destructions inherent in the competition of national sovereignties be ended on earth. Such a federation need not embrace the whole world from the start. It can commence with a smaller group of nations which understand the truth, and then grow by accretion.

Pacifism is no remedy for war, for it does nothing to substitute for the anarchy of sovereignties, which is the real cause of war, the single sovereignty which alone can end it. Armament is not enough, for while it may determine which side wins or whether democracy triumphs over dictatorship or vice versa, it aggravates every tendency to substitute violence for justice and reason in human affairs and ultimately ends in war by its own momentum. The League of Nations is not enough, because so long as it consists of a League of sovereign nations, even if it could get universal membership, it would for that reason be unable to alter the *status quo* and even if it would commit its members to constant war against an aggressor, that war would be to maintain a *status quo* which must progressively become out of date.

IX

What is the bearing of Christianity on this state of affairs? Is it not obvious that anything like a world federation is utterly out of the question today? Even if the vehemence of present-day international fear and suspicion and hatred were to disappear, as it may, there is no such unity of sentiment or principle or ideal or standard of civilization as would make possible a union of Europe, far less of the world. Immense changes in outlook must first come into being. Yet Christianity clearly cannot acquiesce in the unchallenged dominance of the demonism which is represented by the claim of the sovereign State, that it has the right to unquestioning obedience on the part of its citizens, whatever its policy, and that it acknowledges no law above itself. In effect, it claims the attributes of God.

Christianity clearly can tolerate no such claim. The national State,

like every other human institution, must submit itself to the law of God, of justice, mercy, love and brotherhood, and in the end surrender its sovereignty to a world State which can apply the law based on these ethical principles for the whole of mankind.

It may not be the duty of the Church immediately to advocate the creation of the world State. That may only be the ultimate step. But the spread of Christianity will inevitably bring it into being. When Jesus was asked whether His disciples should pay tribute to Caesar, He replied, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's." It was this refusal to accept the mission of a political Messiah, to lead the nationalist movement among the Jews against the Empire of Rome, which threw the populace against Him and made them ask for the release of Barabbas and not of Jesus Himself. It is not unreasonable to infer that Jesus understood the advantage to humanity of a universal empire which, for all its brutality, gave peace and the reign of a fairly advanced system of law, to the then civilized world, apart from India, China and the Far East. Yet Christianity, not Judaism, eventually conquered Rome and in doing so tempered its brutality with tolerance and humanity. It did more. As the Empire of Rome began to decay, as Greco-Roman culture became lifeless and wooden, as new cults from the Orient began to undermine the austere faith and morality of the older Roman society, as the Empire began to break up under the ceaseless attacks of the rough but vigorous "barbarian" from the North, Christianity itself became the unifying, civilizing and humanizing power in a new society more extensive than the old. For centuries the savagery of war was tempered by the consciousness that Christendom was a unity and that the civil power owed obedience, often denied, to the higher law of God.

But in its struggles the Christian Church lost much of its primitive simplicity. It began, indeed, to take on the attributes of Caesar. The attempt to identify Church and State gradually transferred the political divisions and conflicts to church politics, and the Church increasingly used the arm of the State to suppress freedom of thought within itself. So, at the Reformation, the unity of Christendom disappeared. As the authority of Christianity waned new cults and creeds, founded on material and not spiritual foundations, have raised their heads. Human nature, selfish as it often is, craves to be lifted out of itself by consecration to some cause greater than itself. The first of these religions was national

sovereignty. The national State began to claim the absolute allegiance which was no longer given to the universal Church. As the discoveries of natural science and the secularist spirit made further inroads on the validity of the older creeds, yet other faiths, such as Communism and Fascism, arose. So that today Christendom, in the old sense of the word, can hardly be said to exist, and mankind is in a welter of conflict in which the claims of Communism, Fascism and the sovereign State are hopelessly confused.

None the less, Christianity alone offers the remedy. As a noted Oriental scholar has said, all the real achievements of Western civilization, the respect for human personality, the humanitarian movement, the abolition of slavery, individual freedom, the emancipation of women, the ideal of moral purity, the concept of social reform, the rise of democracy, the assault on war, have all derived their greatest support and their greatest driving power from those who have drawn deeply from the fountains of courage and inspiration and devotion to God and man which spring eternally from the Bible. So today Christianity stands immovably for the unity of men and nations in obedience to the moral and spiritual law of God. It is its function to bring into being a type of men and women who are governed by fidelity to conscience, who can be trusted to act in accordance with Principle, who recognize their obligation not to their own nation alone but to all mankind, who understand something of what is really meant by the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. When Christianity has enough followers, nations will recognize that patriotism is not enough, that they are members one of another, that law must govern the earth; and they will then be able to trust one another to act on Christian principles sufficiently to enable them to pool enough of their sovereignty to end anarchy and war and armament on earth.

Christian Faith and the Common Life

WILLIAM TEMPLE, ARCHBISHOP OF YORK

ONE source of much bewilderment in our time is the fact that to some extent the Two Great Commandments have been allowed to fall apart in men's minds. Religion, of which love toward God is the culmination, has come to be regarded as "a private affair between a man and his Maker," whereas love of neighbor has been treated as the substantial duty of men, and as possible of fulfillment apart from love toward God. It is true that the greater part of the drudgery of social service, and almost the whole so far as it aims at restoration of character, is actually carried on by Christian people in the inspiration of their Christian faith. Love of God and love of neighbor do not fall apart so far as they are actual; but the thought of them in the minds of average folk has tended to fall apart, with the result that average folk miss both.

It is quite clear from the New Testament that in the teaching of our Lord and His apostles the two are inseparable. Ecstatic worship which is devoid of charity is for all practical purposes heathen; it might as well be the "sounding brass and tinkling cymbals" familiar in the worship of Dionysus. "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar" is the terse verdict of Saint John. And the parable of the sheep and the goats, together with much direct moral teaching, shows that the apostles who so spoke were fully in line with the Lord Himself.

But the moral precepts of Christ make demands so exacting that men have treated them as pointing to an ideal which is in fact irrelevant to our actual condition. They have been dubbed "Counsels of Perfection" and regarded as binding only on monks or hermits. This crude verdict of the world is not wholly baseless; but standing alone, with more than a little acquiescence from the spokesmen of the Church, it has largely deprived Christianity of its power to lift the world to a new plane. There have, in fact, been two forces tending to destroy the moral appeal and impetus of the gospel. One is the pessimism of much religious orthodoxy, which regards this world as so utterly "fallen" and corrupt that it is itself beyond redemption, so that the purpose of the gospel is not to save the world but to save individuals out of the world; the other is the optimism of much

modern and rationalistic philosophy, which thinks that there is no more amiss with human nature than increase of knowledge and spread of education can put right.

The problem, represented by this bifurcation into an optimism that effects nothing and a pessimism which thinks nothing can be effected, is rendered more acute by the scale upon which all activity in the modern world must be planned. The development of man's control over nature has had the result of binding men together in units both larger and more closely knit. No concern is now either purely personal or purely local. Whatever is done in one place immediately affects conditions elsewhere. Consequently the planning of life passes increasingly into the hands of the State, which alone surveys all areas within its frontiers, and we find that as the State exercises its sovereign rights within those frontiers it affects the interests of people living beyond them. When "charity" could be fully exercised in the personal dealings of individuals, the Christian law of love seemed to be applicable in practice. But in the modern world this condition is not met. A Christian can, of course, be "kind" to unemployed men; he ought to be kind to them, as to all others; but this does not begin to meet the distinctive need of the unemployed. That need cannot be met without entry upon the sphere of "politics." How does the law of love apply here?

If we keep our eyes open, there are many opportunities to be taken, and the utilization of them greatly sweetens the whole atmosphere. The Christian ratepayers of a London Borough lately sent a deputation to their Borough Council to ask that the rates might be increased in order that slum-clearance might be initiated; and though their request was refused, the making of it certainly contributed to mutual good will. When, some years ago, a large number of income-tax payers wrote to their Parliamentary representatives to ask that the prospective surplus on the Budget should be used to restore unemployment relief to its former figure before it was used to reduce the rate of income tax, this undoubtedly led to a greater feeling among the unemployed that they were members of a spiritual community.

But when all is said, the conspicuous effect of such endeavors only illustrates their rarity. It is seldom that whole bodies of men ask that the interests of others may be preferred to their own. Is this solely because of a remediable selfishness in individuals, or is there some inherent law of corporate relationships which hinders in those relationships the opera-

tion of the law of love? And if there is, is this part of the ordinance of God or is it a product of the corruption of our nature?

The occasions which prompt these inquiries are concrete situations, each of them peculiar in some degree; and no general proposition is likely to be directly applicable to any one of these without considerable adjustment. But such general propositions as can be made with truth are far less simple than is often assumed. No one can dispute the contention that a man's duty is largely shaped for him by his social relationships. The greatest English philosopher of the last generation—F. H. Bradley—found in the formula, *My Station and Its Duties*, the leading principle of practical Ethics; and even though we may think that it does not carry us so far as he supposed, we must recognize that a man's station, when once he has accepted it, very largely determines his obligations. The sacrifice of a useful and lucrative career in order to take up some form of social service involving great risk to health—for example, in a leper colony—may be noble in a bachelor, questionable in a husband and blameworthy in a father. The fact that we might admire a father who incurred our censure by such an act, because our own grounds for declining the opportunity would be still more censurable than his conduct, does not alter the other fact that, quite apart from complications due to sin, we recognize social relationships as introducing a modification into the content of duty.

As a matter of fact, each man confronting a need for moral choice, whether on his own part or on that of others, must also take account of the reality of sin alike in himself and in them. If it is his own act that is in question, he must not only think what is the ideally right thing to be done, but whether or not he is disqualified by sin from doing it. This is sometimes forgotten or even denied. But we recognize an obligation to allow for all other forms of disqualification; and there are some actions ideally right in principle, yet only right when done by someone of sufficiently fine character. Thus free forgiveness of injuries is ideally right; but some righteous indignation may be preferable to an indolent acquiescence in wrong, though the former may cause an alienation which the latter avoids. Sincerity is a prerequisite of moral action, and even more so of moral judgment; an element of conscientious primness in a Christian act may make it more detestable than a healthy animal outbreak. What some psychologists call "the conventional self," while often a guardian of commonly accepted morality, is as often a serious hindrance to spiritual effect-

iveness. The agent, the actually operative will, in a truly Christian act, must be the genuine self of the person acting, not a "phantasy" which that self has created and put forward as a façade to impress either the virtuous or the multitude. Consequently the truly Christian action is possible only for the truly Christian man. The same outward conduct done by someone only half converted (which is a true description of nearly all of us) is vitiated. Only Christ can do the acts of Christ. In so far as a man is truly a "member" of the "body," moving only at the direction of His will, he becomes an organic instrument of Christ; in so far as he falls short of that, the question, "What would Jesus do?" is for him as misleading as it is suggestive of the ideally right course.

In short, the gospel must be taken as a whole, not piecemeal. Christ laid down the Law of Love; He also offered the redemptive sacrifice of His perfect obedience to the Father and thereby supplied the power to those, who by spiritual union with Him offer a perfect obedience, to fulfill that Law. But to others that Law presents a demand which they cannot meet; nothing outside themselves prevents them, but by their own selves they are prevented. The Christian who considers what action he should take in any emergency, or what policy he shall, as a citizen, support, must allow for this fact.

How far, then, are the apparent necessities of the political and economic world in which we live to be regarded as part of God's ordinance for us? Here a distinction must be drawn, as the Scholastics would say, between what God wills *simpliciter* and what God wills *secundum quid*. What God wills for all His children is the life of holiness and love. And no circumstances, no environment, can render that life impossible. In every conceivable combination of circumstances it is possible to show love and to maintain purity of heart; and that is God's will for all and each. But in fact mankind has not done this; and the whole fabric of our social and political life reflects our failure to do this completely, as well as our partial success. In the Second Book of the *Republic*, Plato sets out the two principles on which society is founded. In part, society is a tissue of competing selfishnesses, where all agree to forego certain methods of preying upon their neighbors and to check those who follow these, so that each may be comparatively secure in such gains as he may amass. The first form of the Social Contract is thus reached—"neither to commit nor to suffer injustice," where injustice is understood to be whatever all agree,

for the selfish purposes of each, to condemn. Thus arises a code which has some semblance to morality.

Thou shalt not kill; but needst not strive
Officially to keep alive.

Thou shalt not covet; but tradition
Approves all forms of competition.¹

Over against this is the principle of mutual need and help. Men have different gifts, and the benefit of all is served by their co-operation, each doing what he does best, and supplying the needs of others equally with his own. This is the social expression of the supreme rule of Ethics—Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

Actual society rests on both of these foundations and it is quite impossible to disentangle the practical working of the two principles. Both are present in nearly every social institution, policy or action. Progress consists in the increasing preponderance of willing co-operation or love—the principle of Saint Augustine's *Civitas Dei*, over competitive selfishness—the principle of his *Civitas Terrena*.

God wills love. But does this mean that where love fails He has no care for what happens? It is because the world is a "fallen" world and has not corresponded with His will for it, that the special problems of Christian conduct arise. Has God no will for His people except that they should live in a fallen world as if it were not fallen? or that, being fallen themselves, they should behave outwardly as if they were not? Or has He a purpose with which men who know themselves fallen may co-operate, using their fallen nature as in part the instrument for its own recovery?

The discussion of the whole matter has often, as I think, been falsified by over-simplification. It is sometimes said, for example, that the national community and the State belong to the Order of Nature, while the Church and the faith of the Christian belong to the Order of Grace. This sharp distinction leads to the view that the State has its own principles of action with which the Church has nothing to do, while equally the Church has its principles with which the State has nothing to do. But the statesman must ask—Is it so certain that the Church's principles have no political effects? And if they have, how can the State consent to forego all control over the Church? And equally, the theologian must ask—Is there no

¹ A. H. Clough: *The New Decalogue*.

Grace in Nature? Did not God create the universe, and is not the Maker manifest in His work? How then, can the State, in its place in the Order of Nature, refuse direction from the Church to which is entrusted the full revelation of the Author of Nature? If once more it is held that Nature is so far fallen as in no way to manifest its Maker, are we to say that God has abandoned it, and left it to remain fallen and lost? Is not that a denial of the whole gospel?

It is, no doubt, already clear, from the way in which I have put these questions, on what general lines I believe that they should be answered. This is not a theological treatise, and the theological position adopted can only be sketched in outline—not fully expounded, and still less defended or justified.

The world is of God's creation. His will for it, considered absolutely, is that it should correspond to His own nature of holiness and love. It does not so correspond. Whatever explanation is to be given of the fact of evil, evil (as well as good) is a fact. The world is not wholly corrupted by evil; it still bears traces of its divine origin and God's will for it. Whatever seems to be an essential part or principle of its history must be ascribed to the divine will. Thus in the growth of fellowship among men, which is (on this view) a great part of the divine plan for mankind, the territorially delimited nation has its place; and a man's citizenship of his earthly nation is part of God's purpose for him. National loyalty is therefore, in its own degree, obedience to God.

But this loyalty cannot, for the Christian, be absolute. Only God Himself is entitled to absolute loyalty. And though the national State holds authority from Him, it is not a pure transmitter of His will. It is itself part of a world which, though created by God, has deviated from His will for it. That will is expressed with pureness only through the Word of God, which is Jesus Christ. The Christian disciple and the Christian Church, to whom that Word is entrusted, must therefore appraise the action of his State in the light of his knowledge of the will of God as disclosed in Christ. The State has a *prima facie* claim upon his obedience; and he who appraises its action is himself as "fallen" as it also is; therefore he must be very sure of the leading of God's Word before he sets himself in opposition to the State within its own sphere. But he is under solemn obligation to resist the State if, and so far as, he believes himself to have a clear leading from God to do so. He must not let the State

take the place of God, even for a specified department of life; for that is idolatry. God alone is entitled to absolute allegiance in all relationships; and God is known in Jesus Christ.

Further, the Church is bound to claim that the nation and the State owe, by right, an absolute allegiance to Christ, to whom all authority in heaven and on earth is given. In making that claim it must recognize that the nation may, and in all actual cases does, contain many who are not Christians and do not acknowledge that allegiance, so that the State, as the nation's executive organ, cannot properly behave as the Church itself should do. But the Church can never admit that the State, even though all its citizens and all component members of the government be pagans, is thereby released from its allegiance; it is disqualified for certain modes of expressing that allegiance; subjectively it is not conscious of any obligation to express any such thing; but objectively the obligation remains.

This does not, however, entitle the Church to tell the State what its duty from time to time may be. It is the duty of the State to obey God, and it is the duty of the Church to remind the State of this fact. But it is not the duty of the State to obey the Church, and the Church would be guilty of usurpation if it demanded such obedience. In other words, the political sphere has its own relative autonomy, subject to the universal obligation to exercise this in obedience to God.

If Christianity were a revised Pharisaism, like Pharisaism in offering precise directions for conduct but differing in that it offered other directions, the recognition of this relative autonomy in politics, in business, in art, or in science, would be a serious difficulty. But that is not the genius of Christianity, which is emphatically a religion of the spirit and not of the letter. The spirit is not less exacting than the letter of the law; indeed, it is more exacting. For a time may be reached when the law in the letter has been fulfilled, and then there is freedom to please one's self. But from the spirit there is no release; it is true that those who are under the control of the spirit do not desire release; but that does not alter the fact that none is afforded. What has here to be noticed, however, is that though the spirit is more, and not less, exacting than the letter, it is more adaptable to conditions. If we take as a literal command, to be obeyed at all times, "Give to him that asketh thee," we shall often do great harm. But if we treat that precept as a vivid expression of the command always to

act by the generosity which love prompts, we shall do good; for love will prompt us to think out what will in fact benefit the neighbor who brings his need before us.

The actual work of the world has to be carried on subject to the conditions which history provides. The Christian man of business will have his eye fixed on the only manner of business that is in full accord with the spirit of Christ; this includes, among other things, the conduct of business as a form of mutual help and service. Here we may pause for a moment to notice that business and commerce, when true to their own principle, are entirely Christian; for when they are healthy, every exchange made is to the advantage of both parties. But business and commerce are infected, like other human activities, with the egoism which is the original sin of our nature. Consequently they are not conducted wholly, or even perhaps mainly in the spirit of mutual help. Certainly since the War, the inflated egoism of nations has prevented international commerce from being conducted in that spirit. In a world where commerce is carried on largely by a pure self-interest, and where conventions have sprung up for the regulation of that self-interest, what is the Christian man of business to do? It may be that if he follows the principles that would be exemplified by a perfectly Christian form of commerce, he will be undersold and driven from the market, his employees thrown out of work, and the control of business handed over to men of no ideals. It will be better to face all this than to abandon the ideal itself, or to compromise beyond the point where witness to the ideal becomes ineffectual. But it seems clear that the actual purification of commerce depends on the continuance in business of those who have ideals and steadily work toward them. If so, the duty of the Christian man of business is to follow this course. He will be subject to great temptation to go further in compromise than necessity requires; and that temptation he must resist as firmly as he can; but he must not, either on account of this temptation or on account of the compromise itself, withdraw from business and leave commerce a prey to men of no ideals.

What the extent of this compromise may be, no other can claim to judge. It could never, of course, be right for the Christian man of business to fall below the conventions established by the business itself and accepted by those who pay no heed to distinctively Christian claims. It is inconceivable that such a descent should do other than damage witness

to Christian principle. Short of this, the degree of compromise to be effected can only be settled by the conscience of those concerned; nor has any other a right to sit in judgment on them.

Between what terms is such a compromise made? It is often spoken of as a compromise between the claims of Christ and those of the world. But our whole contention is that Christ wills the compromise, and that to refuse to make it is to fail Him. No; it is the Christian compromise between adherence to principles only practicable in the perfected kingdom of God and the prevailing practice of the world; and its aim is not to let a Christian make money without too scandalous inconsistency, but to lead the common practice to a closer approximation to that of the kingdom of God.

In many instances the problem of duty is complicated for the Christian man of business by the fact that he is in greater or less measure a trustee. The welfare of all employed in the business may depend on him and he has no right to bring them to ruin by a quixotic pursuit of ideals. Even the interest of shareholders cannot with justice be ignored!

The critic may feel that in all this we are finding excuses for paying to Christian principles no more than lip-service. No; we are saying that the facts must be squarely faced, or else the service paid to Christian principle will indeed be of the lips only. It is often to be observed that, in a company of people united for the promotion of an ideal end, those who in their own practice make most progress toward that end are those who in speeches or resolutions advocate moderate courses. The true Christian will judge all he does or attempts by the highest standards, and will pronounce sinful his best achievements; but he will not on that account commit the additional sin of injuring other people for the sake of a conscience which is sensitive about his own consistency but not about their sufferings.

All of these considerations apply with redoubled force to international politics. The Christian statesman and the Christian citizen should have before their minds the kingdom of God and His Justice as the only standard of their conduct. But they must work with the material to hand. Men do not love the highest when they see it; they are much more likely to repudiate it with disgust and to crucify or otherwise rid themselves of anyone who proclaims and embodies it. The preacher of the gospel must preach it in its fullness and purity; but even he, when administering spirit-

ual discipline, must seek out the course that will in fact win those who are entrusted to his care to obedience and loyalty, rather than endanger their spiritual growth by following only those methods which are ideal in the sense of being appropriate to the Redeemer of the world. Still more the politician, wrestling with problems not primarily of eternal destiny, but of a temporal and indeed ephemeral balance of forces, some due to Christian impulse, some (probably far more) to sheer self-seeking, must keep the vision clear before him, but pick with care and skill the path that actually will lead to its attainment, even though the course be not very direct.

In all this it is assumed that history, and our day-to-day activities, have eternal significance, that they "matter" to God. If they do not, then the idealist is at liberty to pursue his ideals without regard to the havoc that he causes on the way; but also, for the same reason, the cynic may pursue his course undeterred by any thought of the anger or the grief of God. But if our doings matter to God, then each man must think how he may in fact, being a sinner, so act in a world of sinners, that he sets forth the glory of God most effectively.

This will involve him in both risk and sacrifice, but they are not the same risk and sacrifice as are involved in immediate conformity to "ideal" standards. We may illustrate this from the overshadowing problem of the moment—the problem of peace and war. One type of Christian idealist holds that a Christian can never rightly take part in warfare. If he is very simple, he bases this view on texts; and then he has difficulty with the saying, "He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one." If he is less simple than that, he takes his stand on a supposed sacro-sanctity of physiological life; and then he ought to be in difficulties about the martyrs; for to give life must be as wrong as to take it, if the preservation of it is an ultimate obligation. If the really sacred thing (as I believe) is personal liberty, then it is only as a very last resort that life may be taken, for to take it is the utmost curtailment of liberty possible to man, while to give life may be the supreme manifestation of spiritual liberty. But on this ground it may be a positive duty to take life, for there may be occasions when that is the only way to preserve liberties more extensive than those curtailed by the act of killing.

But the idealist pacifist need not be one of the simple folk described. He may deliberately hold that warfare, however just its cause, always in fact does more harm than good, especially because of the brutal pas-

sions which it lets loose upon the world. Such a judgment cannot be met by argument, for it is an ultimate judgment of value. But it is to be noticed that it involves deliberately allowing an aggressor nation to "get away with it." That may be right, as being the lesser evil. But we are now in the realm of comparative judgments of value, not of absolute principles; and therefore the main point under discussion has been implicitly conceded.

Many Christians feel that so long as any nations are prepared to use armed force, a refusal to resist by force its use in aggression or violence is too like the hand-washing of Pilate. But those who take such a view are not committed to any mere surrender to popular passion. In order that force may be used only for the maintenance of law, they must urge upon their fellow citizens a policy which involves the abrogation of national sovereignty. For as long as every nation claims to be judge in its own cause, there can be no reign of law among the nations. It is also true that the nations need a Tribunal of Equity to adjust the Law of Nations to the needs as well as to the possessive rights of nations; and for many this will also involve sacrifice. But the abrogation of national sovereignty must be asked of all nations; and none is ready to concede it. This is, in the judgment of many Christians, the first step toward securing the application to national communities of the command—Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

But this matter of Peace and War is here introduced as illustration only. The contention of this paper may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) The Christian is bound to apply the standards of his religion to every department of his conduct. (2) In doing this, he is bound to consider the probable effects of any course of action, and choose that which in its consequences is likely to promote the greatest conformity to those standards. (3) He has this obligation because he is called to live, not by the letter of any law or precept, but by a Spirit. (4) In considering the effects of his action he must take the widest possible survey, and not limit his attention to those most immediately concerned on any occasion; and especially he must consider his special responsibilities, for example, as politician or as man of business, or as Labor leader, the discharge of which is for him a primary obligation. (5) Having settled his course by these principles, he must be ready to incur personal sacrifice, and to call others voluntarily to join him in sacrifice, as he follows the course chosen.

And throughout he will remember that, though he must work and pray for the coming of the Kingdom "in earth as it is in heaven," that hope, from the nature of the case, can never be fulfilled. For that hope includes fellowship with the children of God in all generations, which cannot be realized under conditions of mortality; and even so far as the Kingdom comes to fullness of actuality, the work has always to begin again as the generations pass and new citizens of the Kingdom are born, each infected and all infecting one another with the original sin which is self-centeredness. Consequently in this world the Kingdom is actualized always as the Cross—as sacrifice, not barren, indeed, but also not securing the complete fulfillment of the hope for which it is made. Like our predecessors, we also, even though by God's help we win a good report on account of faith, must die without receiving the promises. Yet our strivings here have meaning for God and they whose hearts with their treasure are in the eternal realm are those who do most to give to this temporal world the service which promotes its welfare as the ages pass and endows it with its deepest significance for eternity.

John

JAMES MOFFATT

HE was a man of eloquence, who nevertheless aimed to be a man of action, as did Demosthenes." When a great classical scholar in surveying Greek literature pauses to say this about a Christian preacher, we sit up and take notice. For Wilamowitz-Moellendorff is referring to our John. "Chrysostom of Constantinople" he is generally called, but he was only six years in Constantinople; the larger and happier part of his life had been already spent in Antioch. Besides, his name was not Chrysostom, but John—one of those common names which are now and then carried by an uncommon man. It was not till a century and a half later that admirers called him "Chrysostom," the golden-mouthed.

I

When Libanius, the distinguished philosopher and savant at Antioch, was asked on his death-bed to recommend a successor to himself in the chair of philosophy, he muttered, "John—if only the Christians had not stolen him from us!" To the surprise and disgust of academic circles, this promising student for the bar had actually turned Christian, thanks in the main to the influence of his mother, Anthusa, the widow of a distinguished Roman officer. By this time he was about twenty-three years old. After baptism, he resolved to gratify a craving for the monastic life. Only his mother's entreaties held him back. He agreed, not too cheerfully, to remain with her at home for a time. Then four years later, sometime about 375, possibly after his mother's death, he joined a settlement of recluses in the neighborhood, where he indulged his passion for austerity at the expense of health and temper. In fact he ultimately lived as a hermit, with special strictness. On its higher side, the monastic movement during the latter half of the fourth century within the Eastern Churches was a form of complete surrender to the Lord, a "philosophy" of personal holiness which meant a clean break with the world; it was a witness to ethical simplicity amid circles of Christianity as well as of paganism where luxury and low habits were too common. John considered that he was saving his soul as he brooded quietly among the hills, far from

the distractions and pulsing temptations of city life in the capital. Unluckily there was another side to it, however. Not only was he laying the seeds of dyspepsia, which colored and twisted his judgment ever afterward, almost as unhappily as in the case of Carlyle, but this ascetic interlude developed a nervous strain which dried up part of his nature and left him handicapped by a tendency to be irritable, suspicious, and even unguarded in language. John was not one of the malingeringers who were bringing some disrepute on Eastern Monachism by swarming into monasteries to avoid hard work or military service. He did not vegetate in his retirement. He did some reading and writing. There was no idea in his soul of the vacant mind being an adjunct of the warm heat. And, fortunately, he never went the length of holding that the monastic vocation was incompatible with the ordinary service of the Church; before long we find him back at Antioch, under a new consciousness that to be really good one must be good for something, and that personal holiness was none the worse of an outlet into practical duty. In spite of Jerome's high estimate, we cannot hold that John was a trained theologian, although he came to preach effectively against Jews, heretics, and infidels. He was most himself when he was calling Christians up to a level of conduct which he had himself thought out and practiced during these years of retirement. It would be too much to claim that his chief interest lay in what evangelicals call a theology of the Cross. His preaching and his teaching were not absorbed in the truth of redemption, but he did bring back from the monastic interlude a vivid sense of what bearing the cross daily should mean to real Christians, and also a conviction that it was the duty of the Church to confront worldliness with outspoken testimony and rebuke.

"What is a holy church unless she awes
The times down from their sins?"

So Mrs. Browning asked pointedly in last century. Our John in the fourth century had already realized, like Ambrose of Milan in the Latin West, this aspect of holiness, and he now devoted himself to inculcating it in season and out of season.

II

His first post was that of a "reader," who at this time in the Eastern Church read the scripture lessons audibly and pleasantly. An Oxford contemporary of the late Lord Asquith observes that when he read the

lessons in Balliol Chapel he always seemed to be arguing with the sacred writer and to be conscious of getting the best of it. John also had had a legal training, but he had the spirit of reverence as well as a fine voice. The congregation stood, of course. In a Greek church there were no seats or pews, to encourage lounging during the service. The people had no Bibles with them; many were unable to read at all. The reader's function was to let them hear the Word, as he read it from the *ambo* or raised platform, where there was a desk corresponding to the modern lectern.

In his life as a churchman, John retained a passion for the ideals of monastic seclusion, however, which inclined him at times to be almost as inhuman as his Western contemporary, Jerome. Thus, one of his friends fell in love with a young lady called Hermionê, and proposed to enter the honorable estate of matrimony. John did not agree with the extremists who rejected marriage as a sin, but to him it was a deplorable second-best, and he was horrified to hear of Theodore abandoning the straight and narrow path. No strict vow of celibacy was at this time taken by inmates of a monastic settlement. Still, to the fanatical mind of John, marriage appeared no better than a soldier deserting the army on the eve of battle, and he told Theodore so. The said Theodore afterward became bishop of Mopsuestia, a town about fifty miles from Antioch, where he rose to high distinction as a scholar. He had small cause to bless his friend, however, for unsought advice about marriage.

And worse was to follow. For John was as averse to a bishopric as to marriage. This led him to put another friend into an embarrassing position. Both he and his friend were sincerely afraid of being turned into bishops against their will. Bishops were now great personages in the Empire, with prestige and privileges. It was a temptation for undesirable or ambitious persons to seek the office of a bishop; the best men did not readily put themselves forward, and the churches, with the logic of common sense, argued that someone who was not a candidate would be more than likely to prove the right choice. There were cases of Christians, even of Christian laymen, being practically forced into the presbyterate or the episcopate. Now in Syria some episcopal vacancies had occurred. Learning that they were being considered for these positions, John and his friend Basil agreed to stand side by side; they would either outwit the press-gang of the local authorities or be consecrated bishops together. When the deputation arrived, with powers, John meanly es-

caped, leaving his companion in the lurch. Basil naturally resented what he held to be John's treacherous action. He complained with bitterness that his friend had broken faith with him. The distressing feature of the business is that John's excuses are as bad as his action. He laughed at poor Basil being haled off to a bishopric, and told him coolly that deceit was sometimes justified. Didn't doctors tell fibs to their patients upon occasion? Besides, look at the Bible. Wasn't Jacob quite right in cheating his father and his brother? If you really care for a friend, you will not hesitate to play a pious trick upon him for his own good. "But," said Basil, "what is the good to me?" Whereupon, John wrote his famous treatise on "The Priesthood," an office, he argued, which was vested with such awful powers and responsibilities that no archangel possesses the like. The moral was that, while Basil was fit for such an exalted position, he himself could not dare to be more than a humble underling in the Church.

It is an unsavory episode, betraying a certain defect in veracity or some indifference to ordinary standards of honesty and honor. Mr. Gladstone once expressed the fear that religion might damage the moral nature. That may sound paradoxical, but the English statesman, himself a genuine Christian, went on to maintain that "there is one proposition which the experience of life burns into my soul; it is this, that man should beware of letting his religion spoil his morality. In a thousand ways, some great, some small, but all subtle, we are daily tempted to this great sin." Our John was tempted to it, at the close of the fourth century, and he fell. His contemporary, Augustine, sternly repudiated any such justification of a pious fraud, but here is one instance of a really good man being induced by so-called "religious" considerations to tamper with straightforwardness and integrity of character. While we may admire the high tone of much in John's book on the Christian priesthood, most of us, I fancy, would be glad if this water-lily did not rise out of the mud of moral equivocation.

III

Six years of service as a deacon followed his service as a reader. It was not till 386 that he consented to become a priest or presbyter. Like many another man outside as well as inside the Church, John did not come into his kingdom till he was nearly forty. He had indeed preached before this, now and then. But apparently the Church first discovered,

as he discovered, with some surprise, his possession of an unsuspected talent for preaching. For the next twelve years he was the shining light of the Antioch church, which did not forget the primitive apostolic admonition, "let the presbyters who rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in the word and doctrine." The Eastern Church specially honored preaching. Luckily, John's bishop had no jealousy of his brilliant subordinate. The newly ordained presbyter had every opportunity and encouragement for exercising his gift. It was as a preacher rather than as a writer that John won the attention of his own age, and it was as a preacher that his reputation floated across the centuries, till in the admiring language of the English Church Homilies he came to be hailed as "that godly clerk and great preacher."

He glorified the office of the preacher. To preach, he insisted, was an essential duty of the Christian priesthood. In one sermon, by the way, he mentions that to be a good preacher you must have two qualifications —you must have a powerful voice and you must be indifferent to praise! John knew the latter need, from personal experience. In the fourth century, as at the Reformation, the sermon was one of the main channels for education in the Church. John preached all sorts of sermons, on doctrine, on topics of the day, on ethics like Savonarola, denouncing fashionable Christianity, and on the Bible especially. As a rule he had enormous congregations, except when the horse races drew hundreds away. Indeed, his popularity involved some embarrassing drawbacks. He was sometimes annoyed to find members of the congregation bursting into applause at some purple passages of Greek oratory—and he is honest enough to confess that he felt himself now and then dejected if these interruptions did not occur! He was still more vexed to notice many people crowding to hear the sermon and slipping out of church before the sacrament was administered. He had actually to warn the faithful against wearing a profusion of jewels and bringing their purses to church, since the local pickpockets found chances of stealing in the packed crowds who attended the service. Up in the chancel sat the little, thin man, with a large head, deeply sunk eyes, a broad forehead, and a thin gray beard, pouring out his golden words, while the congregation squeezed and jostled on the floor of the church. Many of them were light half-believers of a casual creed or nominal Christians at the best, like all Antiochenes fond of excitement, whether in sports or in politics or in religion. John delighted

them with his Greek rhetoric. He never mastered Latin, and he despised the vernacular Syriac, but in Greek he held enraptured audiences, and, to do him justice, he instructed them in the "credenda" as well as the agenda of Christianity, expounding the Bible and the creed with as much care as he spent upon sermons that raked their consciences with protests against the demoralizing love of pleasures and the mocking spirit for which Antioch was then notorious. To us, many of these sermons are a mystery. A preacher's reputation, like an actor's or a singer's, largely depends upon his contemporaries. We read the written or printed sermons of some great preacher like Chrysostom and wonder how they ever moved their hearers. They seem florid and verbose. To us they are heaps of gray ashes, though as delivered they must have been alive with fire. Still, even a modern may find, especially in some of his homilies on the epistles, one or two of the vital qualities which won him power and fame at Antioch long, long ago.

IV

So John passed what was to be the fourth act of his human drama. As a youthful recluse, as reader, as deacon, and then as a presbyter who preached, he had played his part at Antioch. If man's life is compared to a drama, the trouble is that no one of us is allowed to see beforehand a list of the *dramatis personae* who are to take a hand for us or against us. John could not have dreamed that in the fifth act the scene was to be changed from Antioch to Constantinople and that he was to meet the Emperor and the Empress. Yet so it was to be.

A really dramatic change came in 398, when he was picked out for the most splendid position in the Eastern Church, that of patriarch or archbishop of Constantinople. His predecessor, Nectarius, had been as popular as an easy-going prelate generally manages to be. This amiable ecclesiastic had been content to enjoy life, sunning himself in royal patronage and disinclined to disturb anybody, least of all himself. He had been the pet lamb rather than the shepherd of the flock, and the flock was consequently in an undisciplined state. Such, unknown to John, was to be his inheritance on the Bosphorus. He was literally kidnaped for the post. John had dodged the local churches in Syria, but there was no escape from the imperial authorities. The prime minister of the day, Eutropius by name, rather a shady character but (as sometimes happens) an in-

veterate sermon-taster, had once heard John preach, and was now determined to secure this brilliant pulpit orator to adorn the church at Constantinople. Also, he wanted to counterbalance the influence of the Alexandrian church at the capital. He knew that John objected to a bishopric. Besides, the Antioch church would not let their favorite preacher go. Hence the prime minister laid a net to snare the unsuspecting John. One day some visitors from Constantinople piously asked John to show them a chapel outside Antioch dedicated to some martyrs. At the shrine, a detachment of soldiers who were lying in concealment suddenly seized him, and he was driven off posthaste in the direction of Tarsus, till, after a drive of over eight hundred miles north, he reached Constantinople. It was much the same route as that which another bishop of Antioch had traversed nearly three centuries earlier. But while Ignatius had been under arrest, John was treated with all outward honor. How could he guess that in five or six years he was to be also maltreated, not by pagans but by fellow Christians in the Christian capital?

V

On February 20, 398, he was solemnly enthroned in his new see. It soon proved to be a hornet's nest. People discovered that the comfortable days of Nectarius were over, with this advent of a bishop who actually made Christianity invade their private lives. Here was an ascetic ruler who spared neither worldly clergy nor worldly laity. Both were in need of being shaken up, but John often rasped them needlessly. His earlier training had not fitted him to manage men. He was apt to be a doctrinaire, and to imagine that if argument failed sarcasm would move men to repent of their evil ways, which it never does. Long accustomed to having his words accepted from the pulpit, he was impatient of contradiction, and met differences of opinion with the airs of an austere schoolmaster who has to handle unruly children. He had little tact, and raised gratuitous opposition to some of his excellent reforms by failing to understand average human nature. Thus, a poor cobbler in Constantinople complained plaintively that "when you meet him anywhere outside church, you can seldom get him to stop and have a word with you." One shining quality of a church leader is to be a good listener and patient even with people who take up your time. Now John rarely troubled to make himself agreeable or polite to anybody, shoemaker or senator, except to the small circle

of his devoted followers. One can understand his reasons for dismantling the rich episcopal palace and declining to give banquets to the clergy. Yet there was an apostolic injunction which he forgot, not only that a bishop must be "the husband of one wife"—if only to keep him human—but that he should be "given to hospitality." John was unmarried and he ate his meals alone. Besides, he did not make pastoral visits. It was a waste of time, he explained, and also, as he put it, "one man complains if he does not get as long a visit as his neighbor." High-minded and sincere as his aims were, he produced the unfortunate impression in some quarters of being a mean, proud, morose person, rather angular and one-sided.

This he might have lived down, had it not been that he came into conflict with the Court. John might depose inefficient bishops, lash degenerate monks, ridicule worldly members of the church, promote missions to the Goths, and hire enthusiasts to demolish pagan shrines, if he chose; all that was regarded as a more or less venial eccentricity. It was a very different matter when he dared to call himself a second Nathan or Elijah or John the Baptist, for then everybody knew who his David was, or his Jezebel, or his Herodias. The target was unmistakable. Plain speaking was indeed a duty, and John did not flinch from it. He was no tame court chaplain. Small wonder that, in the high heaven of the Sun, Dante set John between Nathan the prophet and Anselm, not the Anselm who wrote on theology but the Anselm who rebuked royalties to their face.

VI

The Court meant practically the Empress Eudoxia, a vindictive beauty, who resented anyone like John daring to influence the weak husband over whom she ruled, or to talk in public about her own peccadilloes, such as her dress or lack of dress. She and her ladies were wounded, and their wounds embittered them against this bishop of moral courage. With the masses, John was still popular. They liked his charities and they loved listening to his denunciations of the rich. Even the rich members did not mind his sermons against fashionable society; probably they went home to enjoy their dinners with a fresh relish, after the entertaining eloquence of the preacher. But many of the clergy were infuriated, and ere long, in 403, after a series of events into which there is no space to enter, a shameful intrigue was started, in which the Court party and some ecclesiastics joined

hands. The leader of the latter group was Theophilus the patriarch of Alexandria. It was only by order of the Court that he had reluctantly taken part in John's consecration. Now he thought that his chance of revenge had arrived after brooding for some years over the promotion of John at the expense of his own candidate for the office. Besides, he persuaded himself that John was guilty of sympathizing with Origenism, which was anathema to the church of Alexandria. He trumped up flimsy but dangerous charges of heterodoxy, of John's uncanonical use of episcopal powers, and even of treason—anything to implicate and discredit the offending John in the eyes of the Court and the Church. The charges seemed plausible, as Theophilus had a reputation for sanctity, that is, for orthodoxy, like his equally unpleasant nephew and successor, Cyril. One is content to say of Theophilus, as old Fuller said of Richard Hampole, "It become me not *ἀγιομάχειν*: let him pass for a saint!" An ambiguous fourth-century saint, indeed, whom we prefer to pass by, a prelate whose conduct in hounding John to death reveals under the guise of ecclesiastical rectitude a worldly minded schemer. One of his coadjutors, it is sad to relate, was the old bishop of Beroea, who considered that John had once treated him discourteously by lodging him in poor rooms instead of welcoming him to the episcopal residence. As the old bishop ate what he thought an inadequate supper, he muttered, "I'll cook a dish for the fellow!" So he now did, so did all the party of Theophilus, who arrived in person at Constantinople with money to bribe any doubtful voters in the synod. He persuaded the Empress to give him a free hand. A synod was actually held, at which John was condemned, on charges that ranged from the crime of munching lozenges in church to heresy and maladministration, contumacy, and even treasonable speech against her majesty.

To escape his foes, John slipped off over night. He had hardly left the city before a slight earthquake shook Constantinople. Earthquakes have no respect of persons, and the royal palace quivered. So did Eudoxia. She hated John, but she hated death by an earthquake worse. Evidently there was no use in fighting a man whose God proved so quick and sharp an ally! So John was at once recalled, to the delight of his followers, who celebrated the occasion by chasing Theophilus and his gang out of the city. Eudoxia overflowed with facile excuses. John swallowed her profuse apologies with naïve readiness. If he was never wanting in moral courage, he was sadly defective in judging character; when Eudoxia wrote, "I

have attained a finer crown than the imperial diadem; I have restored the head to the body, the pilot to the ship," and so on, John actually believed these fine words. From the pulpit he called her "the most devout mother, mother of the churches, staff of the poor." If there was one text of scripture which the good man forgot to ponder, it was this: "Put not your trust in princes"—or, for the matter of that, in princesses. At Constantinople, for example, he showed more of the dove's innocence than of the serpent's wisdom.

Two months, and Eudoxia's penitence was over. Her next exploit was to gratify her vanity by erecting a tall column of porphyry in front of Saint Sophia, on the top of which a silver statue of herself was placed for all men to admire and all women to envy. Round this column dances and songs went on uproariously. Inside the church John thundered at her as Herodias. One of the simple axioms for life which he had imbibed from the monastery was, "Where there is dancing, there is the devil." His pulpit utterances were carried to the ear of the Empress and her ladies. They would not lose in the telling. The Court rallied his ecclesiastical foes, and this time the Emperor himself took action, till in the June of 404 another synod solemnly deposed him. The soldiers sent to arrest and eject him hacked their way into church, and blood actually stained the water in the baptismal font. To prevent rioting among his supporters, John withdrew from the city. This time it was a final farewell. No avenging earthquake took place as he was deported to Armenia in the first instance. To him flowed the indignant sympathy of Christendom, except of the churches at Alexandria and (the pity of it!) Antioch, where a new bishop had been installed who sided against John. The church at Constantinople was practically ostracized. But his enemies, now intrenched there, would not leave him alone. Disappointed that he still lived, consulted and supported by the Church at large, they ordered him in 407 to a remote, wild spot on the shore of the Black Sea. The old man had barely reached the place before he died. He had borne his three years of exile with fine courage. Nothing in his life shines out so brightly as the cheerful, undaunted spirit with which he stood the disgraceful treatment meted out to him by the local authorities at Constantinople. "Glory be to God for all things!" were the last words he is said to have uttered, and they were not a mere fine phrase; it was in this noble temper that he had lived out his

exile, interesting himself in local mission work, and assuring his supporters that God would overrule the present confusion for good.

VII

Like Jerome's, John's career suggests that a fair motto for the fourth and fifth centuries might be, "The world was in the Church," just as a similar motto for the first three Christian centuries might run, "The Church was in the world." One of the most ominous and significant things in the story of John's life is the reason why he was persecuted; it was not for heterodoxy—that was generally a pretext—but for having made matters too hot for worldly minded Christians among the clergy as well as among the laity. At his best, when he was preaching, he put a steady pressure on the conscience of his congregations. He was never forgiven at Constantinople for having scorned to be a time-server either in or outside of the pulpit. Nothing was more resented than his moral independence, which was misrepresented as autocratic self-importance or personal self-assertion. "The three greatest evils of the Church today," said Cardinal Manning, with reference to the Roman communion in last century, "are French devotional books, theatrical music"—he meant, in church worship—"and the pulpit orator. And the last is the worst." John was eloquent with all a Greek's power of rhetoric, but he was not a demoralizing influence such as Manning described; he did not preach like an emotional pulpiteer who works with facile sensationalism. He was, indeed, "a man of eloquence who aimed to be a man of action in the world" and in the Church. Instead of echoing popular prejudices, he preached to his times manfully, if not always wisely, both at Antioch and at Constantinople. It was because of this, and because he administered his diocese in the spirit of his sermons, that the tragedy arose in the capital. When the blow fell, he sacrificed himself without a murmur or a regret. It says much for him that he was neither crushed nor soured by the ordeal. The moral determination of the man is conspicuous, through the dark business of his deposition—that, and the genuinely Christian spirit in which he faced an outward defeat due in part to handicaps of training and temper for which he was himself responsible. No one could say of John that he was born a man and died a preacher. He was never more of a man than in the dragging days at the end of his career. These three years broke nothing but his health—he died in his enemies' day and in the peace of God.

A Forgotten Source of Ethics

THEOPHIL MENZEL

THE Nile river seems to come from nowhere. The ancient Egyptians traced their sacred river back beyond the cataracts and found that it emerged from the dense jungle. They concluded that it flowed from the underworld. The river was evident enough to the Egyptian, but its source remained a mystery. Modern explorers have found that the Nile does not flow out of the underworld. Its source goes way back into the interior of Africa. What was formerly called the Nile is simply the lower section of one of the largest rivers of the world.

The traditional academic attitude toward the sources of our ethics is quite comparable to the Egyptian belief concerning the source of the Nile. If we consult the standard treatises on the history of ethics we find that most of them trace our ethics back through the ethical philosophers. It is assumed that back of the ethical philosophers there is little or no ethics. Back of the Greeks lies barbarism. Socrates and Aristotle are supposed to be the fountainhead from which our ethical norms have proceeded. And if we follow the traditional description of the progress of ethics we are told that ethics is well nigh identical with ethical theory. We are supposed to believe that the great molders of our ethical life have been those thinkers whose systems are described in the textbooks on ethics.

This type of teaching is guilty of gross scholastic provincialism. It is scholastic because it assumes that ethics is identical with speculation *about* ethics. That is as false as the assumption that religion proceeds from theology, or that art is created by the art critics. It is so dominated by a speculative interest that it occupies itself exclusively with thought forms and neglects that moral dynamic from which ethics proceeds. Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant and the moderns have re-thought the ethical theory of the West, but have they been the chief molders of our ethical life? Are we not dominated by scholasticism if we attempt to trace the development of our ethics without so much as mentioning the names of the Hebrew prophets, Jesus, Luther, Calvin or Wesley?

The scholastic ethicist may reply that he is not trying to trace the ethical development of our society. He is merely trying to discover the

various types of ethical theory. But in that case he ought to state frankly what he is trying to do. Great numbers of students in our universities today are taking courses in ethics in the hope that they will be enabled to understand the moral confusion of our modern life and be helped in the discovery of an adequate moral dynamic. Often we are giving them stones when they ask for bread. Then, too, the scholastic may reply that he cannot become involved in the study of the history of religion. His occupation with speculative ethics is a sufficient task. But such an attitude reaches the heart of the matter as effectively as the old-fashioned phrenologist who felt the bumps on your head and proceeded to tell you all about the capacities of your mind. Ethical theory hardly scratches the surface of man's moral life. We have discovered the importance of psychology and sociology for an understanding of our moral life, and it is high time that we recognize the importance of religion in man's struggle for the good. It is unnecessary to settle the question of the relation of religion to the origin of ethics, for it is evident enough to anyone who cares to study the question, that all of the higher religions have at least played a tremendous rôle in the development of ethics. All of the more highly developed religions have set up ethical patterns of conduct. In fact, it may be argued that the most influential ethical patterns have been advanced by religions. Then how can the ethicist neglect the study of religion?

We have been prevented from seeing this by the provinciality of our study of history. When we study what we call the "history of philosophy" we are only studying the history of European thought. It is naïvely assumed that there has been no philosophy outside of our Western culture. As a matter of fact, philosophy had already reached a very penetrating stage in India at the time when Thales was propounding his crude teachings in Greece. Egyptian thought had occupied itself with ethical problems before any Indo-Germanic race had appeared in Europe, and Chinese teachers had reached high levels of ethical thought centuries before the time of Plato and Aristotle. We suffer a great loss when we assume that our European thought exhausts the treasury of the world's thought.

And because our study of the history of philosophy has been restricted so provincially to European thought, we have had our perspective of the development of ethics restricted in like manner, for in the West ethics has been regarded as a sideline of philosophy. But in looking for ethics mainly in the field of philosophy we have overlooked many of the world's most

influential ethical patterns. Outside of Europe, ethics has not been the handmaiden of philosophy. In the whole of what we call the "Orient" ethics has had an intimate connection, not only with philosophy, but with religion. The Westerner is apt to overlook this, for the West has not produced a single one of the world's great religions. All of the great surviving religions were born in the Orient.

Our tendency to find ethics only in the sphere of philosophy is a weakness which we have inherited from ancient Greece. The Greeks had good reasons for ceasing to expect anything ethically good to come out of their religion. We have retained their attitude without asking whether we have good reasons for doing so. At the time when philosophy began to develop in Greece, Greek religion was in a process of decay. The Greek pushed forward to great achievements in speculative thinking, science and art. But his religion remained the religion of the childhood of his race. The time came when the mature philosophy and art of the classical age of Greece could no longer live on good terms with the religion of primitive days. Religion remained in a condition of arrested development. Just when Greek religion might have been expected to develop a conviction of a righteous God who guaranteed a righteous order in the universe, religion failed to grow. The result was that philosophy assumed nearly all responsibility for ethics. Philosophy cannot be blamed for this. No prophets had appeared in religious circles. Man's vision of God had not been clarified. No body of sacred scripture had been produced to nourish and enrich Greek piety. Life became increasingly complicated, but religion remained a nature cult. It was as inadequate as the performances of a medicine-man would be in America today. Certain cults arose which tried to meet the need by an appeal to emotional revivalism. Orphism tried to meet these changes by stirring man's feelings, much in the manner of certain modern cults in America. But it had no ethic to offer except a tendency toward asceticism, born out of ritualistic aims. The representatives of classical Greek thought turned away in disappointment.

Something had to be done. Greek life was suffering from a loss of moral nerve. Philosophy tried to step into the breach. In the absence of the conviction of a righteous God, the philosophers tried to discover a pattern of good life. To an increasing extent philosophy begins to take over the functions of religion for the upper classes. It is not philosophy but religion which is to be blamed for this. Religion failed to grow so the

Greeks made a religion out of their philosophy. In the centuries preceding the emergence of Christianity it is difficult to say whether such movements as Stoicism, Platonism and Cynicism were philosophies or religions. They were attempting to fulfill the functions of both. At the time of Christ we find that many Greeks were attempting to use philosophy as a religion, others had turned to the mystery cults, while the Greek peasant clung to the old worship of personified forces of nature. But neither the nature religion of the peasant nor the newly imported mystery cults had any advanced ethical content. The Greek of the upper classes who was struggling for an ethical view of life found an answer to some of his questions in the thought of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Thus ethics was weaned away from religion and men regarded philosophy as the guardian of the good life. Greek religion stagnated upon a childish level when ethics needed to be carefully reared, so philosophy became its foster-father. The contribution of philosophy to the development of Greek ethics was of great value. It not only enhanced pre-Christian thought, but it furnished useful tools for later Christian thought. Both Christian theology and Christian ethics are indebted to Greek thinkers. After a few centuries Christian thinkers realized the value of Greek thought and appropriated much of it, according to the policy of Justin Martyr, "Whatsoever has been rightly said by all men is the property of us Christians."

But what many students of ethics have failed to observe is that while the language of ethics has been largely borrowed from Greek philosophy, the dynamic and character of ethics in the West have not come from philosophy, but from the Christian religion which came to dominate, to some extent at least, the nations of Europe. It is one thing to trace the origin of terms which ethical theorists employ, and it is another thing to discover the source of the dynamic which impels the moral life of a culture. The Greeks have given us ethical concepts, but they have not given us ethical power. Whatever ethical forces have been at work in our culture are largely due to those religious movements which have arisen in our life. Thus the traditional account of the development of our ethics is utterly unrealistic. We assume that Aristotle, Spinoza and Kant have given us our ethics. But they have only been keeping the books and formulating the resolutions. What has actually left an impression upon our moral life is the early Christian hope of a kingdom of God, Augustine's dream of a city of God, the medieval ascetic's longing for salvation, the rediscovery of

the conscience of the individual at the time of the Reformation, and the modern realization of the need of establishing a Christlike social order in the face of a capitalistic industrial order of society. These are the ethical tides that have really affected us. If we forget them, however, and if we merely occupy ourselves with the ethical philosophers, we are hiding in the study room rather than finding out what is actually going on in the living room.

The reason why we have failed so utterly to locate the main stream of ethics is because, in our desire to be objective, we have left out of consideration the one great factor which is the great determiner of ethics in all cultures, namely, the kind of God which men acknowledge. In the history of mankind the nature of dynamic ethics runs parallel to the kind of God or over-world in which men truly believe. Greek ethics remained comparatively sterile because it was formulated, not on a basis of a belief in God, but as a substitute after the old gods had either died or had been transformed into frozen philosophical absolutes. The ethical theorists of our day have followed them in ignoring God. Christianity picked up certain Greek tools which were becoming somewhat rusty, but were nevertheless usable, and used them to express certain Christian moral convictions. And within the history of Christianity the change in the belief in God is a barometer, or rather a partial cause of the shift in ethical emphasis. Early Christian ethics is a corollary of the early belief in the God whose kingdom is a communion of saints. When the concept of God becomes that of an inaccessible Czar in the Middle Ages, ethics becomes other-worldly and ascetic in order that God may be appeased and salvation may be earned by subservience. The Reformation was in part due to the discovery of the accessibility of God. The way to God is open to each individual. Every man is responsible and welcome. Thus ethics became extremely individualistic. In the last generation we have again learned to think of God as being concerned with more than individuals. God is again concerned about the wholeness of things. Life is more than what we are apt to see as individuals. The emphasis upon a God who rules over a kingdom has again brought us face to face with the relations of the members of the kingdom to each other. To be sure, the conditions of our life have enabled us to discover such a God. Our discovery of human realities teaches us something about God's character. But the realization of such facts does not become truly ethical until it is linked with the ultimate reality. When a fact is so utterly real that it par-

takes of the ultimate nature of things it achieves transcendental significance and becomes binding and ethical.

If we see what kind of a God is acknowledged by a culture, we can discover the type of ethics which is truly operative in its affairs. Of course we cannot always discover what kind of a God is acknowledged by consulting the textbooks on theology. The God which preachers and theologians proclaim may be a sort of infinite Santa Claus, while the God which the men of that age actually worship may be a deified banker. But such distortions of belief are apt to be rather temporary and will suffer violent collisions with reality when history steers us around the next corner. Both the Santa Claus and the banker theology are disappearing in American religious life. On the whole the type of belief in God remains fairly permanent within a given religion.

The way in which belief in God is related to ethics may perhaps be seen with greater clarity if we turn to certain of the non-Christian religions. In certain other religions the term "God" may not imply the same degree of personality which is implied in the Christian use of the term God, but there is at least the meaning of an ultimate power or an "over-world." And within the culture in which this God is acknowledged, the ethics which is actually a moral influence is patterned after the character of the God.

Let us take a glance at Chinese culture. No matter what the historians may say about the implications of the Chinese term for "highest being," it does denote an ultimate power upon which man depends and to which he must be obedient. This power dominates the world and causes it to operate as one harmonious organism. It is quite impersonal, encourages no intimacy, and returns good for good, and evil for evil. The impersonality of the divine order discourages any emphasis upon the value of individual personality. Its primary concern with cosmic processes leads the Chinese to place primary emphasis upon the wider relationships of life. The individual is not the focal point of Chinese religion. The family in the wider sense of the clan and the whole span of history are the most actual entities in Chinese life. Moral life consists in living in harmony with this order. The man who refuses to fit himself into this divine natural order is simply running his head against a stone wall. Heaven is not a personal will, so the man does not sin against a personal God, but he makes a fool of himself by refusing to acknowledge a cosmic order which is the supreme fact of life. Chinese ethics is a corollary of the Chinese conception

of the divine order. It is from this order that both goodness and reality are derived.

Indian ethics suffers from a paralysis because of the arrested development of its God-concept. The early nature gods of the Vedas failed to grow up into moral beings and so they passed into the discard with the advance of religious thinking. Religion and philosophy exhausted themselves in the search for the one reality behind the many. The search was ontological rather than ethical. The pure being of the divine was sought aside from the ethical *character* of God. It is no wonder that this characterless God failed to give content to life, for he had no content himself. Like most mystics the Indian mystic claimed that he had found a "that" but he could not say "what." Such a God can appear in vague visions, but he never asserts a clear unequivocal "Thus saith the Lord." The Indian *saw* his God at times, but he seldom heard him *speak*. What we see in visions is vague and must be interpreted with hesitation. What we hear is clear and unquestionable. Visual revelation never has the authority of auditory revelation. Indian religion is primarily visual and never achieves the certainty of the auditory revelations such as are found in Judaism and Islam.

Thus Hinduism remained ethically befuddled. Its gods could not speak with clarity. They had no relation to time and space. They were, as Stanley Jones has said, "sitting gods." So Hinduism must discover an ethic in spite of the silence and inactivity of the gods. It discovered some basis for its ethics in the law of Karma. Karma is the practical world order. It is the over-world to which man adjusts his life. Karma determines caste and caste becomes the molder of lives. Thus Indian religion suffers from a split condition. Devotional life is directed toward gods who have no connection with life, and ethics is determined by powers which do not proceed from the gods. In this case the gods cannot determine an ethic, and the consequence is a lack of integration. Perhaps some of this lack of integration in Indian ethical life is due to another cause, namely, polytheism. Polytheism causes an alienation of affections. How can man find an integrated pattern of life when he is torn between loyalty to a number of gods? An integrated moral life may be as difficult under polytheism as harmonious domestic love is difficult under polygamy. One God demands practices which other gods condemn. Thus the gods are relegated to a place outside of the world and outside of history to become lame-duck gods. Indian

ethics remains inconsistent and shattered. What is right for the holy man is wrong for the layman. What is justifiable for the Brahmin is impious for the outcaste. A constipated theology produces a constipated ethic. The roots of the ethical uncertainty of Hinduism may be found in its religious confusion.

Buddhism succeeded in escaping from much of this confusion by ignoring the old gods of Hinduism. But this does not mean that Buddhism became atheistic, as is so often asserted. It is true that Buddhism may not have been theistic in our sense, but atheistic is too strong a term. It did acknowledge a world order, an over-world upon which man can depend and which is so constructed that salvation is possible. It may be that this over-world was quite impersonal at first (although it is impossible to state with certainty what the doctrines of primitive Buddhism were) but it was not very long before the historical Gautama Buddha was regarded as a symbol of the heart of the universe. Thus the ethics of Buddhism is derived from the character of Buddha. He is for all practical purposes the God of Buddhism. His noble personality has left an indelible stamp upon the Far East. Yet his ethical influence was greatly curtailed by the asceticism of the movement which bears his name. No religion can do its best to save the world if it believes that the world has no value.

The clearest ethical patterns have been projected by those religions in which one God is regarded as the governor of the universe. They are Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islam and Christianity. (Zoroastrianism is often referred to as a dualism, but the dualism is only temporary for Ahura Mazda will ultimately triumph over the forces of destruction. His will is man's only law.) These are the religions which speak of *hearing* the word of God. These are the prophetic religions which speak with clarity and urgency, and well they might, for there is one personal God who has a living contact with the world and who is the great arbiter of history. Such monotheisms project an ethical pattern of life before any ethical theorists appear in their midst to give a reasoned justification for the demands of goodness. And each of these religions deducts its ethics from the character of God. We can say to any true monotheist, "Tell me what your God is like, and I will tell you what your system of ethics is." It is of course true that no culture has been a pure embodiment of the will of the God whom it claims to worship. There are many cross-currents which deflect men from absolute loyalty to God. But if these cross-currents become strong enough, they

may themselves become gods, as nationalism has often done. And when nationalism becomes the supreme authority it immediately imposes its own system of ethics. Thus the emergence of nationalism not only raises political issues, but results in ethical and religious conflicts, as is the case in Germany today. Totalitarianism is a theology which cannot avoid projecting its own pattern of ethics.

Not only has the idea of God been the molder of ethics, but it has also given the world the earliest conception of an order of the universe. Before philosophers attempted to systematize the phenomena of life or before ethical theorists erected their systems of conduct, the religions of the world projected the conception of an order in the universe. And religion preceded science to an even greater extent in this respect. No doubt religion prepared the way for orderly philosophical thinking and for the scientific classification of facts by first suggesting a structure of the universe governed by God. Early Vedic Hinduism spoke of this world order as *Rita*, Zoroastrianism called it *Urta* or *Asha*, early Chinese religion called it *Tao* and Buddhism called it *Dharma*. Greek religion also had several such conceptions. Judaism and Christianity found it rooted in the very character of God and called it the purpose of God and the kingdom of God. Such universal concepts impressed men's minds with the existence of order and relationships in the universe, and greatly facilitated the birth of philosophy, science and ethical theory.

Nothing has been said of the influence of social life upon religious ideas. That is being repeatedly pointed out in modern literature on the subject. What has not been pointed out is the influence of religious conceptions, and still more important, the influence of religious movements upon ethical concepts and ethical patterns of life. It is partly for this reason that the academic study of ethics has remained so sterile. Youth groups in our country are showing an increased interest in the moral passion which the Hebrew prophets derived from their experience of God. They are searching anew for the implications of Christ's vision of the kingdom of God. Gandhi, Kägawa, yes, even the Communists and Fascists, are demonstrating the social dynamic which emanates from a belief in a power beyond the mere analytical logic of individual minds. Yet we continue to treat ethics as if it were a tour through the study rooms of writers on ethical theory.

Our age has sensed the unrealistic nature of such a state of affairs. It

has turned to the economic determinists for an explanation of human conduct. The folly of economic determinism lies in the fact that it claims to explain everything. It can explain much, but it has only preserved a sense of victory because it has failed to venture forth into an explanation of those cultures which existed before or outside of the capitalistic-industrial order. Just as the ethical theorist might be challenged to explain the ethical patterns of life of the great cultures without reference to the gods, so the economic determinist might be challenged to explain the history and social forms of India, for example, without taking into consideration the great molding power of her religious experience. Many of the economic phenomena in Indian life can only be understood when viewed upon the background of traditional religious conceptions. Not even methods of farming or techniques of craftsmanship can be altered without clashing with Indian religion.

We cannot arrive at a mature understanding of human conduct unless we take all of the vital factors into consideration. A dogma of theological determinism would be just as inadequate as any other type of determinism which attempts to explain all of life by means of one factor only. Yet in our attempt to be scientific and rational we have lost contact with organic reality. As a consequence our understanding of life is frequently as vital as the would-be physicist who thought he had arrived at a definition of violin music when he described it as the sound vibrations produced by the contact of horsehair with catgut.

God, whatever kind of God men worship, or whether they call him God or not, leaves his mark upon our life. The influences that bear upon us are many, yet we have not told the whole story until we recall a forgotten source of ethics—God!

The Business of Preaching

JOHN PATERSON

THE writer, who for seventeen years was a minister of the Church of Scotland, has been engaged for the last five years in the task of preparing men for the Christian ministry. He has found it an enriching and enlightening experience to pass from the rôle of preacher to that of auditor, and while at times he has occasion to speak from a pulpit he has had ample opportunity to learn something of current preaching by sitting in the pew. Moreover, he has frequently had the pleasure of addressing meetings of preachers, and as his observations have proved not unwelcome he has ventured to record some of them here.

The purpose of preaching, be it said at the outset, is *to make God visible*. Despite all our talk and verbal ingenuity there is in the hearts of our hearers an unsatisfied feeling which may express itself in many forms but which can be summed up in the words of Philip to Jesus, "Show us the Father and it sufficeth us." That feeling, often mute and unexpressed, is there, and very much there when we have finished our address on the merits of N. R. A. or the Gold Standard; it is still there after our verbal fireworks on such trivial subjects as "Spare Tires" and "Flats Mended." It will not suffice to say that we live in a modern age and must be modern in our preaching. The human heart and sin are essentially the same in our day as in the days of David, and though there should be two cars in every garage and two chickens in every pot men will continue to sin under electric light as they sinned under candlelight. The grace of God and the human heart fit each other like lock and key, and modern men will continue to seek the old-fashioned salvation. "Thou hast made us for Thyself, Lord, and our unquiet heart can find no rest till it finds rest in Thee." The same people who go to the hospital to see a doctor for their body's sake go to church to see and hear a minister for their soul's sake. They believe that there is a word of God for their life. The church, as Bunyan put it, is the Interpreter's House, where men come to hear God's ways interpreted and vindicated to their understanding and conscience, and when that is done there will be an answer and a response on the part of the worshiper in the form of a solemn "Amen." We pride ourselves today that

we have set religion into the interrogative mood and substituted "O Yeah" for the old-time "Hallelujah," but that is only make-believe. It is whistling to keep our courage up, an effort of bravado on our part; for all we have done in these times is to substitute the "fear of life" for the "fear of God." We have become "quakers" in a new sense and have gotten a well-nigh incurable inferiority complex. For all our brave show the heart's cry is really there, and the tragedy is that we ministers fail to deal with it in a satisfying manner. There is still balm in Gilead; there is a physician there; there is a living, healing Word of God for the life of His people.

The unpardonable sin in a preacher is to have nothing to say—and to say it. Preaching is proclamation; the New Testament word for a preacher is a "herald" and the Old Testament word for "prophet" means practically the same, signifying a man who speaks by delegated authority on behalf of another. It is not verbal adroitness nor wisecracking, it is proclamation of the *truth as it is in Jesus Christ*. The preacher's business is not to demonstrate his own ability but to "unveil the Son" and let men see Jesus, that they may believe in the tender loving grace of God. Principal Denney used to urge this sternly on his students and it needs renewed emphasis in every age. There is always the danger that the preacher may get between men and Jesus and obscure Him, so that men marvel at the intermediary and fail to be drawn and fascinated by the winsomeness of the Saviour. It is a solemnizing thing to think of what we have to do; and a sensible man will shrink, as did Jeremiah, from such a task, saying, "Who is sufficient for these things?" But that is what we are set to do, and as we do it wisely or unwisely so shall it be for the fall and rise of many. To read the titles of sermons in a Saturday evening paper frequently leaves one with a feeling of bewilderment as to what it is all about. To hear the comments of a congregation as it disperses is also revealing; quite plainly nothing has happened. Why should it be so? The reaction of the first converts to the Pauline preaching was so different. When Paul "unveiled the Son" men cried out "What must I do to be saved?" or they shouted "Thanks be unto God." So again was it with the preaching of Dwight L. Moody and Spurgeon, and so I have heard it in the preaching of Stanley Jones—but it is certainly not the normal thing today.

In this connection it may be worth asking whether the attitude of a congregation to its minister does not hold inherent danger, whether it does not approach very frequently that envisaged by the writer of the Apocalypse

when he warns of the danger of "worshiping the angel." The "angel," that is, messenger or minister, must guard in his own life against this, for there is always the possibility that he who is called to be the pastor of the flock may end by being its pet lamb. It is to be noted that most of the Old Testament writings and many of the New Testament are anonymous; the preachers there were too much concerned with God and His kingdom to think of perpetuating their own name and fame. It is not for nothing that the Roman Church garbs its clergy in black; black is the negation of color and the priest is one who has negated self and sunk his Ego. We might well learn from them here.

Furthermore, we want to rethink our conception of public worship, that we may know what we are about. There is much confused thinking here. When people come to church they are coming face to face with something God in Christ has done for them, something that lays them under an infinite obligation of gratitude and praise. The instinctive thing should be to burst into doxology, and those churches are wise that set the doxology as the initial act of public worship. That is what makes the New Testament "the most radiant hymn-book ever written"; theology is fused into doxology, for it sees to the roots and realities of things. John McNeill, the well-known evangelist, put this response even further back and deeper, when, referring to the prevailing custom of the plate at the door for reception of the offering, he said the worshiper ought to come bounding up the steps and that his first joyful cry should be, "Hallelujah, where's the plate?" There is more in that than may be obvious, and it might well raise a question in our minds as ministers; if our people were conscious of the infinite debt they owe to God in Christ would we have to plead with them for finance? Is it not possible that we have a financial stringency in our churches because there is a famine in the things of the spirit? It is at least certain that a church whose sole concern and aim is to balance its budget will never become a creative factor in the life of its community; it may be that here in our church policies we have stressed the wrong values and put the cart before the horse. However that may be, and we merely refer to it in passing, the preaching or proclamation ought to be such that the hearers will be moved in some way; the inevitable reaction to preaching like Spurgeon's or Parker's or Phillips Brooks' or Jonathan Edwards' was "Hallelujah, what a Saviour!" or "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?"

The writer's feeling about many sermons he has heard is that the man is standing outside his subject and never seems to put himself into it. It is not fused to white heat; it is not "truth mediated by personality." It is a talk, an address, a good talk, maybe, but after all only a "feast of wind"; it is not a sermon as the prophets or apostles understood sermons. There is a verse in James' Epistle very relevant to the matter in hand; it reads in the Authorized Version as follows, "The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much." A literal rendering would be, "The prayer of a righteous man has great power *when it is energized.*" James knew as well as we know that there are prayers that never rise from the floor because there is no drive, no passion, no push behind them; the man does not throw his heart into them. Likewise with sermons, they must be energized and made dynamic. Every sermon ought to cost a man his life-blood; "virtue must go out" of us as we preach. We are getting nothing out of our preaching because we are putting nothing into it and things that cost nothing are worth nothing. A wealthy business man in Manchester was in the habit of supplying some of the rural pulpits in the North of England. After a morning service in a little church he walked down through the vestibule and saw a box affixed to the wall. Thinking it was for contributions to the poor he put in the equivalent of fifty cents. At the close of the evening service one of the stewards waited on him and explained that as they could pay no honorarium they kept this box in the vestibule for voluntary contributions to the preacher, and this day they had done better than usual. He handed the gentleman the fifty cents. On telling the story to his family at dinner next day one of his children wisely remarked, "Daddy, why didn't you put more in and you would have got more out?" Which thing is a parable; let him that hath ears hear. When the Scottish Covenanters signed the Covenant in 1638 many signed with blood drawn from their veins; every sermon should be so signed today, but most of us are suffering from pernicious anemia. Preaching was meant to edify the saints and convert sinners, but again nothing happens; "the hungry sheep look up and are not fed." Nothing will happen until we put blood and iron into the business and feel the virtue going out of us. Costly preaching will always find buyers.

It is not easy to analyze the cause of all the shortcoming. So far we have considered the matter of preaching; what of the preacher? The preacher should certainly be a man of prayer, a man of study, a man of

God. He should have Greek and Grace and "Gumption." He should be in the ministry because he cannot stay out of it; he feels an irresistible constraint. It is so with every Old Testament prophet and it is so with Paul, and if we would stand in the same succession it must be so with us. These men "run" because "they are sent." This sense of call, of being "else sinning greatly a dedicated spirit," delivers a man from all false starts and gives dynamic to his ministry. "By the grace of God I am what I am." The minister, too, must be an expert in religion—it is not required nor desired that he be expert in politics or economics—and that he is because "the secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him." He stands in the counsel of God and sits in the heavenlies with Christ Jesus; like Moses, he comes down from the mount to make God visible and His claims clear, to show the pattern of life as God means it to become. He lifts his people into the heavenly sphere and lets them hear "the murmur of the infinite sea," points them to the land of far distances and reveals the King in His beauty, until his hearers say, "Surely this is the house of God and the gateway to heaven"; and perhaps they will add, "We never saw it in this fashion so before; he teaches with authority."

The minister should be mighty in the Scriptures, with power to make them plain to the feeblest understanding; his authority here is that of an ambassador who speaks in the name of his King and seeks to win the unredeemed tracts of life and experience for his Lord. Such conquests are won by the proclamation of the Word for it "is mighty to the pulling down of strongholds; it is as the hammer which breaketh the rock in pieces." The Word of God has an authority that does not adhere to the opinions of men and such authority will be admitted by the worshiper generally. Here a caution should be added and it is this; the preacher must remember that he speaks where the hearer has not the right of reply. There will be no need of reply, for when the man knows his business he will be dealing with matters that are not debatable.

This cannot be done dispassionately but only in the spirit of prayer; the minister exercises the offices of a prophet and a priest, and he will bear his people on his heart to the throne of Grace. It is told of Doctor Andrew Bonar, well-known preacher and hymn writer, whose ministry is still memorable in Glasgow, that he used to take his communion roll and pray lovingly over every individual name. Our ideal here will be John Bunyan's Interpreter: "The man whose picture this is is one of a thousand; he can

beget children, travail in birth with children, and nurse them himself when they are born. And whereas thou seest him with his eyes lift up to heaven, the best of books in his hand, and the law of truth writ on his lips, it is to show thee that his work is to know and unfold dark things to sinners; even as thou also seest him stand as if he pleaded with men." The minister must be prophet and priest, interpreter and intercessor.

All this is confirmed by a study of the Old Testament, particularly the prophets, and inasmuch as what has been said in the foregoing is based on their experience and ministry there is no need to dwell on these points further. There are, however, some points in the delivery of their message to which we may refer briefly.

In the first place their preaching was simple and direct. There is no word in Hebrew of more than three letters—no big jawbreaking vocables. In that sense Jesus, too, is thoroughly Hebrew, for there are few words in the gospel story that a child cannot read and understand. It is different with Paul and we can sympathize with Peter when he says, "There are many things hard to be understood in the epistles of our brother Paul." Sanctification, justification, reconciliation, and adoption are no meat for babes, but they find no place in the vocabulary of Jesus. He is the soul of simplicity and there is no darkening of counsel here. "Never man spake like this man." Simplicity is the last word in art, and it should be in our preaching if we are going to stand in the prophetic ministry.

Concreteness again is the mark of the Old Testament and the Gospels. The Bible is fearfully plain; it calls a spade a spade and never turns aside to say it is an agricultural implement. It does not use terms like environment and heredity, and all our psychological jargon is foreign to its speech; it does know the world, the flesh, and the devil and speaks very plainly of them, and the man in the street understands its teaching. Heredity is an abstraction, but "the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge" is not abstract; it is sheerly concrete. Disarmament may be a real issue, but the Hebrew made it more real when he gave the concrete "they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks." A subject like "The Immutability of Character" he would not have understood, but anyone can understand his way of putting it; "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots?" "The Oriental thinks with his eye," and every time the word is made flesh; every abstract becomes concrete and living. "Union is strength," we say in our

abstract manner, but the Jew here thinks again with the eye and visualizes that idea into the concrete with "two dogs killed a lion." Even a child is interested in dogs and lions, and adults are just grown-up children. Mark again the stark realism of the Hebrew as he looks at our proverb, "Familiarity breeds contempt," and how he makes that worn trite thing shine as he renders it "The poor man hungers without noticing it." There is pathos and there is punch about that saying. Again, we can never understand the tragedy of Cain till we *see* it as Scripture lets us see it. "Cain was angry" does not convey much to us, but it conveyed a picture to the Hebrew when he wrote the story and said, "Cain's face fell," and the language used suggests not only a dark, lowering storm cloud—the lips were once turned upward in a smile but are now fallen downward in a frown—but lets us hear the peal of thunder. The Lord who "lifts up his countenance" on the children of men says, "Why is thy face fallen?" The emotion is visualized; the word is made flesh and we see that anger. Or, again, how full of sheer beauty is this, "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth and on the seventh he rested and *took a breather.*" (See Exodus 31. 17.) What a charter of liberty for the toiler! Could the creative joy of the Divine Creator be more picturesquely described or emotion more clearly visualized?

He discusses no problems, but he shows us persons—not a problem of suffering but a man suffering, Job on his ash heap. Joseph in the house of Potiphar keeping his eyes on God and a hold on character; a glittering snake with sinuous coils and fascinating eye whispering in the ear of a woman; Daniel with his back straight when everybody bends in dumb conformity—these are his pictures and they come straight home to us through the Eye-gate. That is the Hebrew way and it is the child's way; it is the soul of simplicity. That it is that makes preaching great and memorable; it opens people's eyes and they see, and what they see they do not readily forget. The graphic method was that of Alexander Whyte, whose centenary is being celebrated just now; who that ever heard his sermon on the Rich Young Ruler could forget that? The prophet says at times he "saw" the Word; we want his eyes. He that hath eyes let him see. The Word is really alive but we kill it by our abstract thinking; we darken the counsel of God and throw dust in our own eyes and in the eyes of our people; we pass for erudite because we are abstruse—and don't know our business. Doctor Bowie in his recent Lyman

Beecher Lectures on Preaching draws an interesting distinction between the authority of dogmatism and the authority of discovery. We have had too much of the former and too little of the latter, with the result that we have a dangerous drift to Fundamentalism which is really a confession of our own mental impotence and a denial of the Holy Spirit. Here we have today the real atheism of fear. At this moment we want to let sleeping dogmas lie and refuse to become victims of phrases or proclaimers of out-worn shibboleths; for that type of preaching we would gladly agree to a prolonged moratorium. But we do want men with the pioneering enthusiasm of discovery which is the authentic mark of the prophets; men who won their message in the sweat of their heart and agony of spirit, and stood forth to proclaim a shining simple certainty that constrained the assent of their hearers. Is not this the veritable mark and token of the Saviour's preaching? and there the response is immediate. "The common people heard him gladly." Something in them rose up to meet the message; deep called unto deep. It had all the authority of discovery; "he taught as one having authority and not as the scribes." Ears were not made for earrings but for hearing, and when the people hear words that come with such authority they will listen and obey. The scribes, ancient and modern, could write fine essays on God and make Him the subject of many a dissertation, but as for knowing Him in living experience or as a present possession they were incompetent. They could not say with constraining and convincing power, "I know and am persuaded," they could not "make God visible" nor show forth the simple reality of the divine grace as did the Master of men in those matchless concrete domestic parables of the gospel story. There is our model and exemplar. "The common people heard him gladly" and they will always respond to such preaching. Sir Iain Colquhoun, a Highland laird of sporting instincts, was King's Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland a year or two ago. In delivering the closing address as representative of His Majesty the late King George V, he commended highly the intellectual equipment and spiritual zeal of the ministry, which could not be too highly praised, but, he added, "when you return to your various parishes and congregations try to speak a *simple word for Jesus Christ.*" All our erudition should make us fit for that; that is our business, and we must strain our intellect and task our conscience until we can "speak a simple word for Jesus Christ."

Can We Believe in Progress?

GEORGE F. THOMAS

THE idea of progress, as we know it, is primarily an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century phenomenon. Earlier thinkers such as Bacon and Descartes prepared the way by turning men's minds away from a past "golden age" and a future "heavenly bliss" to an earthly happiness within their own power. But the full-blown idea of progress came later and required the co-operation of a number of factors: (1) the impressive achievements of human reason in the natural sciences; (2) an empiricist theory of knowledge according to which cumulative experience formed the source of all knowledge; (3) a sensationalistic psychology which regarded the soul as plastic to an indefinite extent; (4) a view of the past as inferior to the present, in knowledge, in freedom, and in the arts; (5) the faith, first clearly enunciated by Comte, that scientific laws of society could be discovered and that social evils could be eliminated by following these laws; (6) the Industrial Revolution, with its multiplication of wealth and the instruments of living; and (7) the Hegelian philosophy of history, and the Spencerian doctrine of evolution which from different points of view encouraged belief in the inevitable development of humanity toward a goal of universal harmony and rational freedom. From its first roots to its latest fruits there can be seen at work upon the modern idea of progress the secular, humanitarian, self-confident will of man, proud of its achievements in scientific discovery, religious and political liberation, and material improvement.

Since the turn of the present century, and especially since the Great War, these foundations of the modern idea of progress have been called in question. For one thing, we have become highly dubious about our superiority to the past. We fear that what we have gained in scientific knowledge we have lost in moral and philosophical wisdom, that we have abused the opportunities provided by our social and political freedom, and that technological progress has become a serious menace to economic security and to life itself. For another, we have little confidence in the power of our reason to discover scientific solutions of fundamental social problems, and less confidence in the power of our will to apply solutions of any kind to

them in the face of entrenched opposition. We see how hard it is to attain objectivity and unselfishness where our own cultural, class, or national interests are involved; and we fear that the minority who are able to do so will be overwhelmed by the inertia, the fear, and the selfishness of the greater number. Finally, we no longer believe that the forces of natural evolution or historical necessity can be trusted to bear us irresistibly onward and upward. There have been too many failures, partial successes, cross purposes, and sheer brutalities for us to rely upon the life-impulse or the dialectic of history. We are more impressed by the tenacity and the fecundity of life than by its rationality; and spiritual life at times seems to us, not the dominating force of history, but a rare and precarious sport of evolution. For these and other reasons, we question the validity of the arguments for general progress drawn from the scientific, social and material changes of the modern world. We are too impressed with the limitations of human capacity and the unreliability of cosmical forces to delude ourselves any longer with Utopian dreams.

In the Romanes Lecture of 1920, Dean Inge gave voice to the post-war feeling about progress. "Neither science nor history," he argued, "gives us any warrant for believing that humanity has advanced, except by accumulating knowledge and experience and the instruments of living." In the absence of any progress in "human nature itself," these gains are "external, precarious, and liable to be turned to our own destruction, as new discoveries in chemistry may easily be." It is "very doubtful" whether we are "more human or more sympathetic or juster or less brutal than the ancients." "We could do much to determine our own future, but there has been no consistency about our aspirations, and we have frequently followed false lights and been disillusioned as much by success as by failure." "It is part of our nature to aspire and hope; even on biological grounds this instinct must be assumed to have some function." But the grandiose nineteenth-century doctrine of progress must be abandoned. "For individuals the path of progress is always open," though it is a narrow and difficult path which will never be crowded. And there will probably be "new types of achievement" and "new flowering-times of genius and virtue" in the lives of nations. But the notion of a single infinite purpose working itself out in the world as a whole must give way to the notion of a number of finite purposes each working out "that perfection which is natural to it." In his restriction of actual progress to knowledge and in-

struments, in his pessimism concerning human nature on its moral side, and in his belief in many finite streaks or waves rather than in one infinite movement of progress, Dean Inge is characteristic of the post-war period. In the light of events of the period since 1920, many will find even his view too optimistic for today.

It may be well to remind ourselves that the post-Renaissance period which developed the idea of progress was a time of liberation, of discovery, and of intellectual achievement. In a time of forward movement, the hopes of its thinkers seemed reasonable. Descartes was convinced that his method of analysis would free men from the heavy hand of authority in scientific and philosophical matters, and clear the way for an indefinite extension of men's knowledge of nature in the future. Bacon's hope that his method of investigation would lead to a greater power of man over nature and his own happiness seemed to justify itself by successive triumphs of natural science and invention. Revolutionary thinkers of the eighteenth century criticized existing religious, political, and social institutions so effectively that ancient superstitions and tyrannies seemed to be disappearing before the dawn of enlightenment. Occasionally, solitary thinkers such as Hume put brakes on the enthusiasms of their rationalistic contemporaries by pointing to the presence of irrational forces in man. For a time, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, a reaction against the excesses of rationalism and utopianism set in. Burke, Wordsworth, Carlyle, and others protested against the unreal abstractions of eighteenth-century thinkers, and urged a more organic and historical view of society. But the current was against them, especially after the defeat of Napoleon brought peace and the Industrial Revolution began to bear its fruits of general prosperity. The gospel of progress merely assumed a more deterministic form in the nineteenth century. Fichte and Hegel lent the sanction of idealistic philosophy to the hopes of political and cultural progress by demonstrating *a priori* the necessity of divine self-realization through the history of states. Comte's dream of a society guided by social scientists according to the laws of society and advancing by historical necessity seemed a more promising and scientific ideal than that of the French Encyclopedists. And Spencer sought to show the absolute necessity of progress toward perfection by appealing to fixed laws of evolution. Thus, the nineteenth-century gospel of progress could appeal, not merely to the reason and will of enlightened individuals, but also to the inevitable work-

ing of biological, historical, and divine processes. Comte, Hegel, Marx, and Spencer, so different in most respects, are at one in their belief in such immanent and impersonal forces. It was an age in which individuals felt themselves carried forward by forces greater and wiser than themselves; and the union of self-confident individualism with this natural and historical determinism generated an invincible optimism.

It was, therefore, not unnatural that an age of such solid achievement in science, government, culture, and industry should develop grandiose hopes for the future. What seems strange to us today is that its thinkers, with few exceptions, accepted an abstract and over-simplified view of human nature that encouraged rather than limited these hopes. The "retarding demons," as Goethe called the irrational forces of pride, selfishness, prejudice, lust, inertia, and fear, were overlooked or minimized by these optimists. Carried away by the successes of reason in mathematics and physics, eighteenth-century revolutionary thinkers were unable to see the difference between abstract reasoning and social wisdom, as Burke pointed out. Because of the obvious evils they found in social institutions and traditions inherited from the past, they assumed that these must be swept away and supplanted by new institutions and traditions constructed by reason. They saw in human history little more than a series of stupidities and tyrannies, or went to it mainly for the purpose of tracing the stages that had led up to their own enlightenment (Condorcet). In ethics, the most influential theory during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a Utilitarianism which saw no great difficulty in reconciling self-interest with social welfare. The mechanistic and atomistic method, which had proved so fruitful in natural science, was applied without reserve to psychology, resulting in a sensationalism and associationism destructive of the spiritual unity and autonomy of the self. The soul was regarded as little more than a sensorium for the reception and assortment of physical stimuli and the registration and calculation of pleasures and pains. Finally, the prestige of natural science led to a confident naturalism in metaphysics and man was swallowed up in the natural order which had increasingly obsessed him. Having forgotten that he was a spiritual being who could never be satisfied completely by natural objects of desire or by social life, it was inevitable that he should accept the anthropological views of the social, biological and historical determinists from Comte to Spencer. It was equally inevitable that practical men should take great satisfaction in the in-

crease of wealth and the number of improvements. Only a minority remembered that human integrity and dignity are more hardly won than human comfort and pleasure.

I believe that there is truth in the idea of progress if it can be purified of excessive hopes and based upon other grounds than those cited by the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century optimists we have been describing. If this is to be done, however, two fallacies which underlie much of their thinking must be avoided. The first is that the question of progress is simply a question of fact concerning the unknown destination toward which man is inevitably being driven by impersonal forces, his own rational will being but a secondary and instrumental factor. And the second is that progress is incompatible with, or at least is independent of, Providence. Even a critical historian like Bury falls into the error of supposing that these fallacies are necessary elements in the idea of progress. "The idea of the Progress of humanity," he writes,¹ "raises a definite question of fact, which man's wishes and labors cannot affect any more than his wishes and labors can prolong life beyond the grave." "The process must be the necessary outcome of the psychical and social nature of man; it must not be at the mercy of any external will; otherwise there would be no guarantee of its continuance and its issue and the idea of Progress would lapse into the idea of Providence."

But the idea of progress does not logically require to be expressed in these terms. (1) Progress is not a "fact" about the "unknown destination" of man which his own efforts cannot affect. A "destination" fixed and independent of human effort would not be a "human" destination but a fate imposed by an external power. It is true that the "psychical and social nature of man" in general must be relied upon for the continuity of progress, for progress requires the co-operation of many individuals during many generations. But this does not mean that progress is not affected by individual purpose and effort or that individual wills are only the instruments of impersonal processes of life and history. Indeed, it is meaningless to say that human progress *is* a "fact" or *not* a "fact." For since human freedom implies creativity and contingency, the future is not determined in advance. Deterministic ways of thinking, whether rooted in metaphysics or in science, must not make us deny this element of contin-

¹ J. B. Bury: *The Idea of Progress*.

gency. As Bury points out, even if it was inevitable that the French Revolution should lead to a military dictator, it was not inevitable that that dictator should have been Napoleon. If Napoleon had not lived to manhood, the course of events might have been very different. We cannot, therefore, speak of progress in the future as a "fact" but only as a "possibility" or "probability." The attempt to explain or predict unique and contingent human events in terms of uniform biological and psychological laws is doomed to failure from the beginning. It is the product of an illegitimate effort to extend the method of the natural sciences into history.

(2) The ideas of Progress and of Providence are *not* mutually exclusive. It is true, as we have just indicated, that individual effort is a necessary condition of progress; and it may be held by robust moralists and successful men of affairs that no other condition is necessary. But is it certain or even probable that there will be enough unity and co-operation between individuals to realize general and continuous progress? The facts of history show that many individuals have attained a high level of self-realization and that there has been much co-operation between individuals for common ends. We do not know with certainty the limits of such self-realization and social co-operation. It may be that they allow a far greater advance toward individual and social perfection than we can now imagine. There are rational and spiritual capacities in men which have been and in the future may be increasingly on the side of progress. T. H. Green has pointed out² how the moral ideal has been deepened and widened in many respects since the time of the Greeks; and Bergson has emphasized³ the fact that religious feeling may produce a universal love of life more effectively than reason can do. We must not, therefore, draw the line too confidently which circumscribes the possibilities of such human rationality and love for progress. But it would be unrealistic to neglect the many evidences of human weakness, perversity, and irrationality forced upon us by our experience of ourselves and by the records of history. Moral optimists can always say, of course, that these evidences are drawn from past experience and that it is the nature of the self to transcend its past weaknesses and errors. There is no logical refutation of this argument, but there is little evidence that the human self in general has such unlimited capacity of self-correction as the argument implies. It would,

²T. H. Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

³H. Bergson: *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*.

therefore, seem that we must postulate a superhuman Being or Agent if we are to have an adequate ground for belief in general and continuous progress. We cannot postulate such a Being on the evidence of past progress alone, for it has been too partial. Nor can we do so on the evidence of future progress; as we have seen, that is as yet not a "fact" but only a "possibility." But if the existence of a divine Being and His providential concern for human life seem probable on other grounds, we may find in Him an adequate explanation for the limited progress of the past and a basis of hope for the future. Our conclusion will then be that, though human progress cannot take place without individual effort, such effort must be inspired and strengthened by a divine and providential Being. In short, the only adequate condition of general and continuous progress is the union of moral effort and providential aid.

Kant has stated the moral ground of belief in progress with much force. Every man, he says,⁴ is prompted by his sense of duty to act so that posterity may become better. "I take my stand upon my innate sense of duty in this connection. . . . Now, whatever doubts may be drawn from history against my hopes, I am not entitled to give up the guidance of duty which is clear and to adopt the prudential rule of not working at the impracticable, since this is not clear but is a mere hypothesis. . . . The fact that something has not yet succeeded is no proof that it will not succeed." He takes the moral imperative to realize a lasting peace as an example. "The moral practical reason utters within us its irrevocable veto: 'There shall be no war.' . . . And although the realization of this purpose may always remain but a pious wish, yet we do certainly not deceive ourselves in adopting the maxim of action that will guide us in working incessantly for it; for it is a duty to do this." Clearly, this means that the belief in progress rests in the first instance upon the moral imperative in individuals to bring about a better world, however unfavorable to their hopes the evidence from history may seem to be. The implication is that the idea of progress is, in part, moral in origin. It is a necessary expression of the purposive nature of man's action. It rests upon a command that refers to the future and to the present action as determining the future. It is not simply a supposed "fact" or "law" to be verified

⁴ Immanuel Kant: *The Idea of a Universal History*, etc.

or rejected by an appeal to the history of the past; it is an ideal set up on the assumption that the future can be made better than the past.

But Kant also recognizes that individual moral effort is not enough by itself. Progress, he says,⁵ "cannot depend so much on what we may do of ourselves . . . as on what human nature as such will do in and with us to compel us to move in a track into which we would not readily have be-taken ourselves. For it is from human nature in general, or rather—since supreme wisdom is requisite for the accomplishment of this end—it is from Providence alone that we can expect a result which proceeds by relation to the whole and reacts through the whole upon the parts. . . . Being adverse to each other in their plans, men would hardly be able to work together in order to influence the whole out of any particular free purpose of their own." Kant is surely right on the main point here, whatever one may think of the rather pessimistic view of human nature which he implies. Since general progress involves a unity of direction of the intelligence and will of countless individuals sustained during many centuries of time, it requires the presence of a pervasive tendency in "human nature in general" which is possible only on the supposition of a controlling Providence.

Once the primacy of the *moral* and *religious* grounds of general progress has been made clear, we may safely admit the importance of self-assertion, economic conflicts, and other *natural* and *social* forces in the process. Kant does so when he argues that there is a sort of natural purpose which is driving man willy-nilly to the perfection of his faculties as a rational being through his irrational impulses. Men, he says,⁶ will be forced by the destructive conflicts that arise from their "unsocial sociability" to form just civil societies and to secure lasting peace under a federation of nations. There is serious objection to this way of putting the matter. It is romantic to ascribe to "Nature" as such a rational "purpose" for man. Kant is here employing eighteenth-century terminology which is really incompatible with his own view of nature as the totality of ordered phenomena. Moreover, if progress rested primarily upon the irrational impulses of human beings as members of a natural species, Kant's strong assertion of its origin in man's moral nature would be contradicted. What he must mean, therefore, is that man's irrational impulses can be turned to the ends

⁵ Kant: *Ibid.*

⁶ Kant: *Ibid.*

of progress by man's rational will aided by the Providence which controls nature. At all events, self-assertiveness by itself could not possibly bring about the political and international order Kant desires. The struggle for economic gain, social prestige, and political power has at times undoubtedly been an important cause of human achievement. But by itself it inevitably results in destructive conflicts. It must be made to serve the moral and spiritual life before it can further progress. In short, while self-assertiveness, individual and collective, may provide a strong challenge and incentive to the rational and moral will by producing evils so great that law and peace are seen to be imperative, by itself it leads to chaos rather than order and progress.

Nevertheless, the importance of these and other non-moral factors for progress must not be underestimated. For one thing, moral imperatives must win the support of non-moral impulses before they can be realized in action on a large scale. Kant describes⁷ with prophetic insight how non-moral causes, such as the poverty, exhaustion, and fear bred by incessant warfare, may help to establish an effective league of nations. And Whitehead has shown⁸ how potent were the non-moral forces which helped to bring about the final triumph of the rational ideal of human worth over slavery. For another thing, the moral imperative would have little content without the recognition of ends that are essentially non-moral. The rational and moral life is not lived in a vacuum, but in the context of all man's interests. Some of the highest values of personal and spiritual life, for example, love or beauty, depend in large part upon non-moral impulses. We must, for these and other reasons, guard ourselves against an exclusively moral and religious interpretation of progress. For progress requires natural occasions and opportunities, no less than moral effort and divine aid. Thus, non-moral forces such as personal ambition, class conflict, and national rivalry may further progress, but only to the extent that they can be limited and qualified by moral purpose.

When we say that the root of progress is the moral will, we do not, of course, mean that all who have contributed to progress have done so from consciously moral motives. In many, perhaps most, cases they have acted from interest in a special science, desire for order in a com-

⁷ Kant: *Ibid.*

⁸ A. N. Whitehead: *Adventures of Ideas.*

munity, the impulse to create beauty, and the like. To many, indeed, it has seemed that such interests have been more effective than moral effort as causes of actual historical progress. Historical progress has been attributed by different thinkers to the development of scientific intelligence and method, to political change, to economic revolution, and to the imagination of the poet and the prophet. But though there is doubtless reason for each of these theories, it must be insisted that general, continuous progress cannot result from the presence of any one or any group of these factors alone. For general progress is not a matter of intellectual, political, economic, or cultural advancement alone, nor of advancement on all of these fronts successively. The chief fallacy of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historical arguments for progress is that they rested upon the facts of development in certain fields of human activity, such as science, political freedom, and industry; and optimistic historians still tend to identify the progress of humanity with the progress of the democratic movement, the increase of wealth and comfort, and the like.

But if man is one, his welfare cannot be a mere sum of unrelated goods nor his progress a series of special attainments. The distinction between progress in limited fields and progress on the whole may not be absolute but it is very real. When the term "progress" is uncritically used, it is often taken to mean mere "change" or "improvement in the material conditions of life." But when thoughtful people discuss the question "whether there has been progress," they almost always have in mind "general" progress or progress "on the whole." It seems obvious that the primary condition of such "general" progress, as distinguished from progress in special fields, is moral will and effort. As "general" progress must include the whole of human nature with all of its major interests, it must rest upon the human faculty which strives for wholeness. And the moral purpose is distinguished from non-moral desires and interests precisely by the fact that it is concerned with the fulfillment of the whole self and the whole of humanity. Moral will must of course be enlightened by reason and motivated by love if it is to perform this high function. This means that its morality must be a dynamic, "prophetic" morality, not the static, "closed" morality which is concerned with conservation rather than betterment.⁹ In short, rational men, whose good will is inspired by love of their fellows, alone can be counted upon to strive

⁹ Bergson: *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*.

always for fullness and increase of life and thus to further general progress.

It is true that "general progress" is a highly complex notion and does not admit of a simple and precise definition. Its criteria are far more difficult to determine than the criteria of progress in special fields. It is complex not only by its reference to many-sided human nature but also by its reference to the whole sweep of human history. To determine adequately the definition and criteria of general progress, therefore, it would be necessary to possess an adequate theory of values, of the self, of society, and of history. Even then only a broad and general treatment of general progress could be given. For one cannot know the ultimate goal of humanity; one can at best trace out certain lines of advance in the past and attempt to chart one's course without disloyalty either to past gains or to future possibilities. The term "general progress" is therefore a "regulative principle." It cannot define adequately the ultimate goal; but it demands that we should act in such a way as to better human life as a whole as it unfolds itself toward the unknown future.

But, it may be asked, what is the theoretical or practical value of the idea of progress if it cannot be precisely defined? This question arises only because it is supposed that the idea of progress is meaningless unless its ultimate goal can be adequately specified. But men can see only a step or two ahead; and their purposes change as they express themselves in action. Progress, then, must have reference to the stages of the journey no less than to its end. That is why it would be unreasonable to "sacrifice" the past and the present to some "divine far-off event" at the end of time. Progress is process rather than goal, movement rather than arrival. Or, rather, it is process always in a measure attaining its goal, movement always in a measure arriving at its terminus. This is not, of course, to deny that a purpose of the process is presupposed, but only that its *purpose* is identical with its *end*. For the end is an abstraction if taken apart from the previous stages of the movement, and vice versa. If this is so, the fact that we cannot give a precise and adequate definition of "general progress" does not destroy its theoretical and practical value, as a "regulative principle." Theoretically, it serves to broaden the basis of our historical judgments, the significance of a particular event or period being es-

timated in relation to as much of the whole movement of history as we can discern. This saves us from hasty and uncharitable judgments upon the acts of others and makes us aware of the complex nature and broad significance of our own. Practically, it makes for action distinguished by piety toward the past and responsibility toward the future. In short, the idea of progress sets us the double task of discovering the meaning of human history as a whole and of relating our action to that meaning as we conceive it.

This presupposes, of course, that human life as a whole has a meaning and that the moral effort of men in time partially discloses that meaning. It presupposes, in short, the ultimacy of teleological, moral, and temporal categories for the understanding of human life. Now, there have always been Christians who have objected to the idea of progress precisely because of these presuppositions. They have argued that moral effort directed toward the betterment of human life encourages pride and worldliness, and that religion is concern with "eternal values" or the "last things" which are in God's power rather than with earthly "Utopias" to be set up by human effort. In other words, the idea of progress has seemed to them a secular idea out of place in a religion more concerned with the eternal life or the last judgment than with worldly progress. Many Platonists, Mystics, and Absolute Idealists have tended to disparage progress in the belief that all that counts is devotion to Eternal Good; Apocalypticists, on the other hand, have scorned progress because it has seemed to them gradual and human rather than dramatic and divine in its coming. My reply to both groups is the same. It is of the very essence of human action to move in time toward ends which can be realized only by progressive approximations. To say that the higher life of humanity is something wholly apart from such action is to say that it has nothing to do with moral effort. But if there is a God who has a concern for the higher life of His creatures, moral action and the human betterment at which it aims cannot be indifferent to Him. To minimize all belief in progress, therefore, is to be guilty of a disguised form of amorality or atheism or both. Christianity is the enemy of unqualified pessimism no less than of sentimental optimism.

It is more profitable, however, to understand an error than to refute it, especially if the error springs from concern for an important but neglected truth. The error of those who attack the idea of progress is of this sort. They realize the glaring weaknesses of the kind of progress

which was exalted in the hundred and fifty years that preceded the World War, particularly its association with evolutionary and optimistic naturalism. They know, too, that progress, even if more firmly grounded in moral will, can never produce a perfect society or humanity. The limitations of human nature and its environment are such that we cannot expect an earthly Paradise to crown even our most sincere efforts. Exponents of progress in their romantic enthusiasm have often overlooked this fact and made progress into an idol. Moreover, the critics of progress are impressed with the abiding and unchanging character of the good life in all ages and among all peoples. Human nature seems to them basically the same today as in the fifth century B.C.; and the values which gave dignity to the life of the Greeks are not yet outmoded in fast-moving America. Does not the idea of progress, on the contrary, emphasize the changing aspects of human life to the neglect of these more important permanent factors? The truth is, progress itself can be conceived only in relation to that which does not change. Not only must it be measured in terms of the realization of enduring values, but it is possible only on condition of the continuity of the human will throughout the process. To neglect eternal value and human continuity is to fall prey to temporalism and externalism. Finally, to men of lofty moral and religious idealism, the character of human will as manifested by its virtues and preferences is more significant than the ultimate consequences of its acts for the future. Does not the idea of progress, on the contrary, stress the external and remote results of human action upon posterity rather than its inner quality? Is it not, indeed, the product of a morally insensitive utilitarianism which prizes men for what they effect rather than for what they are? Does it not lead to the substitution of social improvement for personal goodness?

These criticisms are fatal to any naive attempt to turn devotion to progress into a religion. Progress is not an idol to be worshiped; it is not even an adequate ideal and end of moral action. Like pleasure, it is likely to be furthered best by those who are not always thinking about it. Certainly we cannot settle our moral problems by appealing to the ideal of progress. For we cannot know the ultimate consequences of our acts for the future; we can only trust that acts which are good as far as we can see will be good in their final fruits. But the more modest conception of progress which we have outlined is not open to any of these criticisms. Future progress, we have said, is not a fact, but a possibility. The idea of progress

owes its origin to a moral demand and its hope to a belief in Providence. It makes use of natural forces and limited interests, but the wholeness it seeks requires the continuous efforts of rational men of good will. It is a "regulative principle" by means of which we can gain perspective in our historical and breadth in our moral judgments. Far from sacrificing the present to the future, it sees the future and the present alike in terms of the purpose of history as a whole. It does not tell us how to act, for it is not the moral standard; indeed, it can only be defined and measured in terms of a value standard beyond itself. It does not deny eternal values nor assert the priority of grandiose schemes of external improvement over personal goodness. Finally, it does not assert that progress will continue indefinitely, since we cannot plumb the depths of the divine purpose or determine the limits of human capacity. An honest believer in progress must make full confession of his ignorance as he confronts the mystery of the future. But he can never turn his back upon the moral demand that he use his freedom in such a way as to leave the world better than he found it or upon the faith that his effort will bear its fruit in a meaningful world.

Aesthetic Experience and the Good Life

JANNETTE E. NEWHALL

EVERY thoughtful person is trying to find the secret of rich and satisfactory living. The religious, especially we Protestants, have been slow to recognize the values of aesthetic experience—in part because of our inheritance of a feeling that art is of the devil and also in part because many artists have protested against utilitarian interpretations of their work. But these prejudices are waning and the time is ripe to raise the question of the contribution of aesthetic experience to the good life.

The good life, in the fullest sense, is the life which aims to realize all values in due proportion in so far as conditions allow. The good will, truth, beauty, and holiness, as well as the lower values, such as health and recreation, should each be sought for its own sake, with due regard to its relations to other values; and the purely instrumental values of economic wealth should be pursued solely for their proper use as means to intrinsic values, individual and social.

A life may, nevertheless, be morally good even if it fails to include some of the values, such as the aesthetic, provided it is governed by a consistently good will and provided the omission is due to force of circumstances or to ignorance and not to deliberate and groundless neglect. Kant states the principle of good will in his famous sentence:

“Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will.”

This “formal” goodness is essential to all moral life. It is possible for the most ignorant laborer or the narrowest specialist to exercise a formally good will even though both of them, consciously or unconsciously, may leave certain values out of account. The laborer may ignore the values of Wagner and of Einstein; the specialist may have no time for the value of baseball games on a sandlot or of prayer. The laborer may know that symphonies are beautiful and that his would be a richer life if he could hear them played, but he may choose, or be compelled, to make some other use of his time or money. The specialist likewise must necessarily relinquish some values if he is to fulfill his obligations in his own field. Both are justified

if they have considered the total realm of values, as far as they know it, and chosen to exclude only those which conflict with their main purpose.

All of which is to say that the test of the good life is not a mere quantity of values but rather the rational organization of values for the sake of a life ideal. Most persons could find some place for all the values within their life scheme, but no person can be judged bad because his life is necessarily incomplete. It is accordingly true that a man may be decent and still neglect the aesthetic, and it is also true that, if a man is fortunate enough to be able to include aesthetic values within his moral experience, his good fortune has important consequences for his moral life as a whole. Our present interest is in the latter truth and its social implications. In the *Phaedrus* Socrates prays for a moral life that is a work of art:

"Beloved Pan and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul and 'may the outward and the inward man be at one.'"

A true sense of the beautiful is a judgment upon ugly living as well as upon ugly lines and discordant tones and colors. But the beautiful and the good must not be so mingled as to lose their identity. Just as goodness may be independent of art, so art is, in a certain sense, independent of morality. All of life is a field for aesthetic interpretation, and in this interpretation distinctions of good and evil are aesthetically secondary.

Yet we often forget that personality is an organic unity and that no one type of experience can be wholly cut off from the rest. The fact that aesthetic experience requires disinterested absorption in the aesthetic object is sometimes taken as a proof that beauty can be studied in any of its particular manifestations with no consequent effect upon the moral life. This is false psychology. The good life is the whole life, and aesthetic experiences are parts of that whole and must have meaning for it. There must be some relation between the aesthetic and the moral. In trying to understand this relation, we shall consider several philosophies of art and of life which lie back of common attitudes, noting especially Dewey's contributions to the problem in *Art as Experience*.

I. THE AESTHETIC ESCAPE FROM LIFE

The belief that the aesthetic serves as an avenue of escape from life is due to the interpretation of actual life as ugly, evil, and hopeless, or at least tiresome and unpleasant. Life must, nevertheless, be endured, and one of

the methods of achieving peace and poise is to flee as often as possible from the actual to the ideal. Schopenhauer is the best representative of this view. He believes that reality is fundamentally an irrational will. This will is present in every man, driving him to desire which can never be satisfied. Partial satisfactions are followed by ennui and then give room to new desires. This miserable existence can be endured only by escaping as far as possible from willing. Schopenhauer finds a temporary escape through the contemplation of Platonic Ideas. These Ideas represent all phases of existence, good and evil, but so long as they are treated as Ideas, they may be viewed with disinterested contemplation. Schopenhauer's discussion of the sublime makes especially clear the detached attitude that is necessary. The beautiful, he says, represents the "fittingness of nature" to our life and understanding, while the sublime is found in those objects which bear a hostile relation to the human will. Only the great soul can forget personal danger in a wild storm and maintain the attitude of aesthetic contemplation; yet such contemplation gives a truer and higher value than that derived from viewing the merely beautiful aspects of nature.

Aesthetic escape is difficult even for the genius. The common mortal, "that manufacture of Nature," says Schopenhauer, "which she produces by the thousand every day," does not know how to be disinterested. No person can have aesthetic pleasure if he cannot rise above his own will in contemplation. Yet the genius can supplement the experience of the less gifted by expressing in art what he has perceived in moments of pure contemplation. The vision of the artist is, however,

only conditionally communicable, because the Idea, comprehended and repeated in the work of art, appeals to every one only according to the measure of his own intellectual worth. So that just the most excellent works of every art, the noblest productions of genius, must always remain sealed books to the dull majority of men.

Socially this theory means that the genius tries to communicate his vision to the masses but that most of them are incapable of understanding his language. Hence aesthetic escape is impossible to the many. Even for the genius, escape is only transitory, for the art which seems so perfect in contemplation brings but a deeper insight into the essential evils of existence.

Two other philosophies of aesthetic escape have been influential, namely, the dream theory and the play theory. The dream theory is the view that art is a realm of make-believe. In dreams anything can happen for there are no controlling limits of fact or purpose. Santayana finds the

beautiful in the realm of essence or pure imagination, not in existence. DeWitt Parker's theory that the function of art is "wish-fulfillment" (doubtless influenced by Freud) is also an escape philosophy, although he modifies the view by including the values of contemplation as well as satisfaction of desire. This theory is morally more dangerous than Schopenhauer's type of escape. Schopenhauer finds aesthetic satisfaction by suppressing the interests of the individual and contemplating reality as it is expressed through the Ideas. The dream, on the other hand, lacks a basis in reality. To escape into a dream world is to make a perverted use of aesthetic imagination and to deprive it of a function in reality.

The play theory, suggested first by Kant, is an assertion of opposition within life between work and play, in which work represents drudgery and play, freedom. It is truer than the dream theory because it provides for activity and is related to the real world. Dewey criticizes it for excluding the aesthetic entirely from the field of labor, for he believes that every activity should have its aesthetic side. Perhaps both are a little wrong, Kant in drawing so sharp a line between work and play, while rightly recognizing the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, and Dewey in believing that every instrument must be aesthetically satisfying. There are occasions when a beautiful end can be obtained only through disagreeable and ugly means. However, the real danger in this, as in other philosophies of escape, is that distinctions between the real and the illusory are blurred, and delight in art is won at the expense of a sense of reality.

Socially the philosophy of escape is a failure. Art, as well as religion, too often has been an opium of the people. When art is treated as an escape, the worker may be given an occasional concert instead of a raise, and a Christmas card instead of a bonus. It is easy to appreciate the poetry of Pippa and to overlook the sweatshops of New York.

In short, however common may be the view that aesthetic values are delightful illusions which are to be used as means of escape from an unpleasant reality, it is not an adequate one. Aesthetic values may be so treated, but when they are, neither art nor social life fulfills its function completely. But the view is ultimately to be rejected on metaphysical rather than on merely practical grounds. Idealists like Sorley, who hold that value experience points to an objective order of values precisely as sense experience points to an objective order of things, reject the escape philosophy because they believe that aesthetic experience enlarges our view of the

real and cannot be isolated from the rest of the real. Dewey holds it is metaphysically false because it emphasizes individualistic rather than social values and because it denies the unitary natural order. No view is adequate which breaks up experience into contradictory elements.

2. THE AESTHETIC ABSORPTION IN LIFE

The naturalistic ground for rejecting the attempt to escape from life to art leads logically to the second theory, namely, that art should concentrate on the actual rather than the ideal. If the pessimists were right in saying that existence is an evil, then let us accept it as such and not seek for soft and easy escapes. This is the philosophy for James's tough-minded souls who prefer disillusionment to any illusion, however pleasant. Bertrand Russell's *A Free Man's Worship* is written in this spirit.

In recent art we have many illustrations of this view, which is commonly called aesthetic realism. In contrast with classical sculpture, which represented idealized divine figures of the imagination, modern realistic sculpture gives human nature, full of defects and ugly lines which are often exaggerated through an apparent fear that they may retain some traces of idealism. Much of Epstein's work is a case in point. We have a Eugene O'Neill and a Gertrude Stein, and a host of other writers, who lean over backward lest they paint life with even the faintest sign of a halo—though O'Neill has become religious in his recent work.

The realistic attitude appeals to Dewey, although he rejects such extremes as those just mentioned. He finds art closely bound up with its source in nature. Art is not some illusory ideal that contradicts or ignores actual existence; but every normal experience has an aesthetic quality which should be discovered and fostered. Naturalism in art, he says,

means that all which can be expressed is some aspect of the relation of man and his environment, and that this subject-matter attains its most perfect wedding with form when the basic rhythms that characterize the interaction of the two are depended upon and trusted with abandon.

There is danger, however, in trusting with abandon any one aspect of our natural experience. This trust has led to mere imitation of nature and has cramped the creative imagination. It has retarded society by its unwillingness to portray the ideal. Dewey's general theory, which derives values experimentally from concrete experience, has often resulted practically in a disregard for some of the less obvious but equally important values. It

assumes that values will always yield practical results. The consequence has been constant experimentation with real and supposed values and the rejection of many valuable ends along with the means that have proved inadequate for their realization. Some values which do not show their full worth at the present time may be practical in the future. This argument has been used, it is true, to support a Nietzschean pitilessness in the Germany of Hitler, but it has also been used by Christian martyrs to support loyalty to ideals in spite of torture and death. Let moral reason judge which is the truer value.

The aesthetic absorption in environing life which attempts to draw all its values from the contemporary scene and from the natural order is one-sided and inadequate. Nature must be judged by ideals of how it may be remade by "creative intelligence," to use a term characteristic of pragmatism. Socially aesthetic absorption in life may lead either to complete pessimism and acceptance of the *status quo* or to gradual improvement of conditions as men learn ways of co-operating more adequately with nature. But when nature is remade by intelligence, we have moved beyond the stage of mere realism. And Dewey is one of the first to urge a more adequate interpretation of nature which will show man as a part of nature and as the source of the remaking of nature through intelligence.

3. THE AESTHETIC REDEMPTION OF LIFE

The aesthetic redemption of life is neither an abandoning of life for a realm of delightful but unsound ideals nor an ostrich-like burying of one's head in a sandy reality which has been divested of its most precious values. It is an honest facing of the full content of existence—nature, man, and values—and an organization of the ideal and the real into a new unity in which the truth of both is included in an aesthetic harmony. The thesis set up by the pessimist was that the real world could not be made better on any significant scale and that peace was to be found only in flight to a realm of aesthetic imagination. The antithesis supported by the aesthetic realist was that nature was to be accepted with grim determination as the sole criterion of value. The synthetic view of the function of aesthetics sees the natural order as furnishing material to be molded into a work of art according to human purpose, and believes that genuine progress in harmonious organization of life may be achieved, slowly and with great effort, but nevertheless persistently, if we will give our aesthetic instincts a chance.

Aesthetic experience has an important part in the redemption of life. In the first place, the theorist may set up formal ideals of aesthetic organization which may support and illuminate the moral organization of society. The artist's creative imagination is a realm in which a great variety of possible ends is contemplated. These ends reflect the society in which he lives, whether he accepts it slavishly, rebels against it, or criticizes it objectively. Robert S. Lehman, writing on the "Anatomy of Poetry" recently in the *New Frontier*, speaks of the "intellectual chaos" of our poets who have no integrated world-view. Almost any clear-cut philosophy of life is better than aimless blundering. In order to make existence better either aesthetically or morally, an ideal of the better must be set up. The pragmatists, who have been so influential during the last decade or more, must bear some of the responsibility for the lack of a clear goal in our society. They have stressed experimentation, but in general they have not been conspicuous for their efforts to define ends, in spite of the fact that some conception of a desired outcome is necessary if any genuine experimentation is to take place. Dewey's emphasis on purpose in *Art as Experience* means that plan and system are necessary parts of experimental process. In *Experience and Nature* he uses the example of the builder of a house who must have an "end-in-view," a definite plan, throughout the process of construction. Details of the plan may be modified, but the main structure must be built as intended or no true experiment has been made. The great artist knows at least vaguely what he intends to portray and can judge the finished product by the standard of his initial vision. The good life demands a similar foresight. Both the aesthetic and the moral vision may be criticized, but the presence of the ideal is a stimulus to more perfect organization.

Art may function, secondly, as social criticism. This is a difficult rôle, for purely didactic art ceases to be art and fails in its function of social stimulation. Tolstoi, for instance, overemphasizes the moralistic function of art, demanding that it always promote the Christian virtues. Yet if art is to interpret life as a whole, it cannot omit the moral from consideration. Dickens and Mrs. Stowe, Thornton Wilder and Josephine Johnson, are all moral propagandists, but their success or failure in propaganda has rested on their loyalty to aesthetic standards. *Now in November* has all the imagery and insight of poetry as well as the pathos of the endless struggle with nature and human greed. Daumier's satirical portrayals of the legal

profession reflect malice and scorn, yet with an uncanny insight into human nature which is truly aesthetic.

The aesthetic judgment that an action is in good taste is not to be confused with the moral judgment that it is right, but the former judgment may be a great stimulus to the moral will which makes the latter. Aesthetic experience is peculiarly fitted to view our total life objectively. It demands withdrawal from practical concerns and a disinterested attitude. In dealing with the problem of evil, for instance, art is concerned with understanding rather than with curing the evil which it studies. Yet it is neither anti-social nor anti-practical. The disinterested attitude leads ultimately to the most practical solutions. The man who is completely involved in a situation is not the one who can judge its merits most justly. Detachment is necessary, and the artist may, if he will, remain detached and create the atmosphere of detachment for a society. The practical reformer may immerse himself in immediate experience and simply muddle through; but he might study the insights of the artist and formulate his programs of social betterment with the added help of aesthetic criticism. Surely the latter process is more reasonable and more likely to succeed.

Art redeems life in still a third way. It is an enrichment of experience, individual and social. The wild storms and ruins depicted by a Ruysdael and the sturdy oaks and quiet English countryside of a John Crome open new vistas to the common man. We hardly realize how rapidly our appreciation of nature has grown. It is said that Goethe crossed the Alps with the curtains of his carriage closely drawn so that he might not see the terrible mountains. That seems almost inconceivable to us now. Wordsworth's nature poetry helped to change our attitude. Today every person of good taste sees beauty in nature as well as in art.

Aesthetic experience is an end in itself as well as a means to non-aesthetic ends. Dewey calls it a consummatory experience. But no consummation can be a stopping place. We do not stare forever at the Mona Lisa. Dewey notes a danger in any static view of experience when he says,

"A consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in time to the dust and ashes of boredom."

No aesthetic experience is ideal if it does not drive the experiencer on to further experiences. There is no point in rereading the "Ode to a Grecian Urn" if nothing new happens after the first moments of appreciation.

There is point in refreshing our powers and our intelligence by renewed aesthetic enjoyment which stimulates our whole life.

In conclusion we may point out that aesthetic experience has been shown to have an important function in the development of the good life, both individual and social. It is primarily a value in and for itself, a part of experience which is to be cherished and cultivated for its own sake and without concern for any utilitarian outcome. But if what we said about the unity of personality is correct, no experience of the self can fail to have consequences for the whole self. The aesthetic may be used, not as a means of escape from life, but as a means of understanding life, and there is a practical as well as a theoretical value in understanding the situation in which we find ourselves and our society. We need to use every means of penetrating insight at our command if we are to counteract the madness of economic greed, racial hatred, and super-nationalism. It stirs the creative imagination and gives promise of continued growth to the individual and society. If the aesthetic can really contribute so much to our life, everyone concerned about religion should direct part of his attention to the cultivation of aesthetic possibilities.

Economic change is needed, and any program for society should include a definite plan for obtaining economic justice. But the advocates of social change should think beyond the immediate fact of change to the conditions which will follow such change, and especially to the kind of persons that will be produced. Education which will raise the ideals of the masses should be a prerequisite to or at least an immediate accompaniment of any program of change if chaos is not to result. But it is much easier to bring about economic change, difficult as that may be, than to change the ideals of a society. In fact, the difficulty of economic change is largely due to false ideals among both employers and employees. We feel, and perhaps rightly, that a new conscience in society is too distant a dream, and that we should not wait for it before attacking the economic problem. But we may be at least as conscious of the larger problem as Russia has been in its educational and aesthetic policy and give some stray thoughts to its solution. In America we have the opportunity to work toward moral and aesthetic improvement in society through education at the same time that we are seeking to reform the economic order. Aesthetic values may be used as major forces in the struggle for a good life of shared values; otherwise there may be no real values to share.

The Church and the Modern World

WILBUR M. URBAN

THE modern world has traveled a long way since those disastrous days in which, seemingly at least, the fair ideals of modern liberalism and democracy were permanently shattered by the brutal forces of a great war. New forms of life, social and political, new emotional values, even new morals have developed which would then have been unbelievable. As to Victorian optimism, a world war was itself impossible, so out of that war have developed ideals and systems which the wildest flights of the imagination could not have found realizable.

The names of these new structures are varied, but all have one thing in common; all are forms of Socialism. Communism and National Socialism are, on the surface, bitter enemies, but they share in a common element which makes of both alike a portent in the modern world—and of both a challenge to Christianity. For both constitute in principle a betrayal of the Christian idealism of the centuries. Both abandon the Christian principle of reason in human life and society. Both find their ultimate sanction, as well as their ultimate reality, in force, in the will to power which threatens to become the fundamental belief of the modern world.

To be sure, there had long been mutterings of what was to come. Even before the war we were told, as for instance by Graham Wallace in his *Great Society*, that human societies had become so big as no longer to be encompassed by human reason. The initial idealism of parliamentary Socialism had spent itself, and Syndicalism, with its philosophy of force as developed by Sorel, was coming into the ascendancy. In the underworlds of the capitals of Europe a group of powerful minds had abandoned the principle of reason in society and had organized a system of force that was to be ready to take possession of Russia when the conditions were ripe. A vast and sinister cynicism has taken possession of the world—a cynicism which is the reverse side of atheism. God is no longer in His heaven. *A fortiori*, He is not in His world—not in human history—not in the social structures of man. As in nature God is dethroned and Whirligig has taken His place, so in society is the Divine Reason dethroned, to be replaced by unreason, passion and force.

The problem of the Church in the modern world is, then, the problem of the Church and Socialism, in its various forms. Or, more generally speaking, the problem of the Church and *socialization*—the socialization of the economic life of man and all the consequences for his moral and spiritual life that it entails.

The task of the Church is, indeed, primarily to save souls and to make saints; but it is also to bring about the realization of the kingdom of God on earth. The prayer of the Church and the object of its labor is that the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ. All about us new kingdoms are in the making—new structures, economic, political and social, whose final lineaments we cannot as yet descry. But one thing is common to them all; they are becoming socialistic in form. And as this form becomes everywhere clearer, it becomes also clear that it is not the form of the kingdom of God.

In practice Socialism has everywhere proved itself inimical to the kingdom of God. For Communism there is no kingdom of God, for there is no God to have a kingdom. For the nationalisms of various types no such kingdom is to be endured. For it is in principle universal and supranational in character, and nationalism can have no other God beside its absolute of "Race."

These are the things that immediately meet the eye. The purposeful destruction of religion in Russia, in Mexico, and in Spain; the no less purposeful subordination of religion to the State in Italy and Germany. But the antagonism is *deeper still*—an antagonism of two fundamentally opposite philosophies of life and of the world. For Christianity the kingdoms of this world are built upon the Divine Reason and the Divine Will. They are indeed forms of nature, but the laws of nature are the laws of God, and the two cannot conflict. For Socialism, in both of its great forms, the kingdoms of this world are the products of unreasoning force—of economic process or of racial will.

This, then, is the fundamental antithesis between the Church and the modern world—the fundamental contradiction of which the various conflicts which have sprung up in different parts of the world are but the expressions.

The Christian philosophy to which the Church is committed is crystal clear. The world, society, and individual man, are divine creations, expressions of the Divine Reason. The law of nature is the law of God. Civil

law and secular power can only be the expression of the Divine Reason and the Divine Will. Part of this law of nature and of God are the inalienable rights or claims of the individual man. These belong to his nature as man. As man may not take the life that God has given him, no more may he divest himself or his children of these rights—by any social compact or by any other action of the general will. In so far as man's freedom, man's labor, and the possession of the fruits of that labor in the form of property—in so far as the basal relations of man in family and community, are part of the Divine Will and reason in nature—in so far must they be *part of the eternal structure of the kingdom of God on earth*. Christianity is indeed bound up with no particular form of the secular state. But in so far as modern liberalism and democracy have been attempts, conscious or unconscious, to embody this idealism, to that extent they have become part of Christian philosophy, and part of the kingdom of God on earth. In so far as any form of secular power, any kingdom of this world, becomes inimical to this ideal, to that extent it has become an enemy to the kingdom of God.

This the instinct of the Church has long realized. The famous Encyclical on Labor of Leo the XIII, which has become the social philosophy and the basis for social action for a large part of the Christian world, has made it abundantly clear. One of the most important documents of the modern world, it makes clear, as no other, the eternal opposition of these two philosophies, and the true inwardness of the tension between Church and State as it has developed today.

Socialism in all its forms has, I think, proved itself to be the direct antithesis of the Christian principle—a betrayal of Christian idealism—and the denial of the principle of reason in human life, social and political. This thesis—of the irrationalism of Socialism—seems at first sight to be a veritable paradox, the precise opposite of the real truth. Is not Socialism essentially an “appeal to reason,” as over against the unreason of the competitive system? Is not socialization of industry essentially rationalization of industry in contrast to the waste and madness of capitalism? I will not deny that for a long time I myself held this view and was in principle a Socialist. I, like many others, felt that the entire capitalistic system is essentially irrational and becoming increasingly so. It is geared to a purely productive economy and production abstracted from distribution and consumption—production for its own sake, is essentially irrational and had increasingly shown itself to be self-defeating.

On the other hand, the socialistic economy seemed essentially rational. Karl Marx might be wrong in certain details of his analysis, but the general movement of capitalism was in principle so much as he predicted, that he must have hold of the essential truth. It seemed also that the picture presented of the stage of society that would follow capitalism was essentially rational. In it industry would be rationalized. Production would be subordinated to distribution, as it ought to be. Instead of the haphazard, irrational, and inhuman distribution of wealth, which is alone possible in the competitive *laissez-faire* system, we should have a rational, humane and just distribution. From everyone according to his ability; to everyone according to his needs.

The experiences of the Twentieth Century have, I think, completely changed the picture. They have shown us that in a very real sense the opposite is the truth. This does not mean that the thoughtful man has retracted his criticism of the capitalistic system. The elements of irrationality in our competitive, capitalistic life are still there, and every good citizen, as well as Christian, will look forward to their eradication. My point is rather the *frightful irrationality of what Socialism in all its forms would put in its place*. May I put it this way? Rationalizing of industry, such as Socialism proposes, would mean such a frightful *derationalizing of the rest of human life* that our present state of necessity would be nothing in comparison with it.

This irrationality of Socialism appears chiefly at the following points. I hope that I may make myself clear. Socialism is really possible only when it becomes Communism. Only when with it goes dictatorship, dictatorship of the proletariat. Social democracy, I have come to feel, is an amiable illusion. On the other hand, the dictatorship of the proletariat, or dictatorship in any form indeed, seems to be essentially irrational and self-defeating. Ramsay MacDonald was very clear-sighted there, and this insight is doubtless a ground for his growing conservatism. According to him, all short cuts, such as Russian Communism or National Socialism, are movements in a circle, and essentially irrational. Why? Because they reinstate in another form—always a worse and more irrational form—the very evils and tyrannies against which they revolt. Force always does this.

But the important point is this. *Only such short cuts are possible*, and therefore only this movement in a circle is possible. On this point I think, Sorel, the great philosophical syndicalist, himself a Marxian and whose

influence on these present movements has been so great, was fundamentally right. Socialism is really not possible without force and violence. Dictatorship is inevitable. Force and violence must be justified and must be rationalized.

This inherent irrationality of Socialism is apparent, I think, even in the purely economic sphere. The irrationality of capitalism is found in the sphere of distribution. That of Communism in the sphere of production. Communism takes a short cut to equitable distribution and, behold, it stops production. What then must it do? It must *force* production—if need be—at the point of the bayonet. Production must be regimented and militarized.

This is the brute fact that has everywhere disclosed itself. It may be disguised by various myths—by the myth of a stateless society to come, to which dictatorship is merely the necessary transition stage; by the myth of race and the racial will of which the totalitarian State is merely the necessary instrument. Millions of our fellow human beings are dreaming these myths today. What, we may well ask, will happen when they awake? In any case—and this is the point that I would here emphasize—the absolutizing of the totalitarian State, which everywhere has created such sinister conditions for Christianity and the Christian Church—is no mere monster of perverted patriotism and passion. It is, as Nietzsche long ago saw, the cold and logical necessity of Socialism and the socialization of society.

The gradual disclosure of the essential irrationality at the very heart of all forms of Socialism is, I believe, one of the outstanding events of the modern world. This inherent irrationality is evident, even in the economic sphere. But it appears in its deepest and most significant form in its relation to human morals and values. It is Socialism and Christian morality that presents the deepest problem.

Long before the modern dictatorships began to put Socialism into practice, Sorel, the philosopher to whom I have referred, pointed out that Socialism is incompatible with what he called *bourgeois* morality, and that its establishment must mean a new morality—of the proletariat. Now I think history has shown that this insight was fundamentally sound and that a radical reconstruction of the economic order means also a radical reconstruction of the moral order. Radical reconstruction of economic life involves equally radical reconstruction of moral ideals and values.

This has been amply proved by the developments of both com-

munistic Russia and of National Socialism. What is more, I think these developments are inevitable.

In my callow days, for instance, I used to think that the radical views of the family associated with Marxianism were extraneous. That you could have Marxian economics without Marxian morals. Now I think these views of the family are necessary parts of the whole rational or irrational structure. It is quite clear, I think, that it is impossible to modify the institution of private property as radically as Socialism proposes without an equally radical remodeling of the institution of the family and the whole of sex morality. And this again is impossible without an entire re-education of man in the sentiments connected with sex and the family—a complete transvaluation of all values in this sphere.

But more than this. I think it is impossible to do these things, to remodel radically our institutions of family and of property, without remolding and, as I think, destroying, all our ideas of rights and justice. The Soviet play, *Red Rust*, which was produced by the Theater Guild in New York, illustrates my point precisely. The Communists in that play speak quite frankly of the whole notion of justice as a bourgeois virtue which must disappear in a communistic State. You cannot develop an economic world of mass production and distribution without developing what the Communist philosophers call the "mass man." Such a development of a mass man (the Russian thinkers see) is necessary if Socialism is to work. And he cannot be allowed to retain the individualistic notions of rights and justice. This is the *moral* irrationality of Socialism. It starts by an appeal to rights and justice, but can develop only by destroying them.

This is the moral irrationality of Socialism and of Socialism in all its forms. That which Russian Communism has done in its way, the National Socialism of Germany is, I fear, also doing in its way. I say I fear, for I have much sympathy with many of the elements of the movement. I have been watching with the eye, both of the philosopher and the Christian, the reconstruction of the fundamental law of Germany as it is taking place under the aegis of the totalitarian State. Here is being worked out what has already been accomplished in other forms in Russia and Italy—a complete destruction of traditional notions of rights and justice. Where Russia absolutizes the mass, Germany has absolutized race. Justice—which Christianity makes an absolute value-part of the very Divine Reason itself—is here quite frankly subordinated to the absolute of race.

If there is any point at which Christian idealism has passed over from the realm of emotion and sentiment into that of will and deed, if there is any point at which the kingdom of God has been embodied in the kingdoms of this world, it is in our law and legal institutions, far though they may be from the ideal of justice. If there is any point at which attack on the present structures of society constitutes an attack on the Christian ideal, it is here also.

It seems reasonably clear from the foregoing, where the deepest issues between Christianity and Socialism, between the Church and the modern world, lie. They are moral issues. For Christianity the *rationalizing of industry*, and the consequent political structures involved, means the *derationalizing* and the *dehumanizing of man*.

It may be asked: Why *not* destroy these ideas and values? Why not destroy bourgeois morality and substitute what Sorel calls proletarian morality? Why not abandon the notion of universal and human rights and justice and substitute racial conceptions of justice? Man's moral codes and values have changed in the past. Why not a complete change in the future? Well, I may be wrong, but I do not believe that there is any such thing as proletarian morality. There is only human morality. And, as a Christian, I believe that human morality expresses the laws of nature and of God.

Trotsky wrote a book making fun of proletarian art and the ridiculous and artificial attempt to create it. There is, he said, no such thing as proletarian art—only human art. I think he is right and that the same holds for morality. As there is no proletarian morality so there is no bourgeois morality. What the materialistic philosophy of history calls bourgeois morality, and merely the reflection of economic structures, is really simple human morality. In any case it is for this human morality that Christianity and the Church stand. For the "Everlasting Man" who abides unchanging under all historical changes.

Christianity cannot, I believe, abandon this doctrine of the Everlasting Man without complete stultification of its inmost essence. Nor can it abandon its doctrine of universal and inalienable rights without abandoning the Christian doctrine of man. It may conceivably change the philosophical form of expression, but not the essence. It is here that the Church comes into such frightful opposition, not only to the kingdoms of this world as they are now forming, but with so much of the wisdom of this

world. Even in our own country, in our universities and law schools, even in radical religious circles, this abandonment of the principle of the Divine Reason in society is everywhere in evidence. It is part of the New Erastianism of which I shall speak presently.

Much of this must seem perverse and wrong-headed to some of my hearers, especially to those who like to call themselves Christian Socialists. Yet it seems to me to be of the utmost importance to bring out this moral incompatibility of Christianity and Socialism. Here I speak with feeling for I have not hidden from you the fact that, to my shame, I once called myself a Christian Socialist. I now feel that my views did credit to my heart but not to my head. I now believe that Christianity and Socialism in all its forms have shown themselves to be contradictory.

I do not deny that there was much excuse for this illusion and the fallacies it entails. On the surface Socialism had all the appearance of a Christian way of life. Nietzsche is quite right, I think, in seeing a close historical connection between Christian sentiments and ideas and the humanitarian side of Socialism, although I think he is quite wrong in his interpretation of Christianity as wholly altruistic. Certainly, without Christianity, whatever socialistic tendencies and movements might have arisen in modern capitalistic society, would have had an entirely different color. None the less, I have come to feel that the Christian appearance of Socialism is an illusion. I have come to believe that the Russian thinkers are the hard-headed realists and the Christian Socialists the softheaded sentimentalists.

It is interesting here to recall my own experiences with Pope Leo the XIII's encyclical to which I have already referred. For many years I used it in connection with courses in Ethics and Social Philosophy. At first it appeared to me, as to most of my students, extremely naïve and traditional. Gradually it came to take on a quite different appearance. It seems to me now that the instinct of the Roman Church has from the beginning been sound on this matter. Socialism and Christianity are essentially incompatible. They start from opposite premises and, when thought out, come to absolutely opposite conclusions.

It has already become clear, I think, that the points of tension and strain between the Church and the world are in every case the points at which Church comes into conflict with socialization, whether communistic or nationalistic. Socialization cannot take place without absolutizing the State and such a State can brook no other God beside it. Nor can it take

place without a corresponding remolding of the moral and political structures of society, and coming into conflict with fundamental Christian values. But the entire socialistic movement has, I believe, been inimical to religion and religious values in an even deeper and more subtle way. It is this that I should like to bring to light.

The entire tendency of Socialism in all its forms is, it seems clear, to subordinate all moral and spiritual values to the economic and material—and to look upon them as merely instrumental.

This is true, of course, in so far as the movement is expressed in Communism. Quite apart from the materialistic premises and presuppositions of Marxianism, the exigencies of practice have demanded that all such values shall be tied to the wheels of Communism. Religion is called the opiate of the people, but the real reason for this deathless enmity is that the Christian religion upholds moral and legal conceptions and values that are incompatible with extreme socialization. There is just as little question that this is true of the various forms of National Socialism. Not only do Italian Fascism and German National Socialism demand the control of moral and spiritual education, but they also make moral and legal conceptions subordinate to racial ends. One has only to study the reconstruction of legal codes in both countries to see that this is so. As materialistic Communism can tolerate no other worldly values, so National Socialism cannot tolerate the universality which is the essence of Christian values.

This tendency I have elsewhere described as the New Erastianism. The older Erastianism, of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, made of the Church an arm of the State and against this Erastianism Catholic Christianity has always protested. But the older form never denied the universal and transcendent character of the ideals and values for which the Church stands. The New Erastianism would not only make of the Church a servant of the State but would make it—and indeed religion as a whole—a mere instrument of social welfare and control. Its very essence is the denial of the transcendent and universal character of the Christian values.

But, you will naturally ask: What has all this to do with us in America? These are indeed the issues which our brethren in Europe must face, but what have they to do with this favored land of ours?

For obvious reasons our problems are not the same as theirs. The same elements of tension and strain between the Church and the modern

world are, perhaps, not to be anticipated in our American social and political life. The moral principles that underlie the institutions and legal structure of society are not openly attacked and are given at least lip service. Dictatorship, and the appeal to force and the social will as over against the universal reason of man, are perhaps remote, although of that we cannot, of course, be wholly sure. Yet the same forces are at work among us. The same principles that have created this external tension abroad have also created an internal tension among us.

Into this New Erastianism the thought of our own country has been irresistibly drawn. Here the issues are in a sense gravest because they are the more concealed. The essence of the problem throughout the world is the maintenance—even unto death—of the universal and transcendent character of the Christian values as against the secularization and particularization of morals and moral values. The essence of all the anti-Christian movement is the denial of this transcendence and universality. But that denial is likewise everywhere present in our increasingly secularized American thought. It appears in the Humanism and instrumentalism of our own land. Here, too, the New Erastianism would make of the Church, and of religion as a whole, a mere instrument of social welfare and control. The Russian says: "Religion is the opiate of the people; therefore let us close the churches." The Nazi says: "Religious values are in the last analysis racial values; therefore let us racialize and Aryanize the churches." The American says: "Religion must pay its way economically and socially; therefore let us close the churches for a year and see what difference it makes." The American, no less than his European brother, has to a large extent lost his sense of the transcendent, universal, and timeless character of the Christian values.

Much against my will, I have come to believe that this New Erastianism is quite general in radical religious circles. If I am not mistaken, they have become progressively less and less sympathetic with the Church and all that it stands for. Into their speech at times there even creeps a note of contempt for the other-worldly values which are its very life.

With this contempt for eternal values, as they are called, for those which, so to speak, cannot pay their way, have not immediate cash value in the economic and social life of man, we are familiar in secular circles. It expresses itself in contempt for law—for law as anything except an instrument of social welfare. We have learned to expect it even in the law

schools themselves. It is, however, when it enters into religion, when religion is itself humanized and instrumentalized, that we have the New Erastianism—the great betrayal of that Christian idealism which is the product of the sweat and blood of the Christian centuries.

Humanism and instrumentalism in America may ostensibly have other parents, but their grandparents are Marxian Socialism and evolutionary naturalism. They constitute a virtual atheism: in their inmost essence as much an atheism as that of Marxian Communism.

The position of the Church in the modern world is perhaps as precarious as any in its long history. Certainly its problems are more puzzling and difficult of solution than in any period since its foundation.

The task of the Church is to save souls, but also to realize the kingdom of God on earth. It has become ever clearer with the centuries that the two cannot be separated. The Church must pray and labor that the kingdoms of this earth may become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ. It follows that the Church cannot, even if it would, ignore its relations to the kingdoms of this earth. Long ago its Founder enunciated a great principle: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's;" but the application is perhaps more difficult than ever, the line of division more puzzling than ever before.

There are, I think, two rather clear-cut opposing views. There are those—and these are often the most devoted and sincere among our Christian brethren—who are zealous for God and His kingdom and to whom economic questions belong necessarily to the things of God. Nothing can be left to Caesar. To these radical Christians we owe much, but it cannot be denied that they are also a danger. Quite apart from the question of competence to pronounce on delicate technical, economic questions, there is danger of committing the Church to the changing forms of time. Still more it is a fruitful source of that new Erastianism which forgets the timeless in the temporal, becomes contemptuous of the other-worldly values, and in times of stress sells the birthright of the Church for a mess of potage.

On the other hand, there are those of a wholly opposite tendency, who despair of the things of the world and of time and would leave them wholly to Caesar—if indeed not to the devil. Christianity and the Church are concerned with the soul and not with the body, not with this life but with the life beyond, not with the kingdoms of this world but with the

kingdom of God. This is a philosophy which naturally has always been popular with the Caesars of this world and is enunciated by them today. But it cannot be denied that it has also entered into the thought of the Church. The influence of the philosophy of Karl Barth has not only affected wide circles of thought in Germany, but has a growing influence on the religious thought of our own land. To those who thus reaffirm the things of God, the eternal as over against the temporal, we again owe much. But they also are a danger. Not only must they leave to Caesar things which are clearly not his, but, when understood, their position also constitutes a betrayal of Christian idealism, a surrender of the world to the devils of Unreason and Force.

Is it not clear that neither of these positions is possible to the mind of the Church? Is it not clear that both are in danger of betraying the Christian idealism of the centuries? Now, more than ever, some way must be found to interpret and apply this most difficult of our Lord's precepts. We have seen how pressing the problem has become for our embattled brethren in Europe. Is it any less pressing—*in principle*, with us?

In a conversation with William Jennings Bryan, at which I was present, he was asked how it was that he could be so radical in matters of economics and politics and so conservative in morals and religion. His answer was very simple and a most interesting one. "In the things of time," he replied, "one may be as radical as he pleases, but not in the things of eternity." At the time I was much impressed with the answer and felt that the old gentleman was much more philosophical than I had believed him to be. He might be somewhat shaky on the question of the precise point at which he distinguished between the things of time and of eternity, but the root of the matter was in him. In any case I myself worked on this principle for a long time. I, too, was radical in the things of time—economic, social and political, and increasingly conservative in the things of eternity.

Alas, things are not so simple as all this. If only they were! It has become increasingly clear—to me at least—that the things of time cannot thus be so completely separated from the things of eternity—that the eternal moral and spiritual values for which Christianity stands are at points so closely bound up with the forms of time that they cannot be separated. The Church cannot, therefore, I have come to believe, wholly escape the responsibility of passing judgment upon economic and political forms. It

cannot avoid the task of distinguishing between the changing and the unchanging in man. The risk that it runs is tremendous—the danger of “absolutizing the temporal.” But it must run the risk.

Whether we like it or not, with us also, economic forces of this machine age are pressing upon us processes of socialization. Whether we like it or not, our society and State must take on some of the forms of Socialism. What we call socialization is upon us. It is a condition and not a theory that faces us. Whatever we may individually think about the present administration, there is one thing, I believe, that no one can challenge—President Roosevelt is one of the last great liberals. Realizing that these processes of socialization must come, he is attempting to keep them in harmony with the forms and the spirit of democracy. Realizing that the forces of the “Great Society” have more and more tended to become unmoral, if not immoral, he is at least trying to keep them related to the moral life of man, from which they dare not be separated.

I cannot, therefore, believe that his call for light from the ministers of religion was merely an empty gesture. Nor can I believe that in the long run the Church can refuse such light. It will not do to answer either with an unthinking radicalism or an unthinking conservatism. It will not do to appeal either to the sentimentalism of Christian brotherhood or to the sentimentalism of the Constitution. Here only intense and stubborn thought will avail—here only a philosophy of God, of the World and of Man that shall go to the roots of things. Only so shall we be able to distinguish between the things that are Caesar’s and the things that are God’s, between that which is of nature and that of man, between the things of time and the things of eternity.

The task of the Church in the modern world is thus one of tremendous difficulty, but also of tremendous responsibility and glory. Its difficulties are those of decision—decision between the changing and the changeless. Whether rightly or wrongly, it stands for the Everlasting Man—and for his moral and spiritual dignity as a son of God.

Its responsibility is commensurate with its difficulties. Our embattled fellow churchmen in Europe and elsewhere are deeply conscious of this responsibility. To me at least there is nothing more heartening than the fearlessness with which they have accepted this responsibility and the unerring insight with which they have gone to the root of the matter. For they have seen where the issues lie. The Church and Christianity stand for

the universal and the international as against the particular and the national, for the Divine Reason in nature and man as against force and unreason.

It has been my privilege recently to study this struggle at somewhat closer quarters, during a visit to Germany in which I have at one time or another spent three very happy and useful years. The crowded churches of Southern Germany seemed to me at least to quiver with a sense of the significance and solemnity of the issues which that great figure, Cardinal Faulhaber, has made so clear, not only to the German mind, but to the mind of the entire world. The controversial literature, which I read with avidity, seemed to me to be of the highest order and to go to the roots of things. The struggles of the Church with the world are throwing the Church back upon *First and Last Things* and it is regaining new strength through this touch with ultimate realities.

All this we American churchmen may welcome with joy. We may joy also in the practical support which has been given to our embattled brethren in both Russia and Germany. But should not all this have an even deeper meaning for our common Christianity? Should it not drive us all back to First and Last Things—to a sense of the ultimate realities upon which alone true Christian unity can be built?

Everywhere one senses a feeling-out for a common basis of Christian unity which alone can combat the growing secularization and atheism of the world. It is not, as a Roman Catholic bishop recently put it, an atheism of science or philosophy that fills us with fear. That can be met by science and philosophy. It is rather the practical atheism that has come with the growing mechanization and secularization of life—that practical atheism which has entered into the very warp and woof of modern economic and political structure. It is this that makes us tremble. It is this New Erastianism that is the Church's chief enemy in the modern world. Against this enemy it can prevail only by a unity of all its forces. Whatever theological bases there must be for such unity, and I would be the last to deny their importance—whatever difficulties there may be in the way of such unity, and I would be the last to minimize them—that unity *must come* if we are to meet the tremendous issues of our time. And the ultimate basis of that unity must be the Christian doctrine of man. It is this that is everywhere in jeopardy in the modern world. In salvaging this ideal the Church may lose much of the modern world, but it shall at least save its own soul.

God: Process or Personal Power?

EDWARD T. RAMSDELL

THE religious naturalism of our day has presented critical problems to more than one student of religious thought. No movement is more vigorous, none more prolific. Its amazing vitality has seemed ample proof that it is no mere system of ideas. It has seemed organic to the experience of a scientific era. Nor is any school of thought more clamorously self-confident. Frequently one of its members predicts that the religion of the future belongs to naturalism, or someone affirms that all that is known or can be known about God is the product of scientific method. Whatever else all of this may mean, it is an amazing tribute to the inherent values of religion that a group of naturalists, weary of the traditional theisms, could become so zealously religious.

Certain it is that the concept of God held by these religious naturalists will, if it prevails, have revolutionary reaches. According to their view, God is no longer an object of faith, but of knowledge; no longer the cosmic cause, but the cosmic process, or some part of it. He is no longer posited as the ultimately explanatory, but as the immediately descriptive. To be sure, this concept is none the less metaphysical, in spite of frequent naturalistic harangues against metaphysics, for the simple reason that it regards the natural world as ultimately real.

What the full influence of the new concept will be, and how radical the changes it will induce, is a matter of conjecture. There are, however, certain difficulties which make it impossible for some to share the high confidence of its zealous expounders.

The first count against religious naturalism, as it is being popularly presented, is that it assumes knowledge where knowledge is impossible. This would appear to be a strange judgment against an approach which presumes to be thoroughly scientific. Nevertheless it must be made. Religious naturalism denies that there is any reality transcending the natural world, that is, that there is any reality beyond the reach of scientific instruments and method. This is the meaning of their explicit denial of supernaturalism. Now perhaps they are right. Perhaps there is no causal ground of the natural universe beyond the reach of science. But the point is, they

do not *know* whether there is or not. An agnostic attitude toward the ultimately real is intelligible and defensible. But an outright denial of such a supernatural reality has no leg to stand on except the limitations of scientific method. It is an assumption of knowledge which cannot possibly be verified. None is more emphatic in his profession of ignorance concerning the ultimately real than the atom-smashing physicist of our day. However much is inferred concerning atomic structure, there is a far-reaching realm of the unknown and probably of the unknowable. This is a common testimony in the writings of our leading physicists. An agnostic attitude toward that which is ultimate is, therefore, intelligible and defensible, but the creed of the naturalists that there is no reality transcending nature is sheer dogmatism. Yet it is a necessary creed for them in so far as they would construct a religious philosophy. We have in the first place, therefore, the attempt to construct a philosophy of religion upon an assumption of knowledge where knowledge is impossible. Strictly speaking, this can scarcely be called scientific. To be sure, the denial of a supernatural reality may be presented as an insight, perhaps some will wish to call it a revelation, but it cannot claim to be knowledge. Yet the much vaunted strength of religious naturalism is alleged to lie in the cognitive certainty of all of its propositions.

There is a second weakness of considerable magnitude in the current views of religious naturalism. It defines God in terms of a value-judgment and then defends that definition as though it were verifiable knowledge. For example, God may be defined as growth in meaning and value, because that growth is judged to be supremely worthwhile. Now there is no quarrel with such a judgment. It may be rationally defended, as certainly it has been. But the point is that it has to be defended in precisely the same way as any concept of God in traditional theism. After all, one cannot prove a value-judgment by scientific technique. If others agree, well and good, but it is not a matter of inference from observed facts.

To define a process, or a part of a process, as God is not to *know* that it is God, it is simply to say that the process has the value of God for me. But there is no guarantee of universality in this value-judgment. Take the attitude of the humanist, for example, toward such a proposition. He will not admit that growth in meaning and value has any cosmic or other-than-human significance. Little can be done to convince the hu-

manist otherwise, for it is not a proposition capable of scientific verification. It is a rational interpretation. Or take the same proposition from the point of view of the theist (in the historical sense). He regards not the *growth* of meaning and value as the supremely worthwhile, but rather the *source* of that growth. The ultimately significant fact from his point of view is not the process, but the personal power which he infers to be back of the process. There is thus absolutely nothing to guarantee that the locus of value shall be the process rather than the inferred causal ground of the process. Nevertheless, although their concept of God rests upon personal value-judgments, the religious naturalists continue to defend that concept as though it were scientifically verifiable knowledge.

Of course, it can be argued that at least the religious naturalist is placing his judgment of value on something which he scientifically knows to exist, whereas the theist is placing his judgment of value on something which cannot be scientifically verified. But the theist supports his inference from observed facts and scientific generalizations to a causal and purposive world-ground by exactly the same means that the naturalist uses to enlist support for his supreme value-judgment, namely, rational argument. Causality and purpose as ultimate categories of explanation are not rendered invalid simply because science finds it more fruitful, for its purposes, not to use them.

It would begin to look as though there might be some limitations to the scientific approach to religion, and that the value-judgments implicit in religious concepts are in part at least responsible. To be sure, this has been affirmed again and again, but still the religious naturalists move confidently forward with the claim that they now have a God which they can experience, perceive and verify. It is a classic example of definitional obfuscation. They define God in terms of a particular value-judgment and then present Him to the world as a scientifically verified object of knowledge. Of course, it ought to be something of a reflection upon the objectivity of their method that these religious naturalists seldom come out at the same place. What one defines as God seldom satisfies another. Witness the different parts or aspects of the cosmic process, if not the process as a whole, that have been defined as God. Strange, is it not, that allegedly scientific procedure should produce such varying results?

There is still another ground for questioning the concept of God as used by the religious naturalists, namely, that of its Christian usefulness.

Most of the religious naturalists writing today claim to be Christians. Some of them are teaching in Christian schools of theology. It is only fair, therefore, that their views be considered from the point of view of Christian faith as well as from a general philosophical point of view. Although there would be wide difference of opinion as to the full content of the essential Christian gospel, it probably would be agreed that for most thoughtful Christians the minimal gospel is faith in Jesus as a way of life and as a revelation of God. In defining God as an impersonal process, or as any part of it, religious naturalism either neglects or distorts the second element in this minimal gospel. Christian faith has been essentially theistic, in the historical use of that term. It has held to the personal causality of God. It has regarded God as like Christ, whether that likeness be conceived in the substantialistic terms of the ancient creeds or in the moral and spiritual terms of modern thinking.

Now Christian faith has never presumed to call the Christlikeness of God a matter of knowledge. As an insight or revelation, it is a matter of faith, reasonable faith indeed, allegedly coherent with the total structure of our knowledge, but never attainable as an inductive inference. The chief philosophical requirement of such a faith has always been the personal power of the ultimately real, whether the total metaphysical picture be Platonic or Aristotelian, realistic or idealistic. It has obviously precluded materialism and mechanism, and the question here raised is whether it does not just as clearly preclude the conception of God as impersonal process.

To be sure, the religious naturalists, like all real nontheists, find difficulty in applying the concept of personal power to God. How can God be conceived as personal, they ask? The only personalities which we know are fragmentary, sinful, irrational, and so on. But philosophically the term personal as applied to God is not intended to mean that God is like us in our weakness, but that certain phases of our experience are suggestive of the nature of God. It means that God is conceived as an agential activity capable of thought and purpose. It implies that the universe is not running blindly or by chance, but rather as the operational activity of that thought and purpose. God is personal power. This, it would seem, is a fair philosophical statement of the essential content of Christian faith. Certainly it would seem difficult to maintain that the concept of God as impersonal process is consonant with the most

vital currents of Christian faith. Further, it is worth pointing out again that not one single result of science has disproved the Christian concept of God, nor can it do so in the nature of the case, unless we arbitrarily define the field of science as the ultimately real. To be sure, the Christian concept is not cognitively necessary. It clearly rests upon faith, but we may accept it with intellectual integrity in so far as we find it to be coherent with the total structure of our knowledge.

The chief counts against religious naturalism, then, are these: (1) it assumes that its denial of supernatural reality has the force of verifiable knowledge; (2) it defines God in terms of a value-judgment and then defends that definition as though it too were verifiable knowledge; (3) it presumes to be Christian and yet neglects or distorts the Christlike character (which philosophically means at least the personal causality) of God.

These counts against religious naturalism are not intended to judge the fruitfulness of its work as a whole. Certainly that work has been and continues to be of importance. Scientific method should be carried to the farthest possible limit in the religious field as in every other. The only point is that it is not ultimately definitive. But the use of scientific method by the religious naturalists has sharpened our knowledge and illuminated the religious process. Although it leaves the nature of God as a matter of inference and value-judgment, it has richly described those processes in our experience which deserve to be called divine or related to the divine. The only question is whether we shall place the supreme value in the process itself or in that which we infer to be the source of the process. The answer of the religious naturalist is a perfectly legitimate one as one more view or theory of reality, but clearly it is not a matter of verifiable knowledge.

It comes to this: as Spinoza desired the certainty of mathematics in his view of reality, so the religious naturalists crave the certainty of science in their philosophy of religion; and as the *a priori* method failed to reach the world of experience for Spinoza, so the inductive method of science is inadequate, in and of itself, to determine our value-judgments of the ultimately real. Important as scientific method is, it can never guarantee in and of itself an objective representation of God. Interestingly enough, some of the most significant leaders in the world of science have long since recognized that fact.

The Religious Conflict in Germany

A. W. VERNON

I

MUCH of the holy turmoil in Germany today is the result of the lofty dream of ardent National Socialists, particularly in Thüringen, of bridging the deep cleft which for more than four hundred years has divided the nation into two hostile camps of Protestants and Catholics, and of establishing one great Church of a thoroughly united people. In the first enthusiasm of Hitler's victorious followers, this high goal, which had faded into the mist of the unattainable, seemed the natural culmination of the mighty movement which had flattened sharp picket fences everywhere. I do not, indeed, share the well-nigh universal belief that National Socialism saved Germany from Bolshevism. But it put down the mighty from their seats and exalted those of low degree. It has wiped out ancient class distinctions. It is doing away with state boundaries. It has abolished the countless groups into which the electorate was split. No longer does the gibe obtain that when three Germans talk politics four parties appear; the political unity of the nation is a modern miracle. What wonder that it seemed possible to do with churches what was being done with provinces, and create out of Catholics and Protestants one new Church, so making peace! Only last year I heard a preacher in the Protestant Cathedral of Halberstadt evoke the shade of a German emperor of the eleventh century, who, as head of the German national Church, had deposed papal bishops. "Why then," called out the speaker, "should a national Church be regarded as impossible today? God has called Adolf Hitler; why should he not have his way in the Church as well as in the State?"

But this glittering prospect of church union between Catholics and Protestants was soon proclaimed a will-of-the-wisp by the leaders of both churches. It is still dreamed about. From lovely hilly Thüringen regular appeals are still issued for it. I believe it to be the secret sacred hope of Hitler himself. Only the other day, the now discredited Bishop Müller, Hitler's choice for this new and exalted office, created wide surprise by an-

nouncing his open support of what had died out of the people's consciousness. But, as we shall see, religious roots in Germany strike deep. It is true that the developments which we are to consider have brought orthodox Protestants and Catholics nearer to each other than ever before. But it is mutual opposition to Hitler's policies rather than sympathy with them, which causes this spiritual "rapprochement." To the Catholics, internationally organized, the totalitarian State, as begetter or even as midwife of a national Church, is fully as abhorrent as Communism. And so, as a matter of immediate concern, the one national Church under the aegis of the State has been all but forgotten. The Catholics are standing like a rock for their unmovable traditions, and for their freedom of religious instruction which Hitler's Concordat with the Vatican legally guarantees them.

II

The more religious of the Protestant National Socialists determined, however, to salvage something of the great hope by uniting the twenty provincial Protestant churches into one German Protestant Church, by placing a bishop at its head and by filling it with the mystical spirit of race, which had swept through the nation.

There was much in the wind which favored this smaller enterprise. The word, "Christian," had grown in popular favor through its antithesis to the word, "Jew." The vast majority of the northern Germans had been duly confirmed and was paying its voluntary church tax. The Leader constantly asserted the sacred character of the struggle in which he was engaged. The stage, music, literature were "purified." The spirit of sacrifice, never quite dissociate from religion, was abroad.

Throughout Germany a new election for local church officers was announced. Two lists of nominees were set up. One was frankly National Socialist. The other, the list of "The Faith and the Gospel," attacked the abhorrent idea of a political party in control of the Church. Then the genius of Adolf Hitler spiked the enemy's guns by suggesting for the partisan list of the National Socialists the alluring designation, "German Christians." When, on the eve of the elections, he announced over the radio that, were he to go to the polls, he would vote for the lists of the German Christians, their success was assured. In many regions the supporters of the conservative lists of The Faith and Gospel arrived at a humiliating understanding with the German Christians by conceding them

eight names out of ten on a united list. So the German Christians swept to victory. Their platform declared:

"We fight for the union of the twenty-nine churches now united in the Evangelical Kirchenbund (an organization for practical Christian work). We wish a living Church of the people. We declare ourselves for a Christian faith which suits our stock, which harmonizes with the German spirit of Luther and with the heroic brand of piety. We believe Race, Folk, Nation to be ordinances entrusted to us by God, who decrees their maintenance. We discountenance the spirit of Christian world citizenship. We desire to overcome such pernicious phenomena as Pacifism, Internationalism, Free Masonry, through faith in our racial mission, entrusted to us by God."

The most significant fact in modern Germany is that, while recalcitrant professors, novelists, musicians, playwrights, are banished and protests are feeble and unavailing, this German Christian movement, sponsored by Hitler himself, has only partially succeeded. The Church has proved capable of greater independence than the banks or the universities or the army. Ever since the elections of 1933 the German Christians have been steadily losing ground. Hitler has established the declaration of Lactantius in the fourth century: "Religion alone is the seat in which Liberty has placed her home."

In their initial demand the German Christians were successful; the provincial churches united themselves into a national Church, anticipating the union of the German states into a tightly organized federal State. But this important action was taken, not by the German Christians, but by the officers of the Evangelical Kirchenbund, who also chose as the first bishop of the national church, Pastor Fritz von Bodelschwingh, no better a National Socialist than most of them.

The officials of the Kirchenbund felt forced to this canny action because they sensed something in the spirit of the German Christians which emphasized the adjective at the expense of the noun. They were glad to show their sympathy with the rising tide of national unity, but they shuddered at delivering the churches to men who could permit a public statement of faith like this:

"Christ has come for us through Adolf Hitler. Through his power and his honesty, his faith and his idealism, the Saviour has made his way to us. . . . In the German heaven the German language will be the means of establishing the communion of one soul with another, for this language harmonizes with the

original creation. We have indeed but one goal, 'Become German,' not, 'Become Christian.'

Nor were they more attracted to the calmer language of Rektor Gehde of Liegnitz: "Our struggle is for the recognition of the divine revelation in the German soul and character as of equal right with the biblical revelation. The latter is only one revelation among others and it has been molded by the spirit of an alien race."

When, however, the German Christians found that the men of the older day had stolen their thunder and had created a national Protestant Church, the lightning struck. To prove the arrogant Church to be but a handmaid of the State, they induced the Prussian minister of public worship to appoint a commissioner who should have full power to control the executive machinery of the Church. Bishop von Bodelschwingh, finding it impossible to function in his high office, resigned. The election of delegates to the Prussian Synod by the newly chosen church officials resulted in an overwhelming victory for the German Christians, who thereupon elected Hitler's personal representative in church affairs, Ludwig Müller, as Bishop of Prussia. "Clothed in brown shirts," the Synod passed this law:

Ministers and officials, who have not shown that they unreservedly support the national State and Church may be placed on the retired list. Ministers and officials who are not of Aryan blood, or whose wife is not of Aryan blood, are to be placed on the retired list.

Three weeks later the Bishop of Prussia was unanimously elected Bishop of Germany.

Bishop Müller has qualities to impress the average German as much as has Hitler, whose host he is reported to have been in the days when he was a Marine chaplain. He has a soldierly bearing and that mushiness of heart which results from a top layer of fierceness and an underlayer of tenderness. Before an assembly of sixteen thousand, when the other orators read carefully prepared addresses, he spoke extempore, like his leader. He mixed religion and nationalism naturally and effectively. I doubt if the louder cheering for Germany than for Christianity in the great religious gathering of German Christians was displeasing to him. Although delivered at a time of great stress, there was no word of bitterness in his speech but much simple and pastoral religion.

In a long interview which he was kind enough to grant me, he declared that his task was to make real the declaration of Christ: "By this shall

all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one toward another." This love is lacking between factions of the Church, and alarmingly between Catholics and Protestants. What, then, counts the talk about atonement? Let there be less dogma, less emphasis on the Virgin birth, to which Jesus never referred, less preaching of belief and more of trust. The term, "German Christian," was analogous to "American Christian" and had no other implication. Since, however, but a handful of pastors had supported Adolf Hitler in his days of struggle, it was necessary to have a new ecclesiastical regime, in order that National Socialistic Germany should not lose sympathy with the Church. On my leaving, he touched a button which lit up the emblems of the various warships on which he had held services of worship (strange chamber-illumination for a Christian bishop) and ushered me out with a child's smile.

III

It is by no means true that the German Christian movement has played out. It is, however, true that it has met with surprising and unexpected and persistent opposition. It has deprived its bishop, so unanimously chosen, of all real authority. It has been forced to negotiate with its despised foes. Child of Hitler, as it is, it has most seriously embarrassed its father.

There are at least three reasons why this movement has divided religious Germany, instead of uniting it.

The first is human enough. The leading ministers and theological professors of the Protestant churches were not associated with the National Socialists. Faithfully had they served the Church during the indifferent, but scrupulously fair, governments which had succeeded each other after the War, and they felt outraged by the attempt of men, who had then held aloof, to discredit their spirit and their patriotism.

The second reason is a distinctly Christian one. The Christian consciousness rebelled against an anti-Semitism which could enact such legislation as the "Aryan Paragraph" of the Prussian Synod, above cited. The leading New Testament professors of the German Universities united in a brave and vigorous protest against it as a fatal departure from Christianity and the gospels.

The third reason reveals the spirit of democracy, implicit in Protestantism, and there called the priesthood of all believers. It is a repudiation of

the "Fuehrer-Prinzip"—the final authority of the leader—in the religious realm. This principle, cardinal in National Socialism, no matter how desirable and efficient in the State, is abhorrent in the Protestant church. This soon became the leading issue in this absorbing conflict.

Shortly after his election as Bishop of Prussia, Bishop Müller issued an order "to insure uniform leadership" of the Church in Prussia, in which he declared that he would himself take over the legal powers of the church senate and that he was "entitled to give directions to the supreme council and to all subordinate councils." This deliberate defiance of the church constitution was followed by this edict:

"Until further notice, ministers can be transferred for the good of the service from their pastorates to others and no protests of such transfers are permitted. Church officers may be placed in retirement when it appears that they cannot work effectively in other places."

A prominent but disgusted member of the German Christians informed me that, of the eighteen thousand evangelical pastors in Germany, ten thousand of them had either been placed on the retired list, sent to smaller parishes, or otherwise disciplined. These decrees and their execution were of course designed to reward Hitler's friends and to punish those not active in his party. Religious qualifications were frankly subordinated to political.

IV

It is not remarkable that this ruthless exercise of authority, later pronounced illegal by the German courts, produced consternation. But it is remarkable that in present-day Germany, where all opposition to the ruling powers is silenced, consternation flowered into action. An "Emergency League" was formed which soon numbered one third of the Prussian pastors. The bishops of Wuertemberg and Bavaria, formerly friendly to the German Christian movement, united with the officers of the Emergency League in calling a new General Synod, which set up a new council to govern the evangelical Church.

The confusion in the Protestant situation is due to the fact that the delegates to this new synod and their friends refuse to leave what may be called the established Church of Germany. To it belongs the church buildings, which could not be duplicated, and the church taxes which, though voluntary, are collected with the aid of the State. The adherents

of the "Confessional Synod," as the new protesting synod is named, maintain that the German Christian officials have actually left the Church by their unchristian dogma and actions. Hence whether the delegates from the churches to their synod represent the minority or majority of the local church-taxpayers is of no consequence; it is only they who are loyal to the gospels and to the confessions, only they who have the right to represent the Christian Church.

Thereupon, of course, the desperate fight was on. Through the aid of the friendly government, the German Christians soon ousted the bishops of Bavaria and Wuertemberg from their bishoprics by the simple method of removing the members of the provincial synods who supported them and of appointing their own partisans in their stead. Members of the secret police broke up meetings of protest and confined the banished bishops to their houses under guard. The head of the Emergency League admitted to his study three German Christians, seeking pastoral advice. He was thrown to the floor and later taken to the hospital.

And here occurred the miracle. The Confessional Synod established itself in the Christian consciousness of Germany. Its adherents grew until about 80 per cent of the pastors took instructions from its officers and ignored the legitimate bishop of Germany. Huge mass meetings, broken up by the police, split into groups which filled the churches. As newspapers were prohibited from mentioning the progress of the strife—even the *London Times* was several times confiscated for its report of the facts—the Confessionalists were compelled to fall back upon tracts, official letters and word of mouth. So overwhelming was their success, in spite of all odds, that Hitler publicly announced the neutrality of the government and allowed the Confessional Synod to organize the Church, if it could. The German Christians, however, have naturally refused to resign their influential positions in provincial councils and bishoprics, to which they had been legally elected. The Church found itself with two parallel and hostile ecclesiastical organizations and Hitler, who could not withdraw his loyal forces under fire, is reliably reported as bursting into tears.

V

It may be unfortunate that the protesting synod saw fit to call itself the "Confessional Synod" and to take its stand upon the Apostles'

Creed and the Augsburg Confession as well as upon the gospels. It justifies the assertion that it is a reactionary body, as hopelessly out of touch with the times in theology as in politics. But the verve of the movement came from these ultra-orthodox circles. Karl Barth, the most influential religious teacher in the German language and for long one of the Confessional Council, received me in his study the day after he had been suspended from his professorship in the University of Bonn because of his refusal to take the oath of allegiance to Hitler without a clause safeguarding his Christian convictions. He said to me: "The strife is between those who, in matters of religious authority, put a plus after Revelation and those who do not. The strife is centuries old; it is only now reaching an acute stage. To rely on "Revelation plus Germany" is more crude but not more false than to rely on "Revelation plus Experience" or "Revelation plus Reason." The great enemy to be overthrown is Neo-Protestantism in all its forms." As he ushered me downstairs, he did not light up any war emblems; he said, "Don't lose your sense of humor."

Yet it is but rarely that one finds any definite assertion of strictly confessional theology in the manifestos distributed by the officials of the Confessional Synod to their followers. The most important of these was issued after the ruthless deposition of the bishops of Wuertemberg and Bavaria. Definitely declaring that the constitution of the Church had been broken and that its legal organs no longer exist, it constitutes a new organ of leadership and calls upon the churches to cease fellowship with the legally established German Christian organization. It declares:

"The Church which the bishop of Germany struggles to establish under the slogan, One State, One People, One Church, signifies that the gospel has been stripped of its power to work in the German Evangelical Church and that the message of the Church has been given over to the powers of this world. The presumptuous autocracy of the Bishop of Germany and his legal counsel has erected an impossible papacy in the evangelical Church. The unbiblical introduction of the worldly principle of authoritative leadership into the Church and the demand of unreserved obedience, built upon it, has bound the officials of the Church to the church administration rather than to Christ."

When one remembers that the movement thus condemned is one favored by Hitler and manned by his zealous supporters, one can well believe that no braver words have been uttered in Germany today!

A strange fact in this strange situation is that nearly all of the liberal

theologians in Germany are standing behind the leaders of the decidedly orthodox Confessionalists. Religion, like politics, makes strange bedfellows. The liberals keep in the background. The new emphasis on the confessions is distasteful to them. But they claim for religion the same sacred independence that Barth claims for revelation. Notwithstanding the seductive name, they espouse in the German Christians a cat's paw of the National Socialists, reaching out to control the aims and program of the Church. They believe the dominance of the German Christians portends the end of that liberty of thought for which they have contended for decades. An outstanding liberal professor of theology said to me: "We liberals go with the confessional church because we oppose the totalitarian State, not because we share the theology of the confessions. The state must have nothing to do with the higher religious concerns."

The liberals and the genuine Confessionalists are both convinced that without theology, religion is bound to be supine, but their respective theologies are worlds apart. The German Christians, on the other hand, desire to purge religion of theology. They are not so much interested in the fact that Christianity came from the Hebrews as that it must come to the Germans. The Bible is not as authoritative to them as the German soul, which instinctively separates the essential from the fortuitous in the Christian revelation. It is significant that the leader of the German Christians has not been a clergyman, but a lawyer, and a lawyer who hails not from Berlin or Frankfurt or Munich, but from Kiel. No one who comes close to him can doubt either his sincerity or his Christianity or his lack of philosophical and theological training. As he said to me privately: "The third empire cannot stand unless it is penetrated with the spirit of the gospel. We wish it to stand; hence our whole purpose is to permeate Germany with the gospel." His chief criticism of the rank and file of the Christian ministry is that it speaks the language of the study and of doctrine. He spoke for more than an hour before a vast assembly of German Christians, where I was present, and the entire burden of his carefully modulated speech was that the church of the pastors must give way to a church of the people. He and his co-laborers believe that National Socialism with its high moral flavor and its sense of a holy mission has effectively prepared the way for the message of Christ. The Bishop of Saxony put it thus to me: "As God called Moses, so He has called Hitler. God is to be seen not only in Bible history but in our national

history, in the wonder of the natural world, in everything which causes an exaltation of soul. The people now feel this exaltation through that which Hitler has brought them. It will be a long process to bring them face to face with Christ to receive through Him the grace of God, but it must be undertaken." Hitler, that is to say, takes the place which Paul assigned to the Jewish law. He is the schoolmaster of the Germans to bring them to Christ.

Yet notwithstanding the aversion of the German Christians to theology, the most typical of them are taking a new step in it. It might be thus expressed: Race is a revelation of God, as much as the Bible, indeed displacing some of it. God created race before Christ came and Christ did not destroy it. Redemption is not to submerge creation; creation has clearer stigmata. The divine fatherhood of individual souls, through the gospel of Christ, is not to interfere with the older family laws of race.

VI

In the summer of 1935 the vital controversy was about as I have described it. In the background was the fundamental question of the relation of Church and State, but the foreground was occupied by two other, if related, issues. One was the equality within the Church of Jewish and Nordic Christians. The other was the exercise by the bishop of a dictatorial power analogous to that of the Führer in the State. They were questions of regimentation but of regimentation within the Church.

But now the issues have shifted. Somewhat more than a year ago, the State intervened in the confusion of church administrations as final arbiter. It implicitly recognized that the protest of the Confessionalists had carried the majority of earnest Christians with it. But it also discovered that there was no prospect that the two parallel church administrations would thaw into one. So Hitler appointed a state commissioner for the Protestant Church, who, in turn, appointed a new list of church administrative officers, with some confessional adherents upon it, which should enjoy authority for two years and then be replaced by a still different governing body, chosen by the churches themselves.

Tactically, this unexpected move by the government has proved a success. It has divided the ranks of the Confessionalists into those who trust the commissioner and those who do not. Though the formation of a Lutheran Council, historically inclined to a State Church of some sort, has

jeopardized the authority of the Confessional Synod, composed of both Lutherans and Calvinists, the sturdy majority of the Confessionalists may still see in this official mediation a Trojan horse with a clear label, *By the Authority of the National Socialist State.*" The foreground and background of the great controversy have become interchanged. The Jewish question bids fair to disappear from the Church or at least to retreat into the background, because the Jews have disappeared from the ranks of German citizens, who alone can hold office in the German State. The dictatorial powers of the bishop have been displaced by the beguilingly transitory but enforced control of the State over the Church. Any continuance of ordination and public instruction by the officials of the Confessional Synod in the independent theological seminaries founded by them to offset the state-controlled theological faculties of the Universities, may well be interpreted as treason against the State. Will the State and the brave fighters for their religious faith lock horns? Their leaders have recently addressed a public protest to Hitler against the anti-Christian tendencies of the government. What the end may be, who knows?

VII

Certainly no one can answer that question who does not take into consideration the new "German Faith Movement" and its affiliated or sympathetic groups. During the Republic, there rose in Germany some twenty different groups who favored a recrudescence of German paganism. These have now congealed into three. The most definitely pagan is led by General Ludendorff, the great strategist of the War, and by his clever wife. This group has done the rough pioneering but has cut its way through the Christian underbrush too indiscriminately. The most religious of the three is the one definitely known as the German Faith Movement, until the other day under the leadership of Professor Hauer, a former Christian missionary to India, a man of exalted character and of deep religious feeling. This group openly proclaims itself as a rival of Christianity and has ritualistic tendencies. The third group is the most influential, the most confessedly inchoate, the most aggressive of them all. Its mouthpiece is Alfred Rosenberg.

Like Hitler himself, Rosenberg is not German-born. He is one of Hitler's earliest followers and may be regarded as the intellectual leader of the party. He is the editor of its official paper, and the duly appointed

director of National Socialist culture. A zealous disciple of his has the entire youth of Germany under his educational control. Therefore his great book, *The Sacred Myth of the Twentieth Century* is a significant index to the thought of the Hitler regime. When I procured my copy, several years ago, its circulation was 333,000.

The book is unbelievably vituperative. Its two chief enemies are the Jews and the Roman Catholics. It has been placed on the Index at Rome. Yet it is a work of genius, full of the most brilliant and fascinating historical interpretations and insights, the most exciting book of our century, a spiritual cocktail which no one should leave untasted. Its ideal is honor—National Honor—lying midway between the softness of Christian love and the ruthlessness of Marxian materialism. I cull the sentences which are most terrifying to the leaders of the German Christians as well as of the Confessionalists:

“The most flaming conceivable nationalism is no longer to be built on tribes or dynasties or religious confessions but on Race, the primitive reality, bound to its own genius. . . . The new faith, buttressed by the sharpest knowledge, is that the Nordic Blood is the revelation of that mystery which has displaced and conquered the ancient Sacraments. . . . The strongest personality longs no more for personality but for a type. . . . The Prussian soldier is the primitive cell for the building of our complete being. We need sermons of men like Luther to hypnotize, but the Luther-like leader knows he must yield to the system of a Bismarck. . . . Humanity, Love of Mankind, Pacifism, Slave-emancipation are idols. The State, the Church, Law, Art and Science are only means; the Nation is the Alpha and Omega to which all must be subject. . . . Our new resolve, bestowed upon us by Fate, rejects with conscious pride the highest values of the cultures surrounding us as handicaps of our development. . . . World peace is not to set in with disarmament of armies and navies but with the complete destruction of dishonorable democracy, of the nineteenth-century idea of State, which ignored the foundation of Race. . . . The idea of Honor—of National Honor—will be for us the Alpha and Omega of all thought and action. It tolerates no central power of equal worth by its side—neither the love of the Christian nor the humanity of the Mason nor the philosophy of the Roman.”

VIII

It is this powerful movement which hangs like a sword of Damocles over the Christian Church. To many of the moderates in the camp of the Confessionalists it seems wiser to accept the program of the German Christians, with its assurance of government favor, than by an attitude of intransigence to dare the National Socialists to an open endorsement of these

anti-Christian tendencies. Rosenberg and Hitler hesitate to snap the ties which still bind their followers to the Christian sentiment and tradition of Germany and Europe. So long as this hesitation keeps the Damocles sword from falling, it is possible for the Church to hold its favorable position in the empire and to avoid a bitter struggle for its very existence. Is it not better to throw an uncaged tiger a bone?

There is, no doubt, a great difference of religious temper between the "German Christian" and the "Confessionalist Christian." The one preaches the heroic Christ, confident that its message accords with native German character. The other preaches the atoning Christ and calls for a humble reliance upon the unmerited grace of God. The Confessionalist does well to fear the heroic ideal as an interpretation of Christianity, particularly with the totalitarian State in the background. But is not this danger, with the gospels behind it, less than the other? For if Germany should discard Christianity and set up its own image in the temple of God, it may indeed become the protagonist of the Aryan—but of the Aryan Ishmael of whom it is written: "He shall be as a wild ass among men and his hand shall be against every man and every man's hand against him."

The Adventure of Christianity

FRANCIS B. SAYRE

WE ARE privileged to be living in one of the times of crisis of our civilization. We are passing through a period of prodigious change. Old institutions, old beliefs, old ideals are going fast. In this revolution of thought and of life, new conceptions and beliefs born of Communism, of Fascism, of the assumption of state supremacy over our lives, are competing relentlessly with the older conceptions taught by the Christian Church. The future is literally in our making.

It is a time of disillusionment, of loss of faith and bitter pessimism. We seem to be slipping backward in the long march of progress. We are in danger of losing part of the precious heritage for which our ancestors fought and gave their lives. Human liberty, democracy, parliamentary government, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, tolerance, faith—these in important parts of the world have ceased to exist. Today the tide is running strong for autocracy and dictatorship, for censored speech and writing, for riotous intolerance, for crass materialism. Political institutions are cracking ominously. Democratic government is fighting for its life. Our whole capitalistic system is under fire.

Economic collapse threatens on every side. International trade, which under modern conditions constitutes the very lifeblood of nations, has been strangled to considerably less than half of its former value. Many countries are unable to balance their budgets, and are piling up debts which may never be repaid. Currencies are being depreciated. Millions of human beings are wandering the streets of our great industrial cities, hungry and unable, through no fault of their own, to find work. The demoralization that comes from idleness and public relief is eating into youth. Those who have succeeded in laying something by against sickness or old age are harassed with vanishing values and economic uncertainties. We are forced to mortgage unborn generations to care for present want. In the midst of abundance the world is multiplying poverty.

Fear of the future haunts every land. Security, which forms a rough index of the advance of civilization and which the nineteenth century thought had been permanently won after the turbulent days of feudalism,

is in our day fast losing ground. Yet on top of all this we are building up armaments to a point never before touched in history. Nations are preparing for war—and the system which we ourselves have created seems to leave no room for escape. We are threatened with the breakdown of our civilization.

It will not do to blame our cataclysmic wars and economic catastrophies upon the will of God. I believe they run directly counter to His will. They are of our own making. I do not mean to suggest that God does not control the destinies of the world. But my belief is that God trusts men by giving them true freedom of action; and if men choose to follow selfish and materialistic courses of action, the world for a time must inevitably suffer the consequences.

For a century we have devoted and consecrated our hearts and brains to the upbuilding of a great material civilization. We have succeeded beyond our dreams. We have constructed railways, laid ocean cables, built great cities. We have learned to explore the secrets of invisible atoms, to communicate through unbroken space, to fly. We have multiplied the wealth of the world a hundredfold and more. We have harnessed Nature and made her serve us with the wealth-producing power of a hundred million slaves. We have made ourselves masters of the material world.

We have very much to be proud of. In the advance of the physical sciences we are handing down to future generations a magnificent heritage. We have developed a knowledge and a power to utilize natural laws which if rightly used and wisely directed can prove of incalculable service in human progress and achievement.

But for this we have paid a price. The invention and marvelous development of machines to replace human labor constantly opened up new avenues of wealth. Fortunes were made overnight. We of the West became drunk with the quest of money and more money. We did not consciously discard our faith or our idealism; we still believed vaguely in unseen realities. But we were so intent upon buying and selling and developing new forms of industry—so intoxicated with the new sources of material wealth and power which were being developed before our eyes—that other values were crowded out of our lives.

“Let the young man beware what he asks in his youth for in his old age he shall have it,” runs the old adage. So it has been with us. We have gained what we sought. But our quest was for material power and for

wealth and not for the things of the spirit upon which the rewarding values of life must be built.

The results speak for themselves. With all this magnificent advance in our understanding and mastery of the physical laws of the universe, there has been almost no advance in our understanding and mastery of spiritual laws. In spiritual understanding the past century has been a period of stagnancy. We have not found the way to win and make secure the enduring and really precious values of life. We have sought happiness through acquisition. We have placed our ultimate reliance for security upon material force. We have largely ceased to utilize the matchless power and strength that comes through religion. We are losing our faith in God and in the goodness of life. We have acquired prodigious material power without a corresponding spiritual understanding and restraint. It is as though young children were suddenly endowed with men's strength and powers but without men's understanding—as though children had been given thunderbolts and lightning to play with and knew not how to use them.

Civilization progresses when men share common beliefs and common faiths which are foundationed upon enduring truth. "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Security of life and of property is a *sine qua non* for the advance of the arts, for the sound development of institutions, for human happiness; and security is impossible if men do not share common beliefs in the fundamentals of light because in that event groups will fight groups to gain their selfish desires and there will be naught but force to restrain them. A civilization in which social groups are held in restraint only by force without common beliefs cannot endure. And only as faiths are foundationed on what is true will they be all-embracing or enduring. A civilization which is lacking in such fundamental faiths loses its cohesiveness and its power.

Do you see what this means? If we are to free our civilization from the seeds of its own destruction, if we are to go forward, we must achieve a new growth in spiritual understanding and development. We must gain a keener perception of what values make for human happiness, a more vivid understanding of the laws of spiritual cause and effect. Without this we can make no real progress.

First and foremost we must regain and redefine our faith. The shadows through which we now happen to be passing are but temporary. The great central facts of life are, not the selfishness and lusts and

cruelties of petty men and small minds, temporarily in places of power though many of them may be, not the suffering and the evil which seem at times predominant, but rather the never-ending patient bravery, the constant reaching upward toward goodness, the fundamental nobility of human nature. These are the foundation facts on which lasting progress must be built; and these, despite the prevailing cynicism of the present day, are eternal. In the last analysis human nature inherently admires and reaches out toward nobility rather than depravity. Noble leaders and noble causes are the ones which in the long run win over humanity to their standards. The proof lies in human history. Depressions such as we are now struggling through pass in time; social injustice in the long run is unendurable to humanity and hence will be slowly righted. Materialism contains the seeds of its own destruction. Either it destroys its worshipers or is killed by more satisfying beliefs; it cannot endure permanently. What is enduring to the end of time is not the evil, of which we see so much around us today, but the good. In spite of the appalling lack of faith of the present time, the goodness of a pitying, loving God continues unceasing, directing the hearts of men and, through them, the affairs of the world. Only as men realize this unchanging and unchangeable underlying fact of existence can human progress be made secure against wreckage. Cynics who have lost their faith are often admired for their wit and their cleverness; but somehow they do not achieve lasting results. It is the man of faith who moves people—Peter the Hermit, or Francis of Assisi, or Martin Luther. In the long last only the man with faith achieves.

The fundamentals upon which we build must be those justified by human experience. Shallow idealism will not serve. We must become more practical and more realistic if we would build for permanency.

Our world has gone awry because we have been building upon false foundations. Our fundamental belief is in material acquisition as the root of happiness, and we have filled the world with social injustice, unemployment, hungry mouths and broken hearts. Our fundamental belief is in a social control grounded upon the philosophy of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and we have filled the land with criminals and gangsters and their rackets until no one today is safe. Our fundamental belief is in material force as the surest means of security, and we have brought about the bloodiest and most destructive war in history.

Humanity is not now athirst for more inventions and scientific discoveries and improved methods of manufacture. These things will not stop heartaches or broken lives or suicides. What men and women are yearning and groping for today are spiritual values, such as inner happiness unconquerable by outward circumstances, joy in daily work and satisfaction even in commonplace labor, the abiding affection of a few and the respect of all, some objective of existence which colors all life with beauty. Values such as these cannot be built upon material foundations.

Further progress demands building anew upon spiritual foundations. The amazing and splendid advance in material progress of the last century must now be matched by spiritual progress and understanding. It is not that we must accept arbitrary, unreasonable or fruitless religious dogmas or traditional moral codes. What our civilization needs is a mastery and a practical utilization of spiritual laws with as large a measure of success as our own generation's mastery and utilization of physical laws. How can human personalities be won and fired with emotion, or to put the same thought in other words, what is the secret of influence, the science of power? How can the abiding satisfactions of life be secured and retained? How can we in larger measure satisfy our constant reaching upward toward life on a higher level?

Judged by its fruits, the materialistic philosophy of our present generation has proved impractical—has notably failed in giving to us the fundamental essentials of life. We are beset with problems, social, economic, political, that seem well-nigh insoluble. The current ideas and beliefs which are shaping and directing the course of our civilization seem to be leading us into ever deepening problems, more insoluble issues, more terrible crises. Social scientists have grappled with these problems, but the solution has not come. Economists have tried to solve them—and failed. Statesmen have tried to solve them—and failed. The efforts of all alike have ended in bankruptcy; and today we stand on the brink of a war that can wreck our civilization. Is there no hope?

The one solution that I can see, the *only* solution that seems really practical, lies along the teachings of Jesus Christ. He sensed, as no one else before or since, the heights and depths of human nature, knew how to satisfy its fundamental needs. He has thrilled mankind as no one else before or since. Those who would find lasting solutions for the problems that press in on us from every side, those who would know the

eternal verities of life and gain its mastery, must turn to His life for understanding and guidance. I can see no other way.

I do not mean more ritualism. I do not mean more ecclesiasticism. I do not mean more dogmatic theology.

I mean that if our civilization cannot be brought to understand more clearly and to believe more strongly in the fundamental teachings of Jesus Christ and the principles upon which He staked His life, our civilization cannot survive. I mean that men must of their own consciousness come to perceive the utter folly of trying to build a civilization on materialism and brute force, and come to realize, perhaps through suffering, that the enduring values that humanity will always crave grow out of understanding and love and self-sacrifice.

There is only one way to make people realize that. We must go back to the living Christ—to the audacious, thrilling, winsome figure that actually lived—and lives.

Christ sought to save mankind, not by the magic of some celestial miracle, not by some mystical doctrine of atonement, but through revealing to such as could understand the inmost secret of life—how to gain its mastery and make its rewards richer and more secure.

The principles He taught were not mere words. He lived them. For all time He proved their truth.

Would men in these days of tribulation learn how to deal with suffering so that it can be turned from a withering and blasting misery into one of the really constructive forces of life? Christ faced suffering, probably more bitter and intense than any other man. But He did not let it defeat or embitter Him. Bravely and fearlessly accepting it, He turned it to His own advantage and upon it built much of the power of His life. Do you suppose men would love Him today if He had not suffered? It was by His use of suffering that He gripped the souls of men.

Would men in these days of breakdown and seeming failure learn how to wrest triumph out of disaster? How was it that Christ, with His flaming audacious spirit, dared to cry out to His followers in the midst of what seemed utter failure: "Be of good cheer; for I have overcome the world"? If ever there was seeming failure and disaster it was at the end when Christ's life was snuffed out in a criminal execution, His splendid mission to save humanity apparently ended in a fiasco, His closest followers in His hour of need actually deserting and one betraying Him.

Yet in some strange way He knew how to turn the very shame of that pitiful death into the crowning triumph of His life. The cross, symbol of utter disgrace and failure, He has triumphantly turned into a symbol of eternal victory.

Would men today gain the power to achieve—which in the last analysis is dependent upon a mastery and domination over men? No figure in history has dominated men and generated such resurgent power as has Jesus Christ. He died a felon's death, without a soldier to defend Him—the very negation of material force. Yet by His life and by His death He generated a power such as kings and captains of great armies could not, a power which has fundamentally changed all human history and which still today, nineteen hundred years after His birth, is utterly transforming human lives. How do the materialists explain it?

I would address specifically Christian ministers. Was there ever such a time of world need and of thrilling opportunity for ministers of the living Christ? Upon men's broader and deeper understanding of Christ depends the saving of a civilization. As one catches the vision of all that hangs upon the outcome, the winning of men to Christ's way of life becomes the most exciting challenge in the world today.

The task before you is not primarily to work out and preach concrete solutions for the innumerable industrial, political and international problems which confront the world. Your concern is with fundamental principles—not with detailed solutions. The latter must be left to experts, laboring in season and out of season, working on many fronts.

Yours is the task of making men understand Christ. Love comes with understanding. And unless men learn to love Christ, they will not follow Him. Neither will they come to understand how to master life.

Out of constant love is born abiding faith. Your glory will be that you have imparted to those around you the sure knowledge of a living presence, still passionately loving individual human personalities, still yearning to save our civilization from tragic catastrophe if we will but let Him. Do you remember how Francis Thompson paints the picture?

"I fled Him, down the nights and down the days;
I fled Him, down the arches of the years;
I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways
 Of my own mind; and in the mist of tears
I hid from Him, and under running laughter."

And then finally, at the last

"Halt by me that footfall:
Is my gloom after all,
Shade of His hand, outstretched caressingly?
Ah, fondest, blindest, weakest,
I am He Whom thou seekst!
Thou dravest love from thee, who dravest Me."

The real sermons you preach are not with words. Are you ready to drink the cup of human suffering without flinching and without bitterness—like He did—and to turn the suffering into gain? Are you ready, through a knowledge and mastery gained of Him, to meet the disasters of life with gallant spirit, and turn them into splendid triumphs? Are you ready to walk with Him and to live such lives as will make men love the Master whom you follow? "Through such souls alone, God, stooping, shows sufficient of His light, for us i' the dark to rise by."

If you dare to believe the revolutionary teachings of Christ—which are poles apart from the fundamental beliefs of our time, which are scoffed at and derided by the crowds around us—if you dare to believe that what Christ said was true and to put His faith to the test, what a thrilling adventure Christianity becomes! It means no less than helping to save a civilization—which has in it much that is infinitely precious—by bringing to the profound problems of the day a wisdom gained through knowledge of Christ and a vision caught from His presence. What a fearful and thrilling task for those who, looking into Christ's face and taking His hand, are ready to walk with Him and make the great adventure!

Church and State

A Wealth of Recent Books¹

JOHN C. BENNETT

HERE is good reason to believe that the World Conference on Life and Work which is to convene at Oxford in the summer of 1937 will not be merely a remote project of the rather shadowy international overhead of the churches but will be close to the thought and the concern of the participating churches. The reason for believing this is the nature of the preparation which is being made for the conference. Other articles in this issue have shown the vast undertaking in co-operative thinking, guided by Dr. J. H. Oldham, out of which will come the material for a series of volumes. This material will form the background of the discussion at Oxford. But even more important, this undertaking provides a kind of running start in co-operative thinking on the part of the Christian leadership in many countries, a running start which should be extremely helpful during those two weeks of intensive co-operative thinking at Oxford. In this article another aspect of the preparatory work will be considered. The literature will be reviewed which is recommended for study and discussion among the churches in America. It is of the utmost importance that this literature be used in local churches throughout the country. The more widely that is the case the more truly can it be said that this whole movement which finds expression in the Oxford Conference is the universal Christian Church come alive.

There are four pieces of literature which I shall review here:

Charles H. Corbett: *The Church and the World Crisis*.

Henry S. Leiper: *Christ's Way and the World's*.

William Adams Brown: *Church and State in Contemporary America*.

Adolf Keller: *Church and State on the European Continent*.

¹ *The Church and the World Crisis*. By Charles H. Corbett. New York: Universal Christian Council. 25 cents.

Christ's Way and the World's: In Church, State and Society. By Henry Smith Leiper. New York: The Abingdon Press. Cloth, 90 cents; paper, 65 cents.

The Church and State in Contemporary America. By William Adams Brown. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50.

Church and State on the European Continent. By Adolf Keller. London: The Epworth Press. 6s.

I mention these titles in that order to give emphasis to the first two, which should be the most widely used. Mr. Corbett's outline is intended to be used by the numerous groups which cannot expect much reading but which do require guidance in the selection and clarification of issues for discussion. The leaders of such groups should read at least Doctor Leiper's book. Groups which can presuppose real study would also find Doctor Leiper's book most helpful. The two larger books by Doctor Brown and Doctor Keller are necessary for those who would go further in understanding the problems which face the modern Church.

Charles H. Corbett: The Church and the World Crisis

This discussion outline should be seen to be appreciated. It contains forty pages packed with material which will be invaluable in stimulating and guiding discussion. There are six studies. Each study begins with a clever combination of scripture verses and newspaper headlines. There follow a few paragraphs which interpret the facts behind the headlines and the issue which confronts Christians. Then there are several pages of quotations which reveal a variety of points of view. Each study closes with a page of questions.

The contents of the pamphlet can be seen best from the titles of the six studies:

1. A World in the Throes of Transformation.
2. Is Conscience to be Supreme, or is the State?
3. Education or Regimentation, Free Speech or Censorship?
4. What Can Religion Contribute to Economic Justice and Security?
5. Can We Have Peace, or Must We Have War?
6. The Church, Its Message and Strategy.

Henry Smith Leiper: Christ's Way and the World's

In Church, State, and Society

This little book covers the whole world in 140 pages and does it remarkably well. It brings together into one discussion both the problems of Europe and the problems of America as the two larger books do not attempt to do. It is written in a popular, and in fact, breezy style. Moreover, it is a courageous book. It is a promising fact about the Church that a book which is as outspoken as this should have come out of the heart of its official life. There is a chapter at the beginning on the general world situation and the problems which it raises for the churches. Then there

follows a statement of what Christianity is over against the world. There is a chapter which presents the strength and the weakness of the actual churches and it is an honest chapter. There are chapters on the function of the Church in relation to the State and in relation to the economic order. The chapter on the economic order should be very helpful in making people who are inclined to challenge it understand the concern of a large part of the leadership of the churches for economic problems. The final chapter on "The Changing Church" shows the requirements which the Church must face if it is to be Christ's instrument in the world today and explains the significance of the ecumenical movement and of the world conferences at Oxford and Edinburgh. This book is necessary for leaders of groups which discuss these issues, including the groups which use Corbett's pamphlets, and members of groups should be encouraged to read it.

William Adams Brown: Church and State in Contemporary America

This book is more than the work of an individual. It is the result of the work of a very representative committee which has worked with Doctor Brown as chairman under the auspices of the Federal Council of Churches for several years. Every chapter has been rewritten in the light of criticisms from the members of the committee. It thus represents a broad consensus of opinion. But the book has been written throughout by Doctor Brown and has the full advantage of his clarity of analysis, effectiveness of statement, and wise judgment. Also, unlike most products of committees it is readable. There is no other book which covers the field as this book does and one can be sure that for some years it will be the point of departure for all fruitful discussion of the relation between Church and State in America.

Doctor Brown makes it clear at the outset that the usual assumption that America has solved the problem of the relation between Church and State with the formula of "the separation of Church and State" is a complete illusion. At two points we see that any such assumption is ungrounded. The first is that the whole modern trend is for the State to assume increasing control over the lives of its citizens. This trend, which has raised acute problems for the Church in the totalitarian states of Europe, is at least incipient in democratic America. State education is the entering wedge for state control of the whole of life and this is the more so when the idea of education is broadened to include the molding

of character, as is the case with state education in America today in its more advanced form. In time of war, even a democratic state seeks to become totalitarian and so in relation to war the American state is a threat to the freedom of conscience which the Church encourages in its members. The other point at which we see that Church and State are not separate is the increasing tendency on the part of the Church to seek to influence the whole of society. Every social issue of importance is in one or more aspects a moral issue and comes within the range of the Church's concern. With the exception of the Lutheran churches, the churches in America with surprising unanimity have taken everything human for their province. This fact alone calls for fresh thinking concerning the precise responsibility of the Church in relation to issues which have until the recent past been left entirely to the control of the State.

In seeking light on this problem, Doctor Brown first gives a brief but very useful summary of the various forms of relationship between Church and State in history. He shows in this connection that "in many countries the conditions which we face today more nearly parallel those of the first three centuries than at any intervening period." After showing the underlying divergences which have developed through the centuries within the Church in regard to its relation to the State and secular society, Doctor Brown next presents the theory and practice of the various types of American Christianity. It is extremely significant that he is able to deal with all the major Protestant denominations except the Lutherans in one chapter. Almost all of our churches, "while they accept, as a matter of course, the conventional American doctrine of the separation between Church and State, they interpret the doctrine in terms which lay upon the churches large responsibility for influencing the State to take the form of social action which they consider to be in accord with Christian principles." The churches, such as the Protestant Episcopal and the Presbyterian (U. S. A.), which in their official doctrines preserve a rather sharp distinction between the respective provinces of the Church and the State in their practice show little regard for that distinction. This *aggressiveness* of the Church is the characteristic American trend and is in sharp contrast with what is permitted by the State or desired by the Church in most European countries.

Both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic theory and practice in relation to the State are set forth in separate chapters.

The last section of the book consists of three chapters which gather

together the results of the previous survey and suggest the constructive principles which should guide the Church. This part of the book is less thorough than the descriptive part. It is clearly affirmed that the responsibility of the Church extends to the whole of life; that there should be careful discrimination between the ethical and the technical aspects of any social question; and that it is the ethical aspect which is the Church's responsibility; that when the membership of the Church has developed a corporate conscience on any issue which seems to them to fall within the scope of the Church's mission "it is always appropriate for them to seek to influence political action as a constituent part of the State"; that the methods of the churches should take the form of "education, example, and persuasion"; that the churches should rethink the possibilities of discipline within their own fellowships; that the agencies for co-operative research be strengthened to make the churches more intelligent in suggesting positive remedies; that encouragement be given to unofficial organizations within which Christians work together in making social experiments without committing the Church as a whole. The final chapter puts the whole discussion into the ecumenical perspective, compares the American with the European churches, and concludes with a statement of the urgency of the issues which Communism and nationalism have created for the universal Church. This book is more than a discussion of Church and State in the terms in which that problem is usually discussed. It is one of the most helpful books which we have on the whole question of the function of the Church in society.

Adolph Keller: Church and State on the Continent of Europe

Doctor Brown's book has just enough in it about the general problem of the Church and State in history and about the contrast between the American and European churches to be an excellent introduction to this book by Adolph Keller. (In passing, it should be said that neither of these volumes considers the churches in Great Britain. That is unfortunate for the American reader because he would find in the British churches the same aggressive attitude toward the State to which he is accustomed, complicated by factors growing out of the church establishment which are quite unique. The British genius for making things which look absurd on paper, such as the appointment of Bishops by the government, work well in practice is nowhere more evident than in the church situation.)

Doctor Keller has been for a number of years the secretary of the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work with headquarters at Geneva. He knows the European church situation both inside and out and he has proved himself to be one of the most successful interpreters of European Christianity to the Anglo-Saxon world. In this book he limits himself to describing the present situation and he puts it all together with clarity and also, in spite of very passionate convictions, with real objectivity.

The following quotations show the spirit of the book: "It is astounding to observe with what breathless rapidity Continental nations, men, habits, social systems, ideas and ideals have changed in a few years and are still changing. . . . Millions 'have burnt what they adored and adore what they had burnt.' What is more bewildering than any fall of thrones or rise of new states is the profound and mysterious transformation of our whole inner world, of the soul of the Continental peoples, of our Self in its deepest needs and loftiest aspirations. . . . God Himself, who dwelt quietly in human hearts for centuries, is on the move, and the devil is busy."

The first third of the book is an account of the ideology which lies back of the three great European movements—Communism, Fascism, National Socialism. The sections on Communism and National Socialism are useful summaries of what is familiar ground but the section on Fascism fills a gap for most Americans who are inclined to lump together National Socialism and Fascism without discrimination. Doctor Keller shares the deep feeling of hostility toward Communism which most churchmen under German influence seem to have, but he is not unfair in his statement of facts and he is ready to admit the degree to which Communism is a judgment upon the churches.

There follows a long chapter describing the various legal forms of relationship between Church and State which have existed on the continent. Brief sections on all of the smaller countries are included. The concordats between the Roman Church and Italy, Germany, and Austria are explained.

The remainder of the book is a narrative of the struggles between Church and State in France, Russia, Italy, and Germany. There is an especially full account of the German struggle bringing the tangled story up to the events of recent months—a tragic story of unbelievable tyranny, heroic resistance, and now chaos within the Church.

These two books lead one into very different worlds. It might be said that Doctor Keller's book has as its chief theme the struggle of the churches to retain a margin of freedom from the State, a margin of freedom which includes little more than the sanctuary itself. The theme of Doctor Brown's book is the ways in which the churches should seek to influence the conduct of the State and guide the whole life of society. The freedom of the churches, except at a very few points, is taken for granted and it is the positive impact of the churches upon the world which is stressed. It would seem that the American churches have all the chance that could be asked to consolidate their strength so that in the face of any future threat from a totalitarian State they can stand their ground. The American churches have every opportunity—except the fire of persecution itself—and one wonders if the rebirth of the Church must wait for that.

It is unseemly that we should at this stage lecture the struggling European churches. But there is one thing which it is necessary to point out for our own guidance. The Protestant churches in Europe in delimiting the sphere of their influence and in surrendering the major part of the secular sphere to the State may really have made a successful struggle against the State impossible. They did not have the habit of resisting the State on ethical issues and now that their own freedom is imperiled, resistance may be too late. If the American churches hold fast to what has become their characteristic tendency—an aggressive attitude toward the ethical conduct of the State—they may be a decisive factor in preventing exclusive nationalism, militarism, racialism, and dictatorship from fastening themselves upon America. At this point I believe, and I cannot emphasize it too strongly, that the American churches have a vital contribution which must be made to the witness of the universal Church. Whatever be the *truth* about the right relations between Church and State, to divide the territory between them so that so-called "temporal" or "secular" policies which vitally affect the welfare of persons are considered beyond the scope of the Church's criticism—that is *error*:

Book Reviews

The God Who Speaks. By BURNETT HILLMAN STREETER. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$1.75.

CANON (now Provost) Streeter's Warburton Lectures, delivered in the Chapel of Lincoln's Inn during the Law Terms of 1933-35, have the freshness and vitality of all his works, well-known to American readers of religious books. In a sense, the present volume is a sequel to his book, *Reality*; though the author himself points out that his emphasis is now less purely upon reason. Our adjustment to the all-embracing Reality, "in whom we live and move and have our being," begins "long before our conscious reflection upon it; and it must extend to depths of the personality which are commonly beyond the reach of such reflection." "The way to a knowledge of God will be through a re-orientation of purpose and desire, and a constant re-dedication of the self to the highest that it knows."

The fundamental thesis of the book is that the religion of the Bible traces back to the immediate awareness of the will of God on the part of sensitive souls, seers and prophets, for whom God was no abstract idea but a living person and presence. This principle is outlined in the course of the development of revelation in the Old and New Testament, and its importance for present-day religion is clearly brought out. Modern religion is weak in that it lacks the vivid realization of the will of God—not Fate, or Predestination, but a Plan which runs through all life, and upon conformity with which the success and happiness of the individual, and the nation, depend. Surrender to this plan is not a renuncia-

tion of liberty, but the achievement of a higher freedom—like the conformity of the orchestra-player to the will of the conductor. Modern religion will not renew its strength until this emphasis is once more made primary.

The book may be viewed as Doctor Streeter's "Apologia" for his enrollment in the Oxford Group Movement. For from his proved thesis follows at once the inference that divine guidance, if possible once, is possible still. At the same time he sets forth (pp. 167ff) four "tests of guidance" which members of the "Groups"—as well as other Christians—do well to observe.

A supplementary lecture, "Christianity and Other Religions," concludes this stimulating and suggestive volume.

FREDERICK C. GRANT.
Dean of Seabury-Western
Theological Seminary.

Christian Materialism. By FRANCIS J. McCONNELL. New York: Friendship Press. \$1.25.

In his characteristically inimitable style, Bishop McConnell has written a new book on a timely subject—*Christian Materialism*. Here the matter of Christian stewardship in all its implications is treated skillfully. The book is profound yet superbly simple, making it valuable alike to the scholarly clergyman and the layman of average intelligence.

In the introduction the author says, "The problem of materialism is always of high importance to Christianity," and asserts that materialism has to be redeemed by spiritual forces showing

themselves superior to material forces. "To control this force for moral and spiritual purposes is the aim of Christian materialism." The subject is arranged under three divisions: Getting, Spending and Giving.

The question of Getting is a many-sided one. With searching frankness Bishop McConnell considers it from the standpoint of the Christian's obligations to society, ethics in matters of earned and unearned income and kindred subjects.

The author brings new light upon the perennial question of how the Christian can square Old Testament standards and prohibitions with the modern interpretation of Christian stewardship. Social and economic problems in their relation to human welfare are treated uniquely. The Bishop uses many commonplace and homely illustrations to strengthen his points, reminding the reader of Jesus' method of attack on some of the burning issues of His time.

The chapter on Spending reveals the wide range of thought the author has given this matter: the power of the consumer, his obligations toward labor, the cost of our modern industrialism in human effort and its toll of life, the duties of the older to the new generation and the new to the old, all deserve thoughtful reading on the part of those who feel any obligation for the future welfare of these two groups. All these matters are analyzed with keen insight and sympathetic understanding.

The third division—Giving—is largely devoted to foreign missions. This is defensible. The book is written for Christians and there is need today of a fresh apologetic on this unfinished task of the Church which is regarded with apathy if not antagonism by many of the laity. Two other questions, the spiritual significance of money and

social experimentation, receive thought-provoking treatment.

One reading of the book registers the conviction that not in money but in selfishness and ignorance are rooted most of the evils and dangers of present-day materialism. The real point of this thesis is epitomized in the closing sentence, "Materialism can be converted and sanctified so that through it can be made the revelation of a new creation at the hands of the sons of God."

MRS. V. F. DE VINNY.
Saint Paul, Minnesota.

Old Testament Religion. In the Light of its Canaanite Background. By ELMER A. LESLIE. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

BOTH the professional scholar and the general reader owe Professor Leslie of Boston University School of Theology a debt of gratitude for placing this volume at their disposal. The student of the Old Testament will find not only a great mass of information collected from widely scattered sources, but new points of view and results. The intelligent general reader, and particularly the busy parish minister, will obtain from a perusal of the volume a fresh conception of the development of the religion of the Old Testament to the end of the Exile, and an insight into the latest methods and results of Old Testament research (with special reference to the contribution of archaeological excavations to Biblical studies) not easily obtained otherwise.

"The treatment of the Old Testament religion here presented is genetic in nature and dramatic in method" (p. 10). In tracing the birth and growth of the ancient Hebrew religion, Professor Leslie unfolds before the reader a drama, with a prelude in Canaan (the Patri-

archs) and in the wilderness (Moses), in three acts: the clash between the sedentary Canaanites and the nomadic Israelites that invaded their land; the ensuing dilemma between the worship of Jehovah and that of Baal; the militant and brilliant affirmation of the sublimity of the nature and requirements of Jehovah on the part of the eighth century prophets. The epilogue of the drama consists in the synthesis of the conflicting points of view which was attained by the seventh-century prophets and by Deuteronomy, and culminated in the epoch-making teaching of Ezekiel and of Second Isaiah.

The salient feature of the religion of Canaan, according to Professor Leslie, is its fertility aspect, to which the concept of the dying-rising god was closely related. In fact, he regards the differentiation of sex among the deities of the Palestinian pantheon and the Adonis worship as fundamental, discovering accordingly a fertility meaning in the worship of the gods and of the spirits of the dead, in sacred objects such as the stone pillars, in the festivals, and in sacrifice (including human sacrifice). His most telling evidence is drawn from the newly discovered old Phoenician mythological epics of Ugarit (Ras Shamra), in the interpretation of which he is inclined to follow the speculations of Dussaud. It is not probable that all scholars will agree with the view that the religion of Canaan was exclusively, or even predominantly, a fertility cult, and that the Adonis cult played as fundamental a role in Canaan as the author believes; he even goes so far as to discover allusions to this cult in Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Nahum, Jeremiah and elsewhere, accepting the conclusions of Graham and May. Nor is the Thracian origin of Hebrew prophecy as certain as he assumes, for in spite of superficial resem-

blances between the orgiastic frenzy of the devotees of Dionysius and the ecstatic transports of the Sons of the Prophets, the essential quality of the two phenomena is by no means identical: the first was conceived as the entrance of the human into the divine, the second as the entrance of the divine into the human.

In such general questions, as well as in numerous matters of detail, the opinions of Professor Leslie deserve serious consideration and a fuller discussion than is possible here. The volume represents the outcome of long and careful research, in the course of which a vast body of primary material and of critical opinion has been carefully examined; the bibliography omits very few significant publications, except two or three that appeared in 1935. Even the reader who may not accept the conclusions of Professor Leslie, will find the volume stimulating, original, and well documented.

ROBERT H. PFEIFFER.
Harvard University.

Christian Morality. By HERBERT HENSLEY HENSON. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. \$5.00.

THE Bishop of Durham chose a weighty theme for his Gifford Lectures of 1935-36. He aimed to set forth Christian morality as "natural, developing, final." The lectures undertake to derive the Christian ethic from the authority of the New Testament, and, after tracing its historical development, to apply its principles to modern questions of sex, race, the state, and industrialism.

It must be admitted that the series is below the level of Gifford lectures. The author's disarming appeal to a public larger than the academic is delightfully

frank, but it does not justify his inadequate treatment of the authority of the New Testament or the narrow range of his mastery of New Testament criticism. Still less does it account for his failure to give a clear answer to the question about what Christian morality really is. The problems which perplex the thoughtful mind are hardly touched. What was the nature of the social teaching of Jesus? Was he an individualist? Did he teach a "planned economy"? How great a place did he assign to divine intervention and to human effort? We are left in the dark. There is the barest mention of the relation of Christianity to the mystery cults.

When it comes to the treatment of modern problems, although some apt remarks are made and a suitable Latin adage is always at hand, the net result is meager. While disavowing optimism, the lecturer does not hesitate to call our machine civilization Christian. He is hardly conscious of the criticism of "Christian civilization" by the Orient, although he is sharply on the defensive against Communism.

If one asks to what Christian morality will lead in sex and race, state and industry, one finds allusions to "discipline and conflict," harsh words for the pacifist as "victim of his own disturbed imagination," phrases about "men being what they are," so "What method is there apart from war?" The one soundly vigorous utterance in the book is a condemnation of expensive American cathedrals—ecclesiastical pomp linked with moral failure.

The book is more conspicuous for what it omits than for what it says. Here is another demonstration that an able and well-read preacher is not necessarily a Gifford lecturer.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN.
Boston University.

The Basic Beliefs of Jesus. By PAUL B. KERN. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$2.00.

THE author is one of the younger bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, quickly granted a wide leadership because of his ability as administrator and thinker.

While the volume moves throughout on a high level, it still holds many striking phrases of which we quote a few: "His the golden day of the dictator"; "goose-step morality"; "we do not realize that an idea is dead until we attend its funeral"; "we are our own greatest problem"; "numerical salvation"; "making a disciple and not a convert"; "escalator theory of progress"; "the man with the hoe' is now the man with a gun." But the phrase-power of the book does not at all jerk the reader away from its thought-power.

Not following the chapter headings, we may say that the basic beliefs of Jesus, as treated, relate to Personality, Growth, Faith, Worship, Brotherhood, Love and Redemption. There is also a revealing chapter which discusses the Saviour's relation to God—a chapter which shows how effective an argument can be made for the Saviourhood of Christ upon spiritual rather than metaphysical grounds, and which alone as a pamphlet would make the author's labor worth-while. The conclusion is given in two forms—one in the words of Bishop Kern himself, "If all Jesus has to offer to men is a dazzling idea, with no power to attain, he is the Toftmentor, not the Saviour, of the souls of men;" and the other in the well-known quotation:

"How can my soul
But worship Him as Saviour and as God."

I was a bit tempted, inasmuch as Paul Kern is a fellow-Bishop and a close

friend, to overstrain in the direction of criticizing! But on a reading and re-reading of the chapters, I concluded that any restrictions were too petty to be offered. So I end the review with a personal counsel to my junior colleague—The man who can write such a book as this must not later allow himself to be so occupied with administrative details as to estop such helpful writing.

EDWIN H. HUGHES.

Washington, D. C.

The Presbyterians. 1783-1840. A collection of Source Materials. Vol. II of *Religion on the American Frontier*. By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$3.50.

In 1931, Professor Sweet published the first volume of his projected series, *Religion on the American Frontier*. In that work, dealing with the Baptists, he adopted the plan of devoting about one hundred pages of introduction to a brief history of the westward expansion of that denomination, followed by approximately five hundred pages of documents illustrating their work on the frontier. In the present volume the same general outline is carried out with respect to the Presbyterians.

It is difficult to decide which is the more interesting part of this work, the introductory narrative with its fresh viewpoint, careful analysis and clear and forceful style, or the collection of documents, secured from many sources, most of which are here published for the first time.

The former begins with a picture of American Presbyterianism at the close of the Revolution. According to the author no church in America occupied a more strategic position. Citing Briggs and others to the effect that in 1775 the

ecclesiastical and educational control of the colonies was in the hands of the Presbyterians and Congregationalists, and that upon their action the destinies of America depended, he gives it as his sober judgment that even after discounting whatever coloring might be due to denominational pride, "careful investigation will show that this generalization is not far from the truth."

In his development of the westward expansion of the Presbyterians, full credit is given by the author to their cultural and educational influence on the frontier communities, and to the major role they played in the great revival movement of the first third of the nineteenth century.

The concluding sections deal with Plan of Union, whereby the Presbyterian General Assembly and the Congregational Associations had agreed to co-operate in the newly-opened fields of missionary labor, and with the controversies which finally led to the division of 1837. He has handled all this controversial material in a spirit of eminent fairness.

Perhaps his most important contribution, however, is found in Part II, which contains an extensive and carefully selected collection of documentary material. These documents include extracts from sessional and presbyterial records, contemporary journals and correspondence and other miscellaneous papers. They occupy some 760 pages out of a total of 939. Over two hundred and fifty pages are devoted to the Minutes of the Presbyteries of Transylvania and Cumberland, and of the Synod of Kentucky. Much of the above material was copied from the M. A. collections at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, of the Department of History of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., and of the Historical Foundation of the Southern

Presbyterian Church at Montreat, North Carolina.

The volume contains an extensive bibliography and is well indexed. It is a work of permanent value which no serious student of American Christianity can afford to be without. Professor Sweet is to be congratulated upon his new approach to the study of our ecclesiastical history. His work should prove an inspiration to other historians to the great enrichment of our knowledge in one of the most important fields of research.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

Stated Clerk,
The Presbyterian Church in
the United States of America.

Shaping the Future—A Study in World Perspective. By BASIL MATHews. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.00.

A TYPEWRITTEN sentence affixed to the window of a store on Fifth Avenue recently caught and held my attention: "Use big maps, small maps have no power to stir the heart or kindle the imagination; use big maps."

Basil Mathews is always generous in the sweep of the picture he artistically displays in any of his books. You are convinced he feels the breezes of many lands, and is conscious of tendencies and currents that are eddying and surging in all five continents. He surely is convinced that to understand anywhere you must understand everywhere.

Shaping the Future moves along lines one is accustomed to find coming from the flowing and glowing pen of this author. He is not only a student of world affairs, but one of the ablest living apologists of missionary enterprise. You are certain as you read the opening pages

that the writer, after discussing with penetrating skill the critical issues of modern life, will come to the Christian faith as the only answer and God as the ultimate and final reality. I entirely agree with the whole philosophy and argument presented, but sometimes the unexpected has a special lure and occasionally a knowledge of the goal that will surely be reached dulls expectancy.

The book opens with a splendid review of the gloomy and confused world with its "sense of helplessness." Man seems to be a mere cog at the mercy of colossal impersonal forces over which he has absolutely no control. The path, however, leads with certainty to the "conviction that man can rise to be a decisive factor in modifying the direction" of events. When man appears, history begins. The key of the situation is not in the flashing planet whirling in infinite spaces, but in the friendly man at the small end of the telescope. Mr. Mathews finds all men searching for power, freedom, and fellowship. They are seeking for salvation. And in Christ are all these things.

The new frontiers of paganism which Christianity faces are seen in nationalism, Communism and mechanistic industrialism. But the real barbarism and the ultimate challenge is the strident claim of the totalitarian State. Here Christianity is faced with a menace. The author, in language of thrilling power, announces the awful danger. "A nationalism that puts the goal of the nation above the kingdom of God, the will of the omnipotent State above that of the Creator, is pagan. If that doctrine conquers, the light of the freedom of the spirit is put out, and the floods of cruelty and bestiality will go roaring through the darkness, sweeping away the priceless heritage that man has garnered

through the ages at so high a cost." But he adds that the difficulties of the hour are not more formidable than those that loomed up before the early Church. The uprising of Christianity all over the world in its larger and full interpretations is an able presentation, as is the sympathetic treatment of the artisans of peace, with their deeper significance.

Shaping the Future will be to the minister and the Christian layman a mine of wealth and information as he ponders on the Christian concept of the world and the world service program of the Church. In Britain and America the Church is feeling the stirring of evangelistic campaigns and preaching missions as they attempt to rekindle the fires of religion. A sentence of Mr. Mathews' fine study goes to the heart of the gospel. "The very touchstone of the Church, wherever it is, east or west, in city or village, is whether it is searching to bring back to God His estranged children. God so loved the world that he gave His Son."

The chapters of the book were lectures given at the universities of Toronto, Belfast, and Dublin, and when surcharged with the personality of the lecturer, one can readily understand the larger vision of the Kingdom that would embrace eager-hearted youth.

HARRY N. HOLMES.

New York City.

Moody Still Lives. By ARTHUR PERCY FITT. New York: Fleming H. Revell and Company. \$1.50.

IN recognition of the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Dwight L. Moody, which falls on February 5, 1937, Mr. Fitt, who married the only daughter of Mr. Moody, has given us this volume of intimate snapshots of the

life of the great evangelist. For several years the secretary of Mr. Moody, and practically all his subsequent life associated with the work Mr. Moody began, Mr. Fitt is well qualified by experience and temperament to produce this timely, heart-warming volume.

At several points, this book supplements the larger and earlier ones by W. R. Moody. Indeed, its chief value to many will be the intimate personal touches that brighten and freshen the portrait of this very great Christian preacher. How refreshing, for instance, the incident told by G. Campbell Morgan, of Mr. Moody with his granddaughter asleep by his side in the buggy as they drove into the yard of his home. Unwilling to waken the little girl, he had the horse unhitched, while the grandfather sat watching the little one sleep. From this simple story a shaft of light falls upon the character of one who was able to move to their depths great companies of people.

One could wish that all Christian workers might read of Mr. Moody's urging another whom he was recommending for a responsible position "to keep sweet." Coming from one of Mr. Moody's depth of conviction and after his experience of all sorts of unfair criticism, this is strong medicine indeed.

This little book brings out some of the central aspects of a life which came as a gift of God to a spiritually dull and arid generation. For one thing, reflection on the work of Mr. Moody should send Christians to their knees to ask why we do not, as a common experience, seek to see life-transforming decisions for Christ and His way of life. Has anything in the power of God's Holy Spirit changed, or in the heart of man, that we should not expect and work for commitment to Christ by the multitudes who know Him not?

One can not but wonder why Mr. Fitt

did not speak of Mr. Moody's unflagging interest in the Northfield Schools; or just why he did mention the only institution that, so far as we know, bears his name and yet never fully commanded his interest and support.

GEORGE IRVING.

The National Council
of the Y. M. C. A.

The Living Bible. By WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$2.00.

THE opening chapter of this book is entitled, "Has the Bible a Place in the Modern World?" Addressing himself to the problem of how to make the Bible more effective in the religious life of our day, Doctor Bower offers an approach through the recent viewpoints in the field of religious education. Fundamentally, his thesis is that the Bible is to be handled as any other work of the past, and its values are to be recovered by the historical processes. The first fifty pages deal with the present religious situation. the next section of approximately one hundred pages describes the familiar results of Old and New Testament historical-literary criticism, and the final unit of some seventy-five pages suggests the principles upon which we should proceed to make the Bible a book of value again. In the five principles stated, there is no new approach, but rather a re-statement of well known aids in historical teaching. Familiar phrases of present usage in educational work are brought over to do service in biblical teaching. The book is of service to the technical teacher, and the stress on the centrality of human experience is welcome.

EDWIN P. BOOTH.

Boston University
School of Theology.

The Search for a New Strategy in Protestantism. By IVAN LEE HOLT. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$1.50.

IN this book, Dr. Ivan Lee Holt sums up in concise form certain convictions which he has formulated during his service as President of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America. Originally given as the Bevan Lectures in Adelaide, South Australia, and subsequently enlarged and revised for delivery as the Fondren Lectureship at the Southern Methodist University, they are now given to a wider public.

Doctor Holt's title suggests the central thought of the book, that Protestantism needs a new strategy. His wide contacts with ministers of many communions during his term of office as President of the Federal Council have convinced him that there is a widespread unrest in Protestantism and that this unrest is not concerned with superficial matters. It has to do with the main purpose and program of the Church. He is not unmindful of the importance of the Christian ideals of a warless world, a Christian social order, and a united Church, which have engaged so much of our time and thought during the last decade. But he is convinced that there are some things which must be done to clear the ground before we can make a real advance toward these objectives. It is with these preliminaries that the book has to do.

Doctor Holt's own conclusion is concisely summed up in a single sentence from the Preface: "We are finding that people are not good enough and the Church is not Christian enough to claim some of the wide areas which we have been seeking." If the Church were in fact what in ideal it ought to be, it could do some of the things for failing to do

which it is criticized. It is with the Christian Church, and more specifically with our own part of it and our own share in it, that we must begin.

The several chapters deal, respectively, with "The Confusion in the Protestant World," "The Challenge of the Economic Crisis," "Efforts for a Larger Fellowship," "A New Approach to the Christian World Mission," and "Suggestions for a New Strategy."

The practical suggestions which the author has to offer move along the familiar lines which wise teachers of the Church have long seen to be necessary. On these points Doctor Holt would be the first to admit that there is nothing new which can be said. What we need now is action. As a call to such action we welcome this book.

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN.
Union Theological Seminary.

The Hebrew Heritage. By CHARLES W. HARRIS. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.50.

THE result of the labors of Professor Harris is a real contribution to those who desire a popular yet scholarly presentation of some of the essential elements which have gone into the matrix of Hebrew culture. The thirty-seven chapters of this book are just the right length for study groups, and their division by sub-titles will be of immense value to the reader who will feel the need of a compass as he travels through the wide range of materials presented to him. One may suspect that Professor Harris has selected those subjects which, from his long and rich experience as a minister and teacher, he has found vital to the needs of his students and of special interest to them.

One does wish that the author had treated more in detail Palestinian pre-history, instead of the same period in

Europe. The excavations of Garrod, Neuville and others have given us much information on this early period in Palestine, and the discussion of the Levalloisian and Mousterian skeletal remains and the Natufian art and burial practices would have served as a more fitting introduction to the book. The presence of a Neolithic period in Palestine is extremely doubtful.

A careful study of the differences between Sumerian and Babylonian religion would have been illuminating. Ishtar and Marduk can hardly be characterized as Sumerian deities. As Sidney Smith, F. Bohl, E. A. Speiser and others have pointed out, the so-called royal tombs at Ur are probably to be associated with the rites of the marriage of the god and goddess, representing deaths resulting from the ceremonies in connection with the sacred marriage. There is little evidence that they were actually royal tombs, and they are to be dated around 2900-2800 B. C.

The outline of the religion and ritual of Egypt given to us by Professor Harris is most admirable. There is a wise recognition of the Egyptian influence on the Hebrews, and the statement that this influence was not occasional but quite continuous receives ample archaeological support. That the bull and serpent worship among the Hebrews was due to this, however, is not at all certain, in view of the prevalence of the snake and bull cults throughout the Near East. The tribe of Ephraim probably worshiped its tribal deity in the form of a bull before there were any Hebrews in Egypt. The tale of the golden calf in the desert is perhaps in reality a criticism of the religion of Israel for representing Yahweh by the symbolism of the Ephraimite tribal deity.

The reviewer recalls no ancient Megiddo altars in the surface of which

were holes where the blood of sacrificial victims used to drip, and which might have served the present native women in their laundry. There is no evidence of Neolithic occupation at Megiddo. Professor Harris seems to consider the Governor's House and the Astarte Temple at this site as two different buildings, but the misunderstanding may be a natural one in view of the variant interpretations which have been made. The stele of Shishak is in the Palestine Museum at Jerusalem, and a replica is in Chicago.

The discussion of the sources of Hebrew literature, the oracles of Israel, the books of the prophets, Psalms, Job, and Ecclesiastes will serve the reader as a miniature introduction to the Old Testament. In like manner the discussion of the Greek period will serve as an introduction to Homer, the dramatists, and the philosophers. One might wish that there had been included a brief review of the contents and importance of the Elephantine papyri.

The reviewer commends this book to the public. The general reader will find that Professor Harris has written a book which will be a real addition to his library and a source of profit and pleasure to him.

HERBERT GORDON MAY.

The Graduate School of Theology,
Oberlin College.

Man and His Maker. By PERCY DEARMER. London: Student Christian Movement Press. 3/6.

THE recent death of Doctor Dearmer, Canon of Westminster, removed from the English-speaking world one of its foremost scholars and teachers, and it is our good fortune that the manuscript of *Man and His Maker* was in process of final revision when the author passed away. The book deals with

Christian faith in the light of our newest scientific knowledge. It represents the results of a lifetime of cogent thinking and unhurried reflection. Dealing with the old, yet ever new problems of Imperfection, Pain, Misery and Evil, and doing so in the light of divine design, this volume is an up-to-date edition of the famous Doctor Paley's classic *Evidences*. As one might expect of any thing written by Dearmer, the book is not only profound in content, but at some points it is beautiful, almost lyrical, in style. The author believes that the latest scientific outlook is not unfriendly to a Christian view of the world. He is not the kind of man to genuflect in the presence of test tubes or a telescope, or to seek with feverish zeal some shadowy confirmation of his faith in the latest pronouncement of an Eddington, but he does rejoice in what he rightly considers evidence of divine design in the world of man and nature. Astronomy, biology, chemistry and the whole field of natural science combine in offering interesting and illuminating evidence in behalf of a purposeful universe.

Particularly revealing is Doctor Dearmer's discussion of Beauty and Goodness. He says, "God must love beauty and delight in it. We picture Him as a being whose very life and nature is to make beauty and to love it. Can He love goodness less? Our inmost and truest nature tells us that this cannot be. What then is the explanation? Is it not that God can produce beauty without any help from us? But goodness . . . cannot be made as beauty can, because it comes only from free choice. God cannot produce it without our help, because it needs the intervention of finite wills." Thus does the author describe the reason for the lamentable lag of goodness in our world.

Equally significant is Doctor Dearmer's approach to the nature and function of religious instinct and expression. Historically speaking, religion has been the greatest power in the world. With all its aberrations it has not functioned like an illusion, but "has moved the deepest springs of purpose and action." With this fact in mind we are not unreasonably led to believe that our current sophisticated and always shifting reactions against religion are symptomatic of the disease rather than the vitality of modern civilization.

HOBART D. MCKEEHAN.

The Abbey Church,
Huntingdon, Pa.

The Resources of Religion. By
GEORGIA HARKNESS. New York:
Henry Holt and Company, Inc.
\$2.00.

GEORGIA HARKNESS is one of a small group of women who have gone out into the intellectual and spiritual life of our generation to vindicate in themselves, and in the quality of their work, not only higher education among women but professional and spiritual leadership in the very highest sense.

In recent years a large amount of our theological studies have been distinctly secondary material. We are among men writers and now a rather small group of women writers entering into a new phase. There is far more intellectual power, spiritual insight and deep religious content in many of the volumes which are coming through our press than at any time since the War. Georgia Harkness' *The Resources of Religion* is the true title of one of these excellent books. Those of us who read her *Conflicts in Religious Thought* had a feeling that some such positive and constructive statement would come from her pen.

Being of a realistic type, Miss Harkness starts out by stating what religion is. She points out the sickness of religion, its two foci, what religion demands, and why religion exists. In as clear a chapter as the present reviewer has seen in recent years she asks what Christian religion demands in belief and morals and in Christlike personality. Miss Harkness then pushes on to a social application—What does Christian society mean, what ends and what means may it use? This particular section is covering for much literature by those who have the social vision but who would advocate the same methods of class warfare that one sees in the secular gospels floating about Europe.

In her treatment of the impotence of the Church, Miss Harkness has some of the Pauline quality of keeping the perfect ideal of the Church before her by dealing realistically with the existing order, and major liabilities of our ecclesiastical structure are designated as moral and spiritual lethargy, indifference to social orders, preoccupation with organization and finance, and denominational cleavage. To those who would be disheartened with so formidable an indictment, she has a chapter on areas of power which is refreshing and encouraging.

No such clear-eyed observer of life and of modern philosophy and religion as Miss Harkness would fail to overlook our enlightened paganism. In this section she treats in concise terms the secular ideals which have largely taken the place of religion in our generation. Economics, nationalism, science, culture are all revealed for what they are.

The text is not forgotten in this clear-headed volume. After having stated her problem, Miss Harkness hurries on to address herself to the problem of the knowledge of God through revelation and through induction.

The concluding chapter, "Laying Hold of God," is a fine example of how warm evangelical religion can be stated in persuasive terms to the modern mind. Religion in corporate and private worship, the Bible in the community, the Cross, the monotones of life, are all held to be, not the shackles which throttle existence, but sacramental media in which the grace of God can be manifested.

Enlightening, intelligent and compelling, this book ought to have a wide reading among ministers, thoughtful laymen, student secretaries and upper classmen whose curiosities have been aroused not only about the mysteries of religion but its practical aspects.

GEORGE STEWART.

Minister of
the Presbyterian Church,
Stamford, Conn.

Christianity in America: A Crisis.

By E. G. HOMRIGHAUSEN. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

THIS book is a skillful attempt to apply the message of Karl Barth to American church life. It sounds the alarm bell to Protestant churches to be on the alert against the secularism which, in this author's opinion, has so strong a hold in those churches. Doctor Homrighausen has taken to heart the warnings given by Barth, that the subservience of the Church to the State in Europe, and the control by unspiritual forces, such as the money-power, the craving for success, results, might soon appear in America. Indeed, the author claims that "these forces live a disguised life within the churches" already. And so he pleads that the churches may "rethink their very reason for existence as the Church of Jesus Christ," for the impending crisis will be between a real Church and one "having a name to live, but in reality

dead." In a vigorous analysis, which fills four chapters, he asserts that "secularism is in the Church's household," that they "have lost their vigorous, vigilant and uncompromising obedience to the God and Father of Jesus Christ, and Him alone!"

The first part of the book is a searching diagnosis of what is wrong in the churches. They are too sectarian, too denominational; little aware of "the Church universal" and the Church's long story in the past. There is too much "activism," pandering to human desires; even "liberty and democracy" may be as hostile to true religion as any Church and State connection. The chapter headed, "Sterile Intellectualism," attacks the false liberalism, the truckling to modern philosophy and psychology, which, it is said, "has been destructive of the cardinal fact of Protestantism," displacing "faith as a technique for discovering God, and God's radical revelation in Christ." He deplores the lack of reverence, the spectator attitude toward religion, and pleads for "existential thinking," by which is meant, the whole man is put in jeopardy, confronted by a choice which determines his whole existence. Here the theology of crisis is finely outlined. Another chapter headed, "Christianity too 'Religious,'" will cause deep searchings of heart: leaders of churches may well ponder it again and again. At the root of the mischief, according to this analysis, is lack of a sound theology based on divine revelation.

The second half of the book seeks to present the remedies. The preacher and his messages are examined and the exposure of ignorance of the Bible, of the unsatisfactory teaching in the seminaries, makes uncomfortable reading. Yet the importance of preaching is stressed with Barthian force. The Biblicalism of American Christianity is dissected: the

result being that the word of God Himself speaking is scarcely heard. Three chapters deal with "The Recovery of the Church," "Who is Jesus Christ?" and "The Christian Message." In these the author's positive views are put passionately, lucidly, convincingly: they deserve to be read and re-read and prayed over.

Reviewing the book as a whole, one feels that the writer has a just balance when assessing the weaknesses of the churches and the ministry, that he is right when stressing what is the vital core of the Christian message, but as Edmund Burke said, "you cannot indict a nation," and Christianity covers more than even Doctor Homrichausen, with his rich opportunities, can envisage. May not this very unrest be the convicting work of the Spirit of God? The spirit of this book is warmly commendable: the style is full of force and memorable sayings. Every minister and church officer should read this book which has as its one aim "to the glory of God."

R. BIRCH HOYLE.

London, England.

The Fate of the Family in the Modern World. By ARTHUR E. HOLT. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company. \$2.00.

DOCTOR HOLT has given us a book on the family which combines simplicity of treatment and popular appeal with penetrating insight and far-reaching suggestion. He pictures the bride and groom as they face life together and sketches lightly a background of the life cycle of the family, with the necessary question whether the national mind and the social economy are favorable to the legitimate aspirations of the young family builders.

To give a fuller framework of in-

terpretation, the democratic family of the western world is set over against the Oriental family, which represents "the totalitarian race," and the European family, which suggests "the totalitarian class." It is important to note what these other forms of family organization have that the family based on romantic marriage lacks, and what the American family has which these others lack. In a word, the romantic family is deficient in a sense of the larger social unity and in sense of devotion to the ongoing stream of life, the cosmic process of procreation. On the levels of higher privilege and in the urban environment the American family does not even reproduce itself.

This may be due more to unfavorable factors in the national economy than to anything inherent in the nature of democratic marriage.

Democratic marriage has its roots in free association and in competitive courtship. It frees the family from dominance by the other functions of society whether of the State or of the Church. It builds on love, satisfies the worthwhile elements of individualism and insures against caste. It has not, however, "accepted its responsibility as the center of a constellation of free social functions, each of which must exist for something more than itself." (P. 39.)

A major difficulty is that an excessive development of individualism leads to disintegration and blinds its devotees to the fact that the individual gains significance and secures the highest values of life only in loyally fulfilling the obligations of his group relationships.

The strategy of family betterment has to do with a new evaluation of family building as a part of building a more stable world order. We must have "families by conviction" to supplement

the inadequacy of romantic impulse as a total motive.

The democratic family will remain, in fact it is most worthy to persist; and even the other forms of family organization show modification in that direction. There must be, however, a shaping of national polity favorable to family values, in a family-centered economy. There must be on the part of individuals a sense of the importance of rearing strong, adequate families as compared with the mere money-making motive.

The Church is especially concerned with the family, which is the seed bed of its values and offers the best symbols for the interpretation of religion. Religion helps when it aids the process of creating stable character, when it reinforces the morale of the family and in proportion as it gives a sense of allegiance to a moral order which transcends the life of the particular family. Its ministers have a special opportunity of ministering to the inner strength of the family both at the time of the setting up of new homes and throughout their life cycle. The Church therefore must make preparation for family building and ministry to family life a major interest at the same time that it contends for outward conditions favorable to the little homes of the people.

L. FOSTER WOOD.

Federal Council of Churches,
Secretary, Marriage and the Home.

The Essence of Spiritual Religion.

By D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$1.50.

MANY who have been reading the writings of Rufus M. Jones for a generation or more have wondered who would take his place in the years to come. Clearly it would not be an easy place to

fill. He has spoken out of the great Quaker tradition, giving continued emphasis to a mystical type of religion. He has enlarged and enriched his spiritual inheritance through his own philosophical research and experience.

Then we heard about one of his students, who was appointed as Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Haverford College (more recently appointed as Chaplain of the University and Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at Stanford University). Evidently here was the heir apparent. Naturally great expectations were aroused. The admirers of Rufus Jones have been waiting to hear and read what this young man had to say. Those who have heard him know that he speaks with a strange insight and pertinence, even "as one having authority."

There have been articles here and there, as well as his work as editor of *The Friend*. Now comes this book, the first. An unusual preface is written by Dean Sperry, of Harvard, a distinguished teacher, evidently proud to introduce one of his students. The book is dedicated to Rufus M. Jones, to whom the author acknowledges that he owes a great debt. Elton Trueblood, however, is not the echo of any teacher. The reader quickly feels that the author is venturing out on his own, and is not bound by the limitations of an inherited faith or even by the positions of greatly respected teachers.

The book is written in the interrogative mood. The question is suggested in the title itself. Something of what is meant by spiritual religion is intimated by this quotation from William Penn: "The humble, meek, merciful, just, pious, and devout souls, are everywhere of one religion." Negatively, the position is stated as follows: "We are using spiritual as roughly opposed to *formal, literal, legal, ceremonial, hierarchical*,

sacerdotal, creedal, material, external, traditional."

Possibly the best short statement of what he has in mind appears in the opening sentences of a recent article by him. It runs as follows: "All spiritual religion rests upon certain fundamental insights which we can consider as the primitive propositions of our religious system. These primitive propositions can be reduced to two: First, God is one eternal loving Spirit; second, human souls are akin to God."

As Dean Sperry suggests in the introduction, we have here a "birthright" Quaker, to whom that faith is a sort of second nature. Having been confirmed in that position by rigorous examination he makes "a deliberate attempt to correct and supplement that faith by a recognition of the values inherent in the Catholic position." Such an effort is seldom made. The fact that it is done here gives unusual significance to what the author has to say under such chapter heads as "Worship in Spirit and in Truth," "The Extension of the Sacramental," "The Continuity of Revelation," "The Basis of Spiritual Authority," "The Abolition of the Laity," and "The Implications of Reverence."

In his Yale Lectures, entitled *The Renewing Gospel*, Walter Russell Bowie says, "A third mark of any message which seeks acceptance in this time ought to be that it is conceived not so much in terms of finality as of fertility." I am sure that Doctor Trueblood does not mean to speak a word of finality. He will, we hope, have other words to say, to carry us farther on the way in which he is traveling. However, I am confident that he has written words that are, as Doctor Bowie suggests, germinal with the quality of fertility.

Something of the incisive spirit in which the book is written appears in the

following quotation: "Our tool is not the pestle for the mixing of ingredients, but rather the scalpel by means of which the superfluous is carved away until the core of spiritual religion is displayed in its purity."

HORACE G. SMITH.

President of
Garrett Biblical Institute.

Motive and Method in a Christian Order.

By SIR JOSIAH STAMP.
New York: The Abingdon Press.
\$2.00.

CHANGES come quickly in this modern world, but it is probable that ministers and teachers of religion in the United States will carry on their tasks in a capitalistic regime. We may not like it. We may consider it unchristian and desire another economic order but the fact remains that capitalism, with more or less radical transformations, will be the economic system we are likely to know in this country. Neither Communism nor Fascism has many adherents here, though there is more danger of the latter than the former. In the world in which we live, this recent book by Sir Josiah Stamp is of great value. He gives it the title, *Motive and Method in a Christian Order*. Sir Josiah is Chairman of the L. M. and S. Railway, one of Great Britain's important railroads, a Governor of the Bank of England, and recognized as one of the world's ablest and most thoughtful economists. Through a close friendship, I have come to know the man as a democratic and humble Christian gentleman. His church commands his time; in both character and service he is loyal to the Methodist tradition. He probably holds more honorary degrees from earth's great universities than any other man living. In his book, Sir

Josiah discusses "Christianity and Economics in the Past," "Motive in the Economic Life," "The Christian Motive," and "The Spiritual Task of the Preacher." There is an appendix with an interesting "Economic Canon of the New Testament." The volume is an enlargement of the Fernley-Hartley Lecture delivered at the Methodist Conference in July, 1936. Says the author: "I would not make every preacher a technical economist or sociologist. But I would not warn any earnest amateur off the problems of economic society and assert that they are too involved for him. I would impress upon him that there are elements in them which depend upon him to a vital extent, and to which he can make an immense contribution, just as there are elements upon which he ought not to be pontifical without a mental discipline as severe as the human mind can endure. . . . Above all we must realize that a better society will make greater demands upon human character, and cannot fairly be expected in advance of it." Sir Josiah does not believe that Christianity must resolve problems in many fields; he believes that the value of Christianity consists in the case of a single man raised from sin to conquest, from feebleness to moral strength. He devotes a chapter to a discussion of motives in the present order, and another to the examination of the Christian motive. In the latter he finds three claims for the betterment of valuations—first the individual in his judgment of what life means; second, the emulation and expectation created in the environment; and third, the nature of the machine. The first and second he considers the preacher's opportunity. As for the third, he thinks it is a serious responsibility for the Church to advocate changes in technical organization whose essential needs

are pitched far beyond the average motives of the mass of men; the Church must be chary of giving promissory notes to social revolution until it has brought the wills of men within hail of the new demands upon human character.

The better society awaits better men. Sir Josiah does not agree with E. Stanley Jones in his interpretation of the New Testament passages which carry the Christian motive and obligation. He admires Doctor Jones but he does not feel that his reading of the New Testament is correct in *Christ's Alternative to Communism*.

Those who feel we must have a new economic order will consider this book too conservative. They will wonder whether what is economically sound is always morally sound, and whether you can change society by changing individuals. Are there not inherited customs and mores and attitudes which can be changed only by the collective will?

Even if one does not agree with the main position of the book he must regard it as very important in the economic controversies which threaten the life of the Church. It is an able and scholarly discussion which ought to be read by all parties to those controversies.

IVAN LEE HOLT.

President of the Federal
Council of Churches.

The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry. By WILLIAM S. SADLER, M. D. St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company. \$10.00.

DOCTOR SADLER has been well known for some years through his popular discussions and writings which have made realistic and dynamic many of the significant truths of psychiatry. He was a pioneer among the host of psychiatrists who have revealed to the common reader

the gospel of modern psychiatry. His latest book, *Theory and Practice of Psychiatry*, is the most pretentious product of his versatile pen. Each one of its five general divisions would make a competent book in itself: "The Theory of Psychiatry," "Personality Problem," "The Neuroses," "The Psychoses," "Psychotherapeutics."

Doctor Sadler's point of view and his technique in the set-up of this book may be challenged by some leaders in the field of psychiatry. He frankly believes religion is an asset in psychotherapy. Summarizing his chapter on "Religious Therapy" he carefully lists and discusses eleven ways in which this proves true. Yet he quite fairly points out twelve ways in which religion has proved to be a liability in psychic and emotional troubles. His point of view is clearly put: "The sincere acceptance of the principles and teachings of Christ . . . would at once wipe out more than one-half the difficulties, diseases and sorrows of the human race." Some psychiatrists, on the other hand, prefer to regard the dominant influence of the Christian religion as an escape mechanism from the troublesome realities of life. As a counter to this attitude, Doctor Sadler's discussion of the value of prayer is refreshing.

The technique in the set-up of the large volume may be criticized for it is somewhat repetitious. But this is essential if each topic is to be dealt with adequately without resorting to troublesome cross reference. The system of numbering and captioning each major and minor topic enables one quickly to find the subject he seeks. For this purpose the extensive index is also a great aid.

His position among psychiatrists is not Freudian, nor yet does he adhere to the individualism of Adler, the analytical school of Jung, or the behaviorism of

Watson. In the historical introduction these and other groups of psychologists are described, the author concluding by indicating his adherence to the "American School," which is an eclectic form of psychiatry. He says, "Though Freud, Adler, Jung, Watson, McDougall, and the Gestalt psychologists have their enthusiastic disciples, nevertheless the majority of American psychiatric practitioners are eclectic in their leanings."

Doctor Sadler's life work for thirty years has centered in the diagnosis and treatment of personality problems, neuroses, and psychoses, as one meets them day by day in the office or the private clinic. This book reflects that practical point of view. At the same time it adheres closely to the requirement of a scientific text book. It is a book to study and to place in one's reference library. The generous bibliography which follows each of its 77 chapters enriches its usefulness. I believe it adequately meets the declaration on its title page—"A reference handbook for psychologists, sociologists, pastors, and other professional readers."

J. G. VAUGHAN, M.D.
New York City.

A Fresh Approach to the New Testament and Early Christian Literature. By MARTIN DIBELIUS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00.

Gospel Criticism and Christology. By MARTIN DIBELIUS. London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, Ltd. 4s, 6d.

THE author of these volumes, Professor at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, has a double claim to attention, first as one who has opened up new and fruitful lines of investigation in the field of New Testament study, and second as

one who is active in the life of the Church, particularly as vice-chairman of the professorial commission of the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work. A former pupil of Gunkel and Harnack, Dibelius is the originator of what has since come to be called "form-criticism." This is a type of analysis applied to oral tradition by the aid of which students of the New Testament have been enabled to discover something of the history of our gospel material prior to the period of its codification in written form. The method is set forth in Dibelius' *From Tradition to Gospel*. In addition to providing new criteria of the historical value of our records concerning Jesus, form-criticism has endowed the process by which the New Testament writings came into existence with new life and vividness. This, the first of the two books under discussion here, clearly illustrates. It represents a complete departure from the traditional type of "New Testament Introduction," in which the various "books" are usually discussed under such headings as contents, purpose, date, place and authorship. Instead, we are told how the sayings of Jesus and the stories about Jesus were formulated and handed down finally to be compiled by the Evangelists, how prophecy, never failing in the Church, eventually produced Revelation and kindred works, how treatises, sermons and tractates (such as Ephesians, Hebrews and the Catholic Epistles) took on epistolary form in imitation of great letter-writers such as Paul, how exhortation concerned with ethical and ecclesiastical life led to the composition of James and the Pastoral Epistles, and what part Prayers and Hymns and traditions about the work of the early apostles played in the formation of our New Testament literature. In every instance the discussion necessarily overruns the traditional canonical

boundaries and ties the New Testament writings up more closely than before with the literature of the early Church in the days of the Apostolic Fathers. All this is refreshing to read and to see.

But Dibelius, though he is not a Barthian, is not inclined to believe that history or historical data alone can satisfy the claims and demands of faith. This comes to expression in the second of the two books under discussion here, the fruit of a series of lectures delivered at the University of London. The subject of these lectures is the old problem of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. Dibelius approaches it in a new way. Beginning with the difference in the point of view of the epistolary writers of the New Testament and the Evangelists as to the significance of Jesus' earthly life, he none the less finds it necessary to conclude that with their witness to the Jesus of history the latter combine the confession of Him as Lord and Messiah. Indeed, this combination persists in the tradition about Jesus as far back as form-criticism is able to trace its development. Severe limitations are thereby imposed upon the effort to construct a purely historical account of Jesus, but they are balanced for the Christian by the realization that all true description of Jesus is "from faith unto faith." So, too, the Church, which had an historical origin, is, and must needs be, the Word of eternity in time.

CARL H. KRAELING.

Yale University
Divinity School.

A Faith for Today. By HARRIS FRANKLIN RALL. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

DOCTOR RALL states explicitly for whom he writes: it is "the common man." Consequently, he discards the

usual technical terms of theology, and seeks to put into everyday speech the main things theologians deal with. In this he succeeds. For instance, pages and pages in the textbooks discuss the terms, transcendence, immanence; Doctor Rall's way is to say, "that God is more than the world and is in the world." That has its merits and its defects. One merit is that the mind swiftly grasps the thought conveyed: one defect is, "what lightly comes, lightly goes." The great words of theology carry with them an "aura," "trailing clouds of glory do they come," and when the "common man" passes on to the further reading suggested by the excellent lists of books attached at the end of each chapter, he may not grasp the meanings of terms. And yet, if the "common man," or the study circle, answers the leading questions added to each chapter, he or they will have some grasp of the problems that confront faith today.

Passing on from the style and method of writing to the contents, the reader will be struck by the wide range covered by the author. He takes up a host of themes, each of which has had volumes written on and about it. For instance, there are discussions on What Faith Means, What Religion Is and Does, What Is the Christian Religion? The Relations of Religion to Science, How to Know God, How to Think of God, God and the World, The Problem of Evil, What Is Man? The Meaning of Sin, of Salvation, The Ways of Life, What Prayer Means, The Place of the Bible, The Church in Religion, The Life to Come, and A Social Faith.

It must be said that Doctor Rall successfully indicates the important aspects of these varied themes, the *pros* and *cons* of debate, and presents very effectively

the results of many years of reading and reflection. And so the theologian and working pastor as well as "the common man" will be grateful for helpful guidance on subjects that, as he says, are "every man's concern because the supreme interest of life." One could wish that "every man" thought so. At any rate, if he takes up the book and reads it through, he will know of a certainty that Doctor Rall is convinced that these are the things man, fully developed, must live by.

Writing for "the common man" makes it difficult for the author to take his reader into the deep, solemn places where religion leads. He does not stay long enough to let the sublimity of revelation awe the soul; nor do we get the "tragic sense of existence" as the Spaniard, Unamuno, feels it so piercingly; nor the unbearable tension, as Viebuler has put it, of "moral man in an immoral society," nor the "gravity of sin" which only God could shift by dying at the hands of sinful men. Still, they may be due rather to "coming down and out" from these august themes to where the "common man" is, than to any willful omission on the author's part. For a "faith for today" soon carries one on in thought to the need for "a faith for eternity," and there what God does for man that man cannot do for himself looms larger and larger above the horizon of man's thought. Perhaps Doctor Rall will follow up this book with another on the above lines. For this book makes a first-rate preparation for deeper theology.

R. BIRCH HOYLE.

London, England.

Any of these books may be obtained through your regular book dealer.

Bookish Brevities

ON April 27, 1936, Dr. William Adams Brown, frequently referred to as the most influential of living theologians, ended his teaching of forty-four years in Union Theological Seminary with the noble lecture which appears as the first article in this issue of *RELIGION IN LIFE*. Always a leader in multiplied enterprises, Doctor Brown has retired to a wider and busier life than he has ever before undertaken.

Martin Dibelius, whose two books are reviewed on another page by Carl H. Kraeling, is to spend February and most of March in the United States. He will lecture at Yale and at twelve other universities and seminaries.

Conrad Skinner, author of *Concerning the Bible*, is an authority on rowing and is identical with Michael Maurice, the distinguished novelist and playwright.

The project of the National Preaching Mission, which is hailed as the greatest advance of the American Protestant Church in several decades, appeared in print for the first time in the article on "The Modern Approach to Evangelism," by Hugh Thomson Kerr, in the 1935 Autumn Number of *RELIGION IN LIFE*.

The ministry of Stanley Jones in India has been chiefly to the intellectuals in university centers. His *Christ's Alternative to Communism* has found there, as in this country, a different reading public from his other books, and has become the challenge to India's educated groups on behalf of her submerged millions, who

have been opening themselves to communistic teaching.

The modern man is an autonomous man, but an autonomous man whose belief in his own autonomy is shaken.—Paul Tillich.

Dean Willard L. Sperry announces that the Harvard Divinity School Annual will never recommend "potted, pre-digested" sermons, or "tips" for parish work.

When the *Saturday Review of Literature* twice referred to the Saint James Version of the Bible, various subscribers quickly called attention to the despite of King James.

Realism, though somewhat modified, continues to dominate the literary expression of our material civilization. Realism is the attempt to reproduce life as actually lived. As Taine said, it is characterized by the assemblage of little facts, well-chosen, important, significant, amply circumstantiated, and minutely noted. The time is ripening for a recovery of the aesthetic.

The State Publishing House of Russia is this year bringing out fifteen million volumes of the classics. An edition of twenty thousand copies of the *Odyssey* was quickly bought up, as have been large editions of Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus, and Aristophanes. Byron, Whitman, Heine, Goethe, Sinclair Lewis, and Pearl Buck are popular later writers.

The selection of the fifty most famous

graduates was a feature of Harvard's tercentenary celebration. Oliver Wendell Holmes, James Russell Lowell, George Bancroft, and Francis Parkman received the unanimous vote of the eight judges. Seven of the eight voted for Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Adams, William H. Prescott, and John L. Motley.

In the fifty-year jubilee number of *The British Weekly*, Professor R. Birch Hoyle, who is unsurpassed and perhaps unequalled as a reviewer of religious books, cited as the ten greatest theological books of the last half century: *The Influence of Greek Ideas*, Hibbert Lectures, 1890-91, E. Hatch; *The History of Dogma*, 7 vols., 1894-9, A. von Harnack; *Christ in Modern Theology*, 1893, A. M. Fairbairn; *What Is Christianity?* 1901, A. von Harnack; *Christian Mysticism*, 1899, W. R. Inge; *The Mystical Element in Religion*, 2 vols., 1909, Baron von Hügel; *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1912, William James; or *Atonement and Personality*, 1901, R. C. Moberly; *The Idea of the Holy*, 1927, R. Otto; *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, 1910, A. Schweitzer; *Prolegomena to the Word of God*, 1927-1935, Karl Barth.

In *New Faith for Old*, Shailer Mathews writes: "Repeatedly I have thought that Hell might be pictured as an everlasting committee meeting on a good cause that could not be brought to pass."

Dean Mathews lists as pioneers in

arousing the conscience of Christians to economic injustice, Washington Gladden, Josiah Strong, Lyman Abbott, George D. Herron, David J. Hill, Leighton Williams, Walter Rauschenbusch, Richard T. Ely, William D. Hyde, Graham Taylor, Charles R. Henderson, and Francis G. Peabody.

In Schreiber's *Portraits and Self-Portraits*, Professor Einstein writes: "For the most part, I do the thing which my own nature drives me to do. It is shameful to earn so much respect and love for it. Arrows of hate have been shot at me, but they never hit me because somehow they belonged to another world, with which I have no connection whatsoever. I live in that solitude which is painful in youth, but delicious in the years of maturity."

For four years the *Sunday Times* Book Exhibition has been one of the most popular annual events in the literary and artistic life of London. Similar fairs have been held this year in Toronto and in New York, and in both cities have been successful beyond the fondest hopes of their promoters. The New York Fair, which was sponsored by the *New York Times* and the National Association of Book Publishers, was visited by 85,000 persons in fifteen days. On the day set apart for the special recognition of religious books 4,312 passed through the turnstiles. Obviously there are more book-conscious people than have been recognized and the influence of the book fairs multiplies their number.